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Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory

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Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory

Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman

I. INTRODUCTION

There has been an explosion of interest in the concept of citizenship among political theorists. In 1978, it could be confidently stated that “the concept of citizenship has gone out of fashion among political thinkers” (van Gunsteren 1978, p. 9). Fifteen years later, citizenship has become the “buzz word” among thinkers on all points of the political spectrum (Heater 1990, p. 293; Vogel and Moran 1991, p. x).

There are a number of reasons for this renewed interest in citizenship in the 1990s. At the level of theory, it is a natural evolution in political discourse because the concept of citizenship seems to integrate the demands of justice and community membership—the central concepts of political philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively. Citizenship is intimately linked to ideas of individual entitlement on the one hand and of attachment to a particular community on the other. Thus it may help clarify what is really at stake in the debate between liberals and communitarians.

Interest in citizenship has also been sparked by a number of recent political events and trends throughout the world—increasing voter apathy and long-term welfare dependency in the United States, the resurgence of nationalist movements in Eastern Europe, the stresses created by an increasingly multicultural and multiracial population in Western Europe, the backlash against the welfare state in Thatcher’s England, the failure of environmental policies that rely on voluntary citizen cooperation, and so forth.

These events have made clear that the health and stability of a modern democracy depends, not only on the justice of its ‘basic structure’ but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens:¹ for example,

1. Rawls says that the “basic structure” of society is the primary subject of a theory of justice (Rawls 1971, p. 7; Rawls 1993, pp. 257–89).

their sense of identity and how they view potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from themselves; their desire to participate in the political process in order to promote the public good and hold political authorities accountable; their willingness to show self-restraint and exercise personal responsibility in their economic demands and in personal choices which affect their health and the environment. Without citizens who possess these qualities, democracies become difficult to govern, even unstable.² As Habermas notes, “the institutions of constitutional freedom are only worth as much as a population makes of them” (Habermas 1992, p. 7).

It is not surprising, then, that there should be increasing calls for ‘a theory of citizenship’ that focuses on the identity and conduct of individual citizens, including their responsibilities, loyalties, and roles. There are, however, at least two general hazards in this quest. First,³ the scope of a ‘theory of citizenship’ is potentially limitless—almost every problem in political philosophy involves relations among citizens or between citizens and the state. In this survey we try to avoid this danger by concentrating on two general issues that citizenship theorists claim have been neglected due to the overemphasis in recent political philosophy on structures and institutions—namely, civic virtues and citizenship identity.³

The second danger for a theory of citizenship arises because there are two different concepts which are sometimes conflated in these discussions: citizenship-as-legal-status, that is, as full membership in a particular political community; and citizenship-as-desirable-activity, where the extent and quality of one’s citizenship is a function of one’s participation in that community.

As we shall see in the next section, most writers believe that an adequate theory of citizenship requires greater emphasis on responsibilities and virtues. Few of them, however, are proposing that we should revise our account of citizenship-as-legal-status in a way that would, say, strip apathetic people of their citizenship. Instead, these authors are generally concerned with the requirements of being a ‘good citizen’. But we should expect a theory of the good citizen to be relatively independent of the legal question of what it is to be a citizen, just as a theory of the good person is distinct from the meta-physical (or legal) question of what it is to be a person. While most

2. This may account for the recent interest in citizenship promotion among governments (e.g., Britain’s Commission on Citizenship, *Encouraging Citizenship* [1990]; Senate of Australia, *Active Citizenship Revisited* [1991]; Senate of Canada, *Canadian Citizenship: Sharing the Responsibility* [1993]).

3. One issue we will not discuss is immigration and naturalization policy (e.g., Brubaker 1989; van Gunsteren 1988).

theorists respect this distinction in developing their own theories, we shall discuss in Section IV a fairly widespread tendency to ignore it when criticizing others' theories of citizenship—for example, by contrasting their own 'thick' conception of citizenship-as-activity with an opponent's 'thin' conception of citizenship-as-status.

II. THE POSTWAR ORTHODOXY

Before describing the new work on citizenship, it is necessary to outline quickly the view of citizenship that is implicit in much postwar political theory and that is defined almost entirely in terms of the possession of rights.

The most influential exposition of this postwar conception of citizenship-as-rights is T. H. Marshall's "Citizenship and Social Class," written in 1949.⁴ According to Marshall, citizenship is essentially a matter of ensuring that everyone is treated as a full and equal member of society. And the way to ensure this sense of membership is through according people an increasing number of citizenship rights.

Marshall divides citizenship rights into three categories which he sees as having taken hold in England in three successive centuries: civil rights, which arose in the eighteenth century; political rights, which arose in the nineteenth century; and social rights—for example, to public education, health care, unemployment insurance, and old-age pension—which have become established in this century (Marshall 1965, pp. 78 ff.).⁵ And with the expansion of the rights of citizenship, he notes, there was also an expansion of the class of citizens. Civil and political rights that had been restricted to white property-owning Protestant men were gradually extended to women, the working class, Jews and Catholics, blacks, and other previously excluded groups.

For Marshall, the fullest expression of citizenship requires a liberal-democratic welfare state. By guaranteeing civil, political, and social rights to all, the welfare state ensures that every member of society feels like a full member of society, able to participate in and enjoy the common life of society. Where any of these rights are withheld or violated, people will be marginalized and unable to participate.

This is often called "passive" or "private" citizenship, because of its emphasis on passive entitlements and the absence of any obligation

4. Reprinted in Marshall (1965). For a concise introduction to the history of citizenship, see Heater (1990) and Walzer (1989).

5. It is often noted how idiosyncratically English this history is. In many European countries most of this progress occurred only in the past fifty years, and often in reverse order. Even in England, the historical evidence supports an "ebb and flow model" of citizenship rights, rather than a "unilinear" model (Heater 1990, p. 271; Parry 1991, p. 167; Held 1989, p. 193; Turner 1989).

to participate in public life. It is still widely supported,⁶ and with good reason: “the benefits of private citizenship are not to be sneezed at: they place certain basic human goods (security, prosperity, and freedom) within the grasp of nearly all, and that is nothing less than a fantastic human achievement” (Macedo 1990, p. 39).

Nevertheless, this orthodox postwar conception of citizenship has come increasingly under attack in the past decade. For the purposes of this article, we can identify two sets of criticisms. The first set focuses on the need to supplement (or replace) the passive acceptance of citizenship rights with the active exercise of citizenship responsibilities and virtues, including economic self-reliance, political participation, and even civility. These issues are discussed in Section III.

The second set focuses on the need to revise the current definition of citizenship to accommodate the increasing social and cultural pluralism of modern societies. Can citizenship provide a common experience, identity, and allegiance for the members of society? Is it enough simply to include historically excluded groups on an equal basis, or are special measures sometimes required? This issue is discussed in Section IV.

III. THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND VIRTUES OF CITIZENSHIP

A. The New Right Critique of Social Citizenship and the Welfare State

The first, and most politically powerful, critique of the postwar orthodoxy came from the New Right's attack on the idea of “social rights.” These rights had always been resisted by the right, on the grounds that they were (a) inconsistent with the demands of (negative) freedom or (desert-based) justice, (b) economically inefficient, and (c) steps down ‘the road to serfdom’. But in the public's eye, these arguments were seen as either implausible or, at any rate, as justifiably outweighed by considerations of social justice or by a citizenship-based defense of the welfare state such as Marshall's.

One of the revolutions in conservative thinking during the Thatcher/Reagan years was the willingness to engage the left in battle over the domain of social citizenship itself. Whereas Marshall had argued that social rights enable the disadvantaged to enter the mainstream of society and effectively exercise their civil and political rights, the New Right argues that the welfare state has promoted passivity among the poor, without actually improving their life chances, and

6. When asked what citizenship means to them, people are much more likely to talk about rights than responsibilities. This is true in Britain as well as the United States, although the British tend to emphasize social rights (e.g., to public education and health care), whereas Americans usually mention civil rights (e.g., freedom of speech and religion) (King and Waldron 1988; Conover et al. 1991, p. 804). For most people, citizenship is, as the U.S. Supreme Court once put it, “the right to have rights” (*Trop v. Dulles* 356 U.S. 86, 102 [1958]).

created a culture of dependency. Far from being the solution, the welfare state has itself perpetuated the problem by reducing citizens to passive dependents who are under bureaucratic tutelage. According to Norman Barry, there is no evidence that welfare programs have in fact promoted more active citizenship (Barry 1990, pp. 43–53).

The New Right believes that the model of passive citizenship underestimated the extent to which fulfilling certain obligations is a precondition for being accepted as a full member of society. In particular, by failing to meet the obligation to support themselves, the long-term unemployed are a source of shame for society as well as themselves (Mead 1986, p. 240).⁷ Failure to fulfill common obligations is as much of an obstacle to full membership as the lack of equal rights. In these circumstances, “to obligate the dependent as others are obligated is essential to equality, not opposed to it. An effective welfare [policy] must include recipients in the common obligations of citizens rather than exclude them” (Mead 1986, pp. 12–13).

According to the New Right, to ensure the social and cultural integration of the poor, we must go “beyond entitlement,” and focus instead on their responsibility to earn a living. Since the welfare state discourages people from becoming self-reliant, the safety net should be cut back and any remaining welfare benefits should have obligations tied to them. This is the idea behind one of the principal reforms of the welfare system in the 1980s: “workfare” programs, which require welfare recipients to work for their benefits, to reinforce the idea that citizens should be self-supporting.

This New Right vision of citizenship has not gone unchallenged. For example, the claim that the rise of an unemployed welfare-underclass is due to the availability of welfare ignores the impact of global economic restructuring, and sits uncomfortably with the fact that many of the most extensive welfare states (in Scandinavia, e.g.) have traditionally enjoyed among the lowest unemployment rates.

Moreover, critics charge, it is difficult to find any evidence that the New Right reforms of the 1980s have promoted responsible citizenship. These reforms aimed to extend the scope of markets in people’s lives—through freer trade, deregulation, tax cuts, the weakening of trade unions, and the tightening of unemployment benefits—in part in order to teach people the virtues of initiative, self-reliance, and self-sufficiency (Mulgan 1991, p. 43).

Instead, however, many market deregulations arguably made possible an era of unprecedented greed and economic irresponsibility, as

7. For evidence that there is a set of social expectations that Americans have of each other, and of themselves, that must be fulfilled if people are to be perceived as full members of society, see Mead (1986, p. 243); Shklar (1991, p. 413); Moon (1988, pp. 34–35); Dworkin (1992, p. 131).

evidenced by the savings and loan and junk bond scandals in America (Mulgan 1991, p. 39). Also, cutting welfare benefits, far from getting the disadvantaged back on their feet, has expanded the underclass. Class inequalities have been exacerbated, and the working poor and unemployed have been effectively “disenfranchised,” unable to participate in the new economy of the New Right (Fierlbeck 1991, p. 579; Hoover and Plant 1988, chap. 12).⁸

For many, therefore, the New Right program is most plausibly seen not as an alternative account of citizenship but as an assault on the very principle of citizenship. As Plant puts it, “Instead of accepting citizenship as a political and social status, modern Conservatives have sought to reassert the role of the market and have rejected the idea that citizenship confers a status independent of economic standing” (Plant 1991, p. 52; cf. Heater 1990, p. 303; King 1987, pp. 196–98).

B. Rethinking Social Citizenship

Given these difficulties with the New Right critique of welfare entitlements, most people on the left continue to defend the principle that full citizenship requires social rights. For the left, Marshall’s argument that people can be full members and participants in the common life of society only if their basic needs are met “is as strong now . . . as it ever was” (Ignatieff 1989, p. 72). However, many on the left accept that the existing institutions of the welfare state are unpopular, in part because they seem to promote passivity and dependence, and to “facilitate a privatist retreat from citizenship and a particular ‘clientalization’ of the citizen’s role” (Habermas 1992, pp. 10–11; cf. King 1987, pp. 45–46).

How then should the state foster self-reliance and personal responsibility? The left has responded ambivalently to issues such as ‘workfare’. On the one hand, the principle of personal responsibility and social obligation has always been at the heart of socialism (Mulgan 1991, p. 39). A duty to work is, after all, implicit in Marx’s famous slogan, “From each according to his talents, to each according to his needs.” Some people on the left, therefore, express qualified acceptance of workfare, if it “gives both responsibility and the power to use it” (Mulgan 1991, p. 46).

On the other hand, most people on the left remain uncomfortable with imposing obligations as a matter of public policy. They believe that the dependent are kept out of the mainstream of society because

8. Some people on the right have recognized this danger with a purely market-based conception of citizenship and have sought to supplement it with an emphasis on volunteerism and charity. See the discussion of the British Conservative party’s citizenship rhetoric in Fierlbeck (1991, p. 589), Andrews (1991, p. 13), and Heater (1990, p. 303).

of a lack of opportunities, such as jobs, education, and training, not because of any desire to avoid work. Imposing obligations, therefore, is futile if genuine opportunities are absent, and unnecessary if those opportunities are present, since the vast majority of people on welfare would prefer not to be (King 1987, pp. 186–91; Fullinwider 1988, pp. 270–78). Rather than impose an obligation to work, the left would try to achieve full employment through, for example, worker-training programs. So while the left accepts the general principle that citizenship involves both rights and responsibilities, it feels that rights to participate must, in a sense, precede the responsibilities—that is, it is only appropriate to demand fulfillment of the responsibilities after the rights to participate are secured.

A similar rejection of the New Right's view of citizenship can be found in recent feminist discussions of citizenship. Many feminists accept the importance of balancing rights and responsibilities—indeed, Carol Gilligan's findings suggest that women, in their everyday moral reasoning, prefer the language of responsibility to the language of rights (Gilligan 1982, p. 19). But feminists have grave doubts about the New Right rhetoric of economic self-sufficiency. Gender-neutral talk about "self-reliance" is often a code for the view that men should financially support the family, while women should look after the household and care for the elderly, the sick, and the young. This reinforces, rather than eliminates, the barriers to women's full participation in society.⁹

When the New Right talks about self-reliance, the boundaries of the "self" include the family—it is families that should be self-reliant. Hence, greater "self-reliance" is consistent with, and may even require, greater dependency within the family. Yet women's dependence on men within the family can be every bit as harmful as welfare dependency, since it allows men to exercise unequal power over decisions regarding sex, reproduction, consumption, leisure, and so on (King 1987, p. 47; Okin 1989, pp. 128–29).

Since perceptions of responsibility tend to fall unequally on women, many feminists share the left's view that rights to participate must, in a sense, precede responsibilities. Indeed, feminists wish to expand the list of social rights, in order to tackle structural barriers to women's full participation as citizens that the welfare state currently ignores, or even exacerbates, such as the unequal distribution of domestic responsibilities (Phillips 1991a, 1991b; Okin 1992). Given the

9. The New Right's emphasis on self-reliance puts women in a double bind. If they stay home and care for their children, they are accused of failing to live up to their duty to be self-supporting. (Hence the stereotype of irresponsible welfare mothers.) If they seek to earn a living, however, they are accused of failing to live up to their family responsibilities.

difficulty of combining family and public responsibilities, equal citizenship for women is impossible until workplaces and career expectations are rearranged to allow more room for family responsibilities and until men accept their share of domestic responsibilities (Okin 1989, pp. 175–77).

However, if rights must precede responsibilities, it seems we are back to the old view of passive citizenship. Yet the left, as much as the right, accepts the need for change. The most popular proposal is to decentralize and democratize the welfare state—for example, by giving local welfare agencies more power and making them accountable to their clients (Pierson 1991, pp. 200–207). Hence the now-familiar talk of “empowering” welfare recipients by supplementing welfare rights with democratic participatory rights in the administration of welfare programs.

This is the central theme of the contemporary left view of social citizenship.¹⁰ Whether it will work to overcome welfare dependency is difficult to say. Service providers have often resisted attempts to increase their accountability (Rustin 1991, p. 231; Pierson 1991, pp. 206–7). Moreover, there may be some tension between the goal of increasing democratic accountability to the local community and increasing accountability to clients (Plant 1990, p. 30). As we discuss in the next section, the left may have excessive faith in the ability of democratic participation to solve the problems of citizenship.

C. The Need for Civic Virtues

Many classical liberals believed that a liberal democracy could be made secure, even in the absence of an especially virtuous citizenry, by creating checks and balances. Institutional and procedural devices such as the separation of powers, a bicameral legislature, and federalism would all serve to block would-be oppressors. Even if each person pursued her own self-interest, without regard for the common good, one set of private interests would check another set of private interests.¹¹ However, it has become clear that procedural-institutional

10. Another theme in recent left writing on citizenship is the importance of constitutional rights. Indeed, the left’s reconciliation with liberal rights “is one of the major theoretical phenomena of our times” (Phillips 1991b, p. 13; Andrews 1991, pp. 207–11; Sedley 1991, p. 226).

11. Kant thought that the problem of good government “can be solved even for a race of devils” (quoted in Galston 1991, p. 215). Of course, other liberals recognized the need for civic virtue, including Locke, Mill, and the British Idealists (see Vincent and Plant 1984, chap. 1). See also Carens (1986) and Deigh (1988), who argue that basic liberal rights and principles ground a fairly extensive range of positive social duties and responsibilities, including the obligation to make good use of one’s talents, to vote, to fulfill the responsibilities of one’s office, and to aid in the defense of one’s country, as well as the duty to protect and educate one’s children.

mechanisms to balance self-interest are not enough, and that some level of civic virtue and public-spiritedness is required (Galston 1991, pp. 217, 244; Macedo 1990, pp. 138–39).

Consider the many ways that public policy relies on responsible personal lifestyle decisions: the state will be unable to provide adequate health care if citizens do not act responsibly with respect to their own health, in terms of a healthy diet, exercise, and the consumption of liquor and tobacco; the state will be unable to meet the needs of children, the elderly, or the disabled if citizens do not agree to share this responsibility by providing some care for their relatives; the state cannot protect the environment if citizens are unwilling to reduce, reuse, and recycle in their own homes; the ability of the government to regulate the economy can be undermined if citizens borrow immoderate amounts or demand excessive wage increases; attempts to create a fairer society will flounder if citizens are chronically intolerant of difference and generally lacking in what Rawls calls a sense of justice (Rawls 1971, pp. 114–16, 335). Without cooperation and self-restraint in these areas, “the ability of liberal societies to function successfully progressively diminishes” (Galston 1991, p. 220; Macedo 1990, p. 39).

In short, we need “a fuller, richer and yet more subtle understanding and practice of citizenship,” because “what the state needs from the citizenry cannot be secured by coercion, but only cooperation and self-restraint in the exercise of private power” (Cairns and Williams 1985, p. 43). Yet there is growing fear that the civility and public-spiritedness of citizens of liberal democracies may be in serious decline (Walzer 1992, p. 90).¹²

An adequate conception of citizenship, therefore, seems to require a balance of rights and responsibilities. Where do we learn these virtues? The New Right relies heavily on the market as a school of virtue. But there are other answers to this question.

1. *The left and participatory democracy.*—As we just noted, one of the left’s responses to the problem of citizen passivity is to “empower” citizens by democratizing the welfare state and, more generally, by dispersing state power through local democratic institutions, regional assemblies, and judicable rights. However, emphasizing participation does not yet explain how to ensure that citizens participate responsibly—that is, in a public-spirited, rather than self-interested or prejudiced, way.

12. According to a recent survey, only 12 percent of American teenagers said voting was important to being a good citizen. Moreover, this apathy is not just a function of youth—comparisons with similar surveys from the previous fifty years suggest that “the current cohort knows less, cares less, votes less, and is less critical of its leaders and institutions than young people have been at any time over the past five decades” (Glendon 1991, p. 129). The evidence from Great Britain is similar (Heater 1990, p. 215).

Indeed, as Mulgan notes, “by concentrating too narrowly on the need to devolve power and on the virtues of freedom, issues of responsibility have been pushed to the margins” (Mulgan 1991, pp. 40–41). Empowered citizens may use their power irresponsibly by pushing for benefits and entitlements they cannot ultimately afford, or by voting themselves tax breaks and slashing assistance to the needy, or by “seeking scapegoats in the indolence of the poor, the strangeness of ethnic minorities, or the insolence and irresponsibility of modern women” (Fierlbeck 1991, p. 592).

Following Rousseau and J. S. Mill, many modern participatory democrats assume that political participation itself will teach people responsibility and toleration. As Oldfield notes, they place their faith in the activity of participation “as the means whereby individuals may become accustomed to perform the duties of citizenship. Political participation enlarges the minds of individuals, familiarizes them with interests which lie beyond the immediacy of personal circumstance and environment, and encourages them to acknowledge that public concerns are the proper ones to which they should pay attention” (Oldfield 1990b, p. 184).

Many people on the left have tried in this way to bypass the issue of responsible citizenship “by dissolving [it] into that of democracy itself,” which in turn has led to the “advocacy of collective decision-making as a resolution to all the problems of citizenship” (Held 1991, p. 23; cf. Pierson 1991, p. 202).¹³ Unfortunately, this faith in the educative function of participation seems overly optimistic (Oldfield 1990b, p. 184; Mead 1986, p. 247; Andrews 1991, p. 216).

Hence there is increasing recognition that citizenship responsibilities should be incorporated more explicitly into left-wing theory (Hoover and Plant 1988, pp. 289–91; Vogel and Moran 1991, p. xv; Mouffe 1992a). But it seems clear that the left has not yet found a language of responsibility that it is comfortable with, or a set of concrete policies to promote these responsibilities.¹⁴

2. *Civic republicanism.*—The modern civic republican tradition is an extreme form of participatory democracy largely inspired by Machiavelli and Rousseau (who were in turn enamored with the Greeks and Romans). It is not surprising that the recent upsurge of interest in citizenship has given civic republicans a wider audience.

13. See Arneson (1992, pp. 488–92) for a range of potential conflicts between democratic procedures and socialist goals. As Dworkin notes, there is a danger of making democracy “a black hole into which all other political virtues collapse” (1992, p. 132).

14. The left neglected many of these issues for decades, on the ground that a concern with “citizenship” was bourgeois ideology. The very language of citizenship was “alien” (Selbourne 1991, p. 94; van Gunsteren 1978, p. 9; Dietz 1992, p. 70; Wolin 1992, p. 241; Andrews 1991, p. 13).

The feature that distinguishes civic republicans from other participationists, such as the left-wing theorists discussed above, is their emphasis on the intrinsic value of political participation for the participants themselves. Such participation is, in Oldfield's words, "the highest form of human living-together that most individuals can aspire to" (Oldfield 1990a, p. 6). On this view, political life is superior to the merely private pleasures of family, neighborhood, and profession and so should occupy the center of people's lives. Failure to participate in politics makes one a "radically incomplete and stunted being" (Oldfield 1990b, p. 187; cf. Pocock 1992, pp. 45, 53; Skinner 1992; Beiner 1992).

As its proponents admit, this conception is markedly at odds with the way most people in the modern world understand both citizenship and the good life. Most people find the greatest happiness in their family life, work, religion, or leisure, not in politics. Political participation is seen as an occasional, and often burdensome, activity needed to ensure that government respects and supports their freedom to pursue these personal occupations and attachments. This assumption that politics is a means to private life is shared by most people on the left (Ignatieff 1989, pp. 72–73) and right (Mead 1986, p. 254), as well as by liberals (Rawls 1971, pp. 229–30), civil society theorists (Walzer 1989, p. 215), and feminists (Elshtain 1981, p. 327), and defines the modern view of citizenship.

In order to explain the modern indifference to political participation, civic republicans often argue that political life today has become impoverished compared to the active citizenship of, say, ancient Greece. Political debate is no longer meaningful and people lack access to effective participation.

But it is more plausible to view our attachment to private life as a result not of the impoverishment of public life but of the enrichment of private life. We no longer seek gratification in politics because our personal and social life is so much richer than the Greeks'. There are many reasons for this historical change, including the rise of romantic love and the nuclear family (and its emphasis on intimacy and privacy), increased prosperity (and hence richer forms of leisure and consumption), the Christian commitment to the dignity of labor (which the Greeks despised), and the growing dislike for war (which the Greeks esteemed).

Those passive citizens who prefer the joys of family and career to the duties of politics are not necessarily misguided. As Galston has put it, republicans who denigrate private life as tedious and self-absorbed show no delight in real communities of people, and indeed are "contemptuous" of "everyday life" (Galston 1991, pp. 58–63).¹⁵

15. Civic republicans rarely defend their conception of value at length. For example, after asserting that political life is "the highest form of human living-together that

3. *Civil society theorists.*—We shall use the label ‘civil society theorists’ to identify a recent development from communitarian thought in the 1980s. These theorists emphasize the necessity of civility and self-restraint to a healthy democracy but deny that either the market or political participation is sufficient to teach these virtues. Instead, it is in the voluntary organizations of civil society—churches, families, unions, ethnic associations, cooperatives, environmental groups, neighborhood associations, women’s support groups, charities—that we learn the virtues of mutual obligation. As Walzer puts it, “the civility that makes democratic politics possible can only be learned in the associational networks” of civil society (Walzer 1992, p. 104).

Because these groups are voluntary, failure to live up to the responsibilities that come with them is usually met simply with disapproval rather than legal punishment. Yet because the disapproval comes from family, friends, colleagues, or comrades, it is in many ways a more powerful incentive to act responsibly than punishment by an impersonal state. It is here that “human character, competence, and capacity for citizenship are formed,” for it is here that we internalize the idea of personal responsibility and mutual obligation and learn the voluntary self-restraint which is essential to truly responsible citizenship (Glendon 1991, p. 109).

It follows, therefore, that one of the first obligations of citizenship is to participate in civil society. As Walzer notes, “Join the association of your choice” is “not a slogan to rally political militants, and yet that is what civil society requires” (Walzer 1992, p. 106).

The claim that civil society is the “seedbed of civic virtue” (Glendon 1991, p. 109) is essentially an empirical claim, for which there is little hard evidence one way or the other. It is an old and venerable view, but it is not obviously true. It may be in the neighborhood that we learn to be good neighbors, but neighborhood associations also teach people to operate on the “NIMBY” (not in my backyard) principle when it comes to the location of group homes or public works. Similarly, the family is often “a school of despotism” that teaches male dominance over women (Okin 1992, p. 65); churches often teach

most individuals can aspire to,” Oldfield goes on to say, “I shall not argue for this moral point. It has in any case been argued many times within the corpus of civic republican writing” (1990a, p. 6). But many critics have argued that these earlier defenses rest on sexism and denigration of the private sphere (e.g., Vogel 1991, p. 68; Young 1989, p. 253; Phillips 1991b, p. 49) or on ethnic exclusiveness (Habermas 1992, p. 8). Skinner’s argument seems to be that while political participation may only have instrumental value for most people, we must get people to view it as if it has intrinsic value, or else they will not withstand internal or external threats to democracy (Skinner 1992, pp. 219–21). For discussions of the relationship between republican conceptions of the good and liberalism, see Dworkin (1989, pp. 499–504), Taylor (1989, pp. 177–81), Hill (1993, pp. 67–84), and Sinopoli (1992, pp. 163–71).

deference to authority and intolerance of other faiths; ethnic groups often teach prejudice against other races; and so on.

Walzer recognizes that most people are “trapped in one or another subordinate relationship, where the ‘civility’ they learned was deferential rather than independent and active.” In these circumstances, he says, we have to “reconstruct” the associational network “under new conditions of freedom and equality.” Similarly, when the activities of some associations “are narrowly conceived, partial and particularist,” then “they need political correction.” Walzer calls his view “critical associationalism” to signify that the associations of civil society may need to be reformed in the light of principles of citizenship (Walzer 1992, pp. 106–7).

But this may go too far in the other direction. Rather than supporting voluntary associations, this approach may unintentionally license wholesale intervention in them. Governments must of course intervene to protect the rights of people inside and outside the group if these rights are threatened. But do we want governments to reconstruct churches, for example, to make them more internally democratic, or to make sure that their members learn to be independent rather than deferential? And, in any event, wouldn’t reconstructing churches, families, or unions to make them more internally democratic start to undermine their essentially uncoerced and voluntary character, which is what supposedly made them the seedbeds of civic virtue?

Civil society theorists demand too much of these voluntary associations in expecting them to be the main school for, or small-scale replica of, democratic citizenship. While these associations may teach civic virtue, that is not their *raison d’être*. The reason why people join churches, families, or ethnic organizations is not to learn civic virtue. It is, rather, to honor certain values and enjoy certain human goods, and these motives may have little to do with the promotion of citizenship.

Joining a religious or ethnic association may be more a matter of withdrawing from the mainstream of society than of learning how to participate in it. To expect parents, priests, or union members to organize the internal life of their groups to promote citizenship maximally is to ignore why these groups exist in the first place. (Some associations, like the Boy Scouts, are designed to promote citizenship, but they are the exception, not the rule.)¹⁶

A similar issue arises with theorists of “maternal citizenship,” who focus on the family, and mothering in particular, as the school of

16. Also, it is difficult to see how even reconstructed groups could teach what some regard as an essential aspect of citizenship—namely, a common identity and sense of purpose (Phillips 1991b, pp. 117–18). We discuss this in Sec. IV below.

responsibility and virtue. According to Jean Elshtain and Sara Ruddick, mothering teaches women about the responsibility to conserve life and protect the vulnerable, and these lessons should become the guiding principles of political life as well. For example, mothering involves a “metaphysical attitude” of “holding,” which gives priority to the protection of existing relationships over the acquisition of new benefits (Elshtain 1981, pp. 326–27, 349–53; Ruddick 1987, p. 242). This has obvious implications for decisions about war or the environment.

However, some critics argue that mothering does not involve the same attributes or virtues as citizenship and that there is no evidence that maternal attitudes such as “holding” promote democratic values such as “active citizenship, self-government, egalitarianism, and the exercise of freedom” (Dietz 1985, p. 30; Nauta 1992, p. 31). As Dietz puts it, “An enlightened despotism, a welfare-state, a single-party bureaucracy and a democratic republic may all respect mothers, protect children’s lives and show compassion for the vulnerable” (Dietz 1992, p. 76).

This criticism parallels that of civil society theories. Both maternal feminists and civil society theorists define citizenship in terms of the virtues of the private sphere. But while these virtues may sometimes be necessary for good citizenship, they are not sufficient, and may sometimes be counterproductive.

4. *Liberal virtue theory.*—Liberals are often blamed for the current imbalance between rights and responsibilities, and not without reason. Liberal theorists in the 1970s and 1980s focused almost exclusively on the justification of rights and of the institutions to secure these rights, without attending to the responsibilities of citizens. Many critics believe that liberals are incapable of righting this imbalance, since the liberal commitment to liberty or neutrality or individualism renders the concept of civic virtue unintelligible (Mouffe 1992a).

However, some of the most interesting work on the importance of civic virtue is in fact being done by liberals such as Amy Gutmann, Stephen Macedo, and William Galston. According to Galston, the virtues required for responsible citizenship can be divided into four groups: (i) general virtues: courage, law-abidingness, loyalty; (ii) social virtues: independence, open-mindedness; (iii) economic virtues: work ethic, capacity to delay self-gratification, adaptability to economic and technological change; and (iv) political virtues: capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, willingness to demand only what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness to engage in public discourse (Galston 1991, pp. 221–24).

It is the last two virtues—the ability to question authority and the willingness to engage in public discourse—which are the most distinctive components of liberal virtue theory. The need to question authority arises in part from the fact that citizens in a representative

democracy elect representatives who govern in their name. Hence, an important responsibility of citizens is to monitor those officials and judge their conduct.

The need to engage in public discourse arises from the fact that the decisions of government in a democracy should be made publicly, through free and open discussion. But as Galston notes, the virtue of public discourse is not just the willingness to participate in politics or to make one's views known. Rather, it "includes the willingness to listen seriously to a range of views which, given the diversity of liberal societies, will include ideas the listener is bound to find strange and even obnoxious. The virtue of political discourse also includes the willingness to set forth one's own views intelligibly and candidly as the basis for a politics of persuasion rather than manipulation or coercion" (Galston 1991, p. 227).

Macedo calls this the virtue of "public reasonableness." Liberal citizens must give reasons for their political demands, not just state preferences or make threats. Moreover, these reasons must be "public" reasons, in the sense that they are capable of persuading people of different faiths and nationalities. Hence it is not enough to invoke Scripture or tradition.¹⁷ Liberal citizens must justify their political demands in terms that fellow citizens can understand and accept as consistent with their status as free and equal citizens. It requires a conscientious effort to distinguish those beliefs which are matters of private faith from those which are capable of public defense and to see how issues look from the point of view of those with differing religious commitments and cultural backgrounds (cf. Phillips 1991b, pp. 57–59).¹⁸

Where do we learn these virtues? Other theorists we have examined relied on the market, the family, or the associations of civil society to teach civic virtue. But it is clear that people will not automatically learn to engage in public discourse or to question authority in any of these spheres, since these spheres are often held together by private discourse and respect for authority.

The answer, according to many liberal virtue theorists, is the system of education. Schools must teach children how to engage in the kind of critical reasoning and moral perspective that defines public reasonableness. As Amy Gutmann puts it, children at school "must

17. See the discussion of the "principle of secular motivation" in Audi (1989, p. 284).

18. This shows why civil society theorists are mistaken to think that good citizenship can be based on essentially private virtues. The requirement of public reasonableness in political debate is unnecessary and undesirable in the private sphere. It would be absurd to ask churchgoers to abstain from appealing to Scripture in deciding how to run their church.

learn not just to behave in accordance with authority but to think critically about authority if they are to live up to the democratic ideal of sharing political sovereignty as citizens." People who "are ruled only by habit and authority . . . are incapable of constituting a society of sovereign citizens" (Gutmann 1987, p. 51).¹⁹

However, this idea that schools should teach children to be skeptical of political authority and to distance themselves from their own cultural traditions when engaging in public discourse is controversial. Traditionalists object to it on the grounds that it inevitably leads children to question tradition and parental or religious authority in private life. And that is surely correct. As Gutmann admits, education for democratic citizenship will necessarily involve "equipping children with the intellectual skills necessary to evaluate ways of life different from that of their parents," because "many if not all of the capacities necessary for choice among good lives are also necessary for choice among good societies" (Gutmann 1987, pp. 30, 40).

Hence, those groups which rely heavily on an uncritical acceptance of tradition and authority, while not strictly ruled out, "are bound to be discouraged by the free, open, pluralistic, progressive" attitudes which liberal education encourages (Macedo 1990, pp. 53–54). This is why groups such as the Amish have sought to remove their children from the school system.

This creates a dilemma for liberals, many of whom wish to accommodate law-abiding groups like the Amish. Some liberals view the demise of such groups as regrettable but sometimes inevitable in a democratic society (Rawls 1975, p. 551; but see Rawls 1988, pp. 267–68). Other liberals, however, want to adjust citizenship education to minimize the impact on parental and religious authority. Galston, for example, argues that the need to teach children how to engage in public discourse and to evaluate political leaders "does not warrant the conclusion that the state must (or may) structure public education to foster in children skeptical reflection on ways of life inherited from parents or local communities" (Galston 1991, p. 253). However, he admits that it is not easy for schools to promote a child's willingness to question political authority without undermining her "unswerving belief in the correctness" of her parents' way of life.

This parallels the dilemma facing civil society theorists. They face the question of when to intervene in private groups in order to make them more effective schools of civic virtue; liberal virtue theorists, on the other hand, face the question of when to modify civic education

19. Public schools teach these virtues not only through their curriculum but also "by insisting that students sit in their seats (next to students of different races and religions), raise their hands before speaking, hand in their homework on time . . . be good sports on its playing field" (Gutmann 1987, p. 53).

in the schools in order to limit its impact on private associations. Neither group has, to date, fully come to grips with these questions.

D. Conclusion: Responsible Citizenship and Public Policy

In most postwar political theory, the fundamental normative concepts were democracy (for evaluating procedures) and justice (for evaluating outcomes). Citizenship, if it was discussed at all, was usually seen as derivative of democracy and justice—that is, a citizen is someone who has democratic rights and claims of justice. There is increasing support, however, from all points of the political spectrum, for the view that citizenship must play an independent normative role in any plausible political theory and that the promotion of responsible citizenship is an urgent aim of public policy.

And yet a striking feature of the current debate is the timidity with which authors apply their theories of citizenship to questions of public policy. As we have seen, there are some suggestions about the sorts of institutions or policies that would promote or enforce the virtues and responsibilities of good citizenship. But these tend to be the same policies which have long been defended on grounds of justice or democracy. The left favored democratizing the welfare state long before they adopted the language of citizenship, just as feminists favored day care and the New Right opposed the welfare state. It is not clear whether adopting the perspective of citizenship really leads to different policy conclusions than the more familiar perspectives of justice and democracy.

We can imagine more radical proposals to promote citizenship. If civility is important, why not pass Good Samaritan laws, as many European countries have done? If political participation is important, why not require mandatory voting, as in Australia or Belgium? If public-spiritedness is important, why not require a period of mandatory national service, as in most European countries? If public schools help teach responsible citizenship, because they require children of different races and religions to sit together and learn to respect each other, why not prohibit private schools?

These are the kinds of policies which are concerned specifically with promoting citizenship, rather than justice or democracy. Yet few authors even contemplate such proposals. Instead, most citizenship theorists either leave the question of how to promote citizenship unanswered (Glendon 1991, p. 138) or focus on “modest” or “gentle and relatively unobtrusive ways” to promote civic virtues (Macedo 1990, pp. 234, 253).²⁰ While citizenship theorists bemoan the excessive focus

20. For other accounts of the “unobtrusive” promotion of citizenship, see Habermas (1992, pp. 6–7), Hill (1993), and Rawls (1993, pp. 216–20).

given to rights, they seem reluctant to propose any policies that could be seen as restricting those rights.

There may be good reasons for this timidity, but it sits uneasily with the claim that we face a crisis of citizenship and that we urgently need a theory of citizenship. As a result, much recent work on citizenship virtues seems quite hollow. In the absence of some account of legitimate and illegitimate ways to promote or enforce good citizenship, many works on citizenship reduce to a platitude: namely, society would be better if the people in it were nicer and more thoughtful.²¹

Indeed, it is not clear how urgent the need to promote good citizenship is. The literature on citizenship is full of dire predictions about the decline of virtue, but as Galston admits, “cultural pessimism is a pervasive theme of human history, and in nearly every generation” (Galston 1991, p. 237).²² If there are increasing crime and decreasing voting rates, it is equally true that we are more tolerant, more respectful of others’ rights, and more committed to democracy and constitutionalism than were previous generations (Macedo 1990, pp. 6–7). So it remains unclear how we should be promoting good citizenship and how urgent it is to do so.

IV. CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITY, AND DIFFERENCE

Citizenship is not just a certain status, defined by a set of rights and responsibilities. It is also an identity, an expression of one’s membership in a political community. Marshall saw citizenship as a shared identity that would integrate previously excluded groups within British society and provide a source of national unity. He was particularly concerned to integrate the working classes, whose lack of education and economic resources excluded them from the “common culture” which should have been a “common possession and heritage” (Marshall 1965, pp. 101–2).²³

21. For example, Mouffe criticizes liberalism for reducing citizenship “to a mere legal status, setting out the rights that the individual holds against the state” (1992a, p. 227) and seeks to “reestablish the lost connection between ethics and politics,” by understanding citizenship as a form of “political identity that is created through the identification with the *res publica*” (p. 230). Yet she offers no suggestions about how to promote or compel this public-spirited participation, and insists (against civic republicans) that citizens must be free to choose not to give priority to their political activities. Her critique of liberalism, therefore, seems to reduce to the claim that the liberal conception of citizenship-as-legal-status is not an adequate conception of good citizenship, which liberals would readily accept. Many critiques of liberal citizenship amount to the same unenlightening claim.

22. Indeed, we can find similar worries about political apathy in 1950s political sociologists, and even in Tocqueville.

23. See the discussion of citizenship’s “integrative function” in Barbalet (1988, p. 93).

It has become clear, however, that many groups—blacks, women, Aboriginal peoples, ethnic and religious minorities, gays and lesbians—still feel excluded from the ‘common culture’, despite possessing the common rights of citizenship. Members of these groups feel excluded not only because of their socioeconomic status but also because of their sociocultural identity—their ‘difference’.

An increasing number of theorists, whom we will call ‘cultural pluralists’, argue that citizenship must take account of these differences. Cultural pluralists believe that the common rights of citizenship, originally defined by and for white men, cannot accommodate the special needs of minority groups. These groups can only be integrated into the common culture if we adopt what Iris Marion Young calls a conception of “differentiated citizenship” (Young 1989, p. 258).

On this view, members of certain groups would be incorporated into the political community not only as individuals but also through the group, and their rights would depend, in part, on their group membership. For example, some immigrant groups are demanding special rights or exemptions to accommodate their religious practices; historically disadvantaged groups, such as women or blacks, are demanding special representation in the political process; and many national minorities (Québécois, Kurds, Catalans) are seeking greater powers of self-government within the larger country, if not outright secession.

These demands for “differentiated citizenship” pose a serious challenge to the prevailing conception of citizenship. Many people regard the idea of group-differentiated citizenship as a contradiction in terms. On the orthodox view, citizenship is, by definition, a matter of treating people as individuals with equal rights under the law. This is what distinguishes democratic citizenship from feudal and other premodern views that determined people’s political status by their religious, ethnic, or class membership. Hence, “the organization of society on the basis of rights or claims that derive from group membership is sharply opposed to the concept of society based on citizenship” (Porter 1987, p. 128). The idea of differentiated citizenship, therefore, is a radical development in citizenship theory.

One of the most influential theorists of cultural pluralism is Iris Marion Young. According to Young, the attempt to create a universal conception of citizenship which transcends group differences is fundamentally unjust because it oppresses historically excluded groups: “In a society where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting that as citizens persons should leave behind their particular affiliations and experiences to adopt a general point of view serves only to reinforce the privilege; for the perspective and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate this unified public, marginalizing or

silencing those of other groups" (Young 1989, p. 257).²⁴ Young gives two reasons why genuine equality requires affirming rather than ignoring group differences. First, culturally excluded groups are at a disadvantage in the political process, and "the solution lies at least in part in providing institutionalized means for the explicit recognition and representation of oppressed groups" (Young 1989, p. 259). These procedural measures would include public funds for advocacy groups, guaranteed representation in political bodies, and veto rights over specific policies that affect a group directly (Young 1989, pp. 261–62; 1990, pp. 183–91).

Second, culturally excluded groups often have distinctive needs which can only be met through group-differentiated policies. These include language rights for Hispanics, land rights for Aboriginal groups, and reproductive rights for women (Young 1990, pp. 175–83). Other policies which have been advocated by cultural pluralists include group libel laws for women or Muslims, publicly funded schools for certain religious minorities, and exemptions from laws that interfere with religious worship, such as Sunday closing, animal-slaughtering legislation for Jews and Muslims, or motorcycle helmet laws for Sikhs (Parekh 1990, p. 705; 1991, pp. 197–204; Modood 1992).

Much has been written regarding the justification for these rights and how they relate to broader theories of justice and democracy. Young herself defends them as a response to "oppression," of which she outlines five forms: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and "random violence and harassment motivated by group hatred or fear" (Young 1989, p. 261). It would take us too far afield to consider these justifications or the various objections to them.²⁵ Instead, we will focus on the impact of these rights on citizenship identity.

Critics of differentiated citizenship worry that if groups are encouraged by the very terms of citizenship to turn inward and focus on their 'difference' (whether racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, and so on), then "the hope of a larger fraternity of all Americans will have to be abandoned" (Glazer 1983, p. 227). Citizenship will cease to be

24. See also Pateman's discussion of how citizenship is currently "constructed from men's attributes, capacities and activities," so that citizenship can only be extended to women "as lesser men" (1988, pp. 252–53; cf. James 1992, pp. 52–55; Pateman 1992).

25. Critics have objected that differentiated citizenship (a) violates equality: granting rights to some people but not others on the basis of their group membership sets up a hierarchy in which some citizens are 'more equal' than others; (b) violates liberal neutrality: the role of the state in matters of culture should be limited to maintaining a fair cultural marketplace; and (c) is arbitrary: there is no principled way to determine which groups are entitled to differential status. For a discussion of these objections, see Glazer (1983), Taylor (1991; 1992a, pp. 51–61), Hindess (1993), Kymlicka (1989, 1991), Phillips (1992), and Van Dyke (1985).

“a device to cultivate a sense of community and a common sense of purpose” (Heater 1990, p. 295; Kristeva 1993, p. 7; Cairns 1993). Nothing will bind the various groups in society together and prevent the spread of mutual mistrust or conflict (Kukathas 1993, p. 156).

Critics also worry that differentiated citizenship would create a “politics of grievance.” If, as Young implies, only oppressed groups are entitled to differentiated citizenship, this may encourage group leaders to devote their political energy to establishing a perception of disadvantage—rather than working to overcome it—in order to secure their claim to group rights.

These are serious concerns. In evaluating them, however, we need to distinguish three different kinds of groups and three different kinds of group rights, which both Young and her critics tend to run together: (a) special representation rights (for disadvantaged groups); (b) multicultural rights (for immigrant and religious groups); and (c) self-government rights (for national minorities). Each of these has very different implications for citizenship identity.

Special representation rights.—For many of the groups on Young’s list, such as the poor, elderly, African-Americans, and gays, the demand for group rights takes the form of special representation within the political process of the larger society. Since Young views these rights as a response to conditions of oppression, they are most plausibly seen as a temporary measure on the way to a society where the need for special representation no longer exists. Society should seek to remove the oppression, thereby eliminating the need for these rights.

Self-government rights.—In some of Young’s examples, such as the reservation system of the American Indians, the demand for group rights is not seen as a temporary measure, and it is misleading to say that group rights are a response to a form of oppression that we hope someday to eliminate. Aboriginal peoples and other national minorities like the Québécois or Scots claim permanent and inherent rights, grounded in a principle of self-determination. These groups are ‘cultures’, ‘peoples’, or ‘nations’, in the sense of being historical communities, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given homeland or territory, sharing a distinct language and history. These nations find themselves within the boundaries of a larger political community, but claim the right to govern themselves in certain key matters, in order to ensure the full and free development of their culture and the best interests of their people. What these national minorities want is not primarily better representation in the central government but, rather, the transfer of power and legislative jurisdictions from the central government to their own communities.

Multicultural rights.—The case of Hispanics and other immigrant groups in the United States is different again. Their demands include public support of bilingual education and ethnic studies in schools and

exemptions from laws that disadvantage them, given their religious practices. These measures are intended to help immigrants express their cultural particularity and pride without its hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant society. Like self-government rights, these rights need not be temporary, because the cultural differences they promote are not something we hope to eliminate. But unlike self-government rights, multicultural rights are intended to promote integration into the larger society, not self-government.

Obviously, these three kinds of rights can overlap, in the sense that some groups can claim more than one kind of group right.

If differentiated citizenship is defined as the adoption of one or more of these group-differentiated rights, then virtually every modern democracy recognizes some form of it. Citizenship today "is a much more differentiated and far less homogeneous concept than has been presupposed by political theorists" (Parekh 1990, p. 702). Nevertheless, most cultural pluralists demand a degree of differentiation not present in almost any developed democracy.

Would adopting one or more of these group rights undermine the integrative function of citizenship? A closer look at the distinction between the three kinds of rights suggests that such fears are often misplaced. The fact is that, generally speaking, the demand for both representation rights and multicultural rights is a demand for inclusion. Groups that feel excluded want to be included in the larger society, and the recognition and accommodation of their 'difference' is intended to facilitate this.

The right to special representation is just a new twist on an old idea. It has always been recognized that a majoritarian democracy can systematically ignore the voices of minorities. In cases where minorities are regionally concentrated, democratic systems have responded by intentionally drawing the boundaries of federal units, or of individual constituencies, to create seats where the minority is in a majority (Beitz 1989, chap. 7). Cultural pluralists simply extend this logic to nonterritorial minorities, who may equally be in need of representation (e.g., women, the disabled, or gays and lesbians).

There are enormous practical obstacles to such a proposal. For example, how do we decide which groups are entitled to such representation,²⁶ and how do we ensure that their 'representatives' are in fact

26. According to Young, "Once we are clear that the principle of group representation refers only to oppressed social groups, then the fear of an unworkable proliferation of group representation should dissipate" (1990, p. 187). However, her list of "oppressed groups" would seem to include 80 percent of the population—she says that "in the United States today, at least the following groups are oppressed in one or more of these ways: women, blacks, Native Americans, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-

accountable to the group?²⁷ But the basic impulse underlying representation rights is integration, not separation.

Similarly, most multicultural demands are evidence that members of minority groups want to get into the mainstream of society. Consider the case of Canadian Sikhs who wanted to join the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) but, because of their religious requirement to wear a turban, could not do so unless they were exempted from the usual dress code regarding headgear. The fact that these men wanted to be a part of the RCMP, one of Canada's "national symbols," is ample evidence of their desire to participate in the larger community. The special right they were requesting could only be seen as promoting, not discouraging, their integration.²⁸

Some people fear that multicultural rights impede the process of integration for immigrants by creating a confusing halfway house between their old nation and citizenship in the new one. But these worries seem empirically unfounded. Experience in countries with extensive multicultural programs, such as Canada and Australia, suggest that first- and second-generation immigrants who remain proud of their heritage are also among the most patriotic citizens of their new country (Kruhlak 1992).²⁹ Moreover, their strong affiliation with

speaking Americans, Asian Americans, gay men, lesbians, working-class people, poor people, old people, and mentally and physically disabled people" (1989, p. 261). In short, everyone but healthy, relatively well-off, relatively young, heterosexual white males. Even then, it is hard to see how this criterion would avoid an 'unworkable proliferation', since each of these groups has subgroups that might claim their own rights. In the case of Britain, e.g., "the all-embracing concept of 'black' people rapidly dissolved into a distinction between the Asian and Afro-Caribbean communities, and then subsequently into finer distinctions between a wide variety of ethnic groups. What in this context then counts as 'adequate' ethnic representation?" (Phillips 1992, p. 89). Nevertheless, many political parties and trade unions have allowed for special group representation without entering an escalating spiral of demands and resentment (Young 1989, pp. 187–89).

27. "There are few mechanisms for establishing what each group wants. . . . Accountability is always the other side of representation, and, in the absence of procedures for establishing what any group wants or thinks, we cannot usefully talk of their political representation" (Phillips 1992, pp. 86–88). In the absence of accountability, it might be more appropriate to talk of consultation than representation.

28. This is in contrast to many Aboriginal communities in Canada who, as part of their self-government, have been trying to remove the RCMP from their reserves and replace it with a Native police force. Of course, some demands for multicultural rights also take the form of withdrawal from the larger society, although this is more likely to be true of religious sects (e.g., the Amish) than of ethnic communities per se.

29. Moreover, a proliferation of such demands is unlikely, since they usually involve clear and specific cases of unintended conflict between majority rules and minority religious practices. And since proof of oppression is neither necessary nor sufficient to claim these rights, there is little risk that they will promote a politics of grievance.

their new country seems to be based in large part on its willingness not just to tolerate but to welcome cultural difference.³⁰

Self-government rights, however, do raise deep problems for traditional notions of citizenship identity. While both representation and multicultural rights take the larger political community for granted and seek greater inclusion in it, demands for self-government reflect a desire to weaken the bonds with the larger community and, indeed, question its very nature, authority, and permanence. If democracy is the rule of the people, group self-determination raises the question of who 'the people' really are. National minorities claim that they are distinct peoples, with inherent rights of self-determination which were not relinquished by their (sometimes involuntary) federation with other nations within a larger country. Indeed, the retaining of certain powers is often explicitly spelled out in the treaties or constitutional agreements which specified the terms of federation.

Self-government rights, therefore, are the most complete case of differentiated citizenship, since they divide the people into separate 'peoples', each with its own historic rights, territories, and powers of self-government, and each, therefore, with its own political community.

It seems unlikely that differentiated citizenship can serve an integrative function in this context. If citizenship is membership in a political community, then in creating overlapping political communities, self-government rights necessarily give rise to a sort of dual citizenship and to potential conflicts about which community citizens identify with most deeply (Vernon 1988). Moreover, there seems to be no natural stopping point to the demands for increasing self-government. If limited autonomy is granted, this may simply fuel the ambitions of nationalist leaders who will be satisfied with nothing short of their own undifferentiated nation-state. Democratic multinational states are, it would seem, inherently unstable for this reason.

It might seem tempting, therefore, to ignore the demands of national minorities, keep any reference to particular groups out of the constitution, and insist that citizenship is a common identity shared by all individuals without regard to group membership. This

30. Of course, liberals cannot accept a group's demand to practice its religious or cultural customs if these violate the basic rights of the members of these groups (e.g., clitoridectomy, restrictions on exit). It is important to distinguish what we can call "internal" and "external" group rights. Internal rights are rights of a group against its own members, used to force individuals within the group to obey traditional customs or authority. External rights are rights of the group against the larger society, used to provide support for the group against economic or political pressure from outside for cultural assimilation. In western democracies, group-differentiated rights are almost always external rights, since internal rights are clearly inconsistent with liberal democratic norms. See Kukathas (1992) and the reply in Kymlicka (1992).

is often described as the American strategy for dealing with cultural pluralism. But with a few exceptions—such as the (mostly outlying or isolated) American Indian, Inuit, Puerto Rican, and native Hawaiian populations—the United States is not a multination state. It faced the problem of assimilating voluntary immigrants, not of incorporating historically self-governing communities whose homeland has become part of the larger community. And where it was applied to national minorities—for example, American Indians—the ‘common citizenship’ strategy has often been a spectacular failure, as even its supporters admit (Walzer 1982, p. 27; cf. Kymlicka 1991). Hence, many of these groups are now accorded self-government rights within the United States.

Indeed, there are very few democratic multination states that follow the strict ‘common citizenship’ strategy. This is not surprising, because refusing demands for self-government rights may simply aggravate alienation among these groups and increase the desire for secession (Taylor 1992a, p. 64).³¹

Hence, demands for self-government raise a problem for proponents of both common citizenship and differentiated citizenship. Yet remarkably little attention has been paid, by either defenders or critics, to this form of differentiated citizenship (or to the most common arrangement for instantiating self-government rights, namely, federalism).³²

What, then, is the source of unity in a multination country? Rawls claims that the source of union in modern societies is a shared conception of justice: “Although a well-ordered society is divided and pluralistic . . . public agreement on questions of political and social justice supports ties of civic friendship and secures the bonds of association” (Rawls 1980, p. 540). But the fact that two national groups share the same principles of justice does not necessarily give them any strong reason to join (or remain) together, rather than remaining (or splitting into) two separate countries. The fact that people in Norway and Sweden share the same principles of justice is no reason for them to regret the secession of Norway in 1905. Similarly, the fact that the anglophones and francophones in Canada share the same principles of justice is not a strong reason to remain together, since the Québécois rightly assume that their own national state could respect the same principles. A shared conception of justice throughout a political community does not necessarily generate a shared identity, let alone a

31. In any event, the state cannot avoid giving public recognition to particular group identities. After all, governments must decide which language(s) will serve as the official language of the schools, courts, and legislatures.

32. For a survey of philosophical work on federalism, see Norman (1993b).

shared citizenship identity that will supersede rival identities based on ethnicity (Nickel 1990; Norman 1993a).³³

It seems clear, then, that this is one place where we really do need a theory of citizenship, not just a theory of democracy or justice. How can we construct a common identity in a country where people not only belong to separate political communities but also belong in different ways—that is, some are incorporated as individuals and others through membership in a group? Taylor calls this “deep diversity” and insists that it is “the only formula” on which a multination state can remain united (Taylor 1991). However, he admits that it is an open question what holds such a country together.³⁴

Indeed, the great variance in historical, cultural, and political situations in multination states suggests that any generalized answer to this question will likely be overstated. It might be a mistake to suppose that one could develop a general theory about the role of either a common citizenship identity or a differentiated citizenship identity in promoting or hindering national unity (Taylor 1992b, pp. 65–66). Here, as with the other issues we have examined in this survey, it remains unclear what we can expect from a ‘theory of citizenship’.

33. If governments wish to use citizenship identity to promote national unity, therefore, they will have to identify citizenship, not only with acceptance of principles of justice but also with an emotional-affective sense of identity, based perhaps on a manipulation of shared symbols or historical myths. For a discussion of this strategy, see Norman (1993a).

34. European philosophers are confronting increasingly these dilemmas as they seek to understand the nature of the European Community and the form of citizenship it requires. Habermas and his followers argue that European unity cannot be based on the shared traditions, cultures, and languages that characterized successful nation-states. Instead, European citizenship must be founded on a ‘postnational’ constitutional patriotism based on shared principles of justice and democracy (Habermas 1992; Berten 1992; Ferry 1992). Others, however, argue that such a basis for unity is too ‘thin’. As Taylor notes, even the model experiments in constitutional patriotism, France and the United States, have always also required many of the trappings of nation-states, including founding myths, national symbols, and ideals of historical and quasi-ethnic membership (Taylor 1992b, p. 61; cf. Lenoble 1992; Smith 1993). According to Taylor, it is not for philosophers to define a priori the form of citizenship that is legitimate or admissible. Rather, we should seek forms of identity which appear significant to the people themselves (Taylor 1992b, p. 65; Berten 1992, p. 64).

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Special Thematic Section on "The Social Psychology of Citizenship, Participation and Social Exclusion"

Everyday Citizenship: Identity Claims and Their Reception

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Abstract

Citizenship involves being able to speak and be heard as a member of the community. This can be a formal right (e.g., a right to vote). It can also be something experienced in everyday life. However, the criteria for being judged a fellow member of the community are multiple and accorded different weights by different people. Thus, although one may self-define alongside one's fellows, the degree to which these others reciprocate depends on the weight they give to various membership criteria. This suggests we approach everyday community membership in terms of an identity claims-making process in which first, an individual claims membership through invoking certain criteria of belonging, and second, others evaluate that claim. Pursuing this logic we report three experiments investigating the reception of such identity-claims. Study 1 showed that in Scotland a claim to membership of the national ingroup was accepted more if couched in terms of place of birth and ancestry rather than just in terms of one's subjective identification. Studies 2 and 3 showed that this differential acceptance mattered for the claimant's ability to be heard as a community member. We discuss the implications of these studies for the conceptualization of community membership and the realization of everyday citizenship rights.

Keywords: citizenship, identity claims-making, intergroup sensitivity effect, black sheep effect

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"Though you prove patriots a thousand times... some fine morning you find yourselves crossing the border and you are reminded by the mob that you are, after all, nothing but vagrants and parasites, outside the protection of the law."

(Leo Pinsker, *Auto-Emancipation* – an early Zionist pamphlet, published in 1882, cited in Morris, 2001, pp. 16-17)

Such observations on the sorry fate of Russia's Jews illustrate the point that however much individuals may regard themselves as belonging they are not necessarily regarded as such by those they regard as their fellows. Moreover, this example illustrates the potentially dramatic consequences of this asymmetry: To find one-self physically expelled speaks volumes about one's place in the community.

Yet, dramatic as such examples are, there is a danger that an exclusive focus on hostile acts of rejection and discrimination neglects the more everyday occasions in which individuals may find their self-conception as members of the community questioned. Moreover, such a questioning of one's inclusion is not only psychologically distressing but can be practically consequential for one's ability to access the everyday benefits of group membership. These benefits are diverse. They can include the benefits of feeling valued and respected (Khan et al., in press-a, in press-b; Renger & Simon, 2011) and knowing that one can rely on others for support (Pandey, Stevenson, Shankar, Hopkins, & Reicher, 2014; Reicher & Haslam, 2009), etc.

Some of these benefits may appear rather distant from the rights we associate with 'citizenship'. However, recent work has broadened our understanding of what citizenship entails and this requires that we attend to the everyday significance of being recognized as someone who 'belongs'. Indeed, in the current paper we wish to explore how social psychological theorizing on the benefits of being recognized as a *bone-fide* group member can help illuminate the processes involved in the claiming of everyday citizenship rights. Specifically, we focus on the claiming of the right to be heard as a member of the national community and report experimental studies addressing the degree to which such claims count in the eyes of others and result in the individual being heard and treated as a co-national.

Before detailing our work, we consider (i) the nature of everyday citizenship, (ii) the claiming of rights on the basis of being a fellow national, and (iii) the reception of such claims.

Identity and Everyday Citizenship

Historically, citizenship has been conceptualized in terms of the formal rights associated with membership of the national community. However, contemporary citizenship research has increasingly broadened its focus beyond the formal and legal aspects of national citizenship (e.g., voting rights) to include hitherto un-theorized topics such as sexual rights and 'sexual citizenship' (Richardson, 2000), the recognition of minority identities (Soysal, 2000), etc.

This tendency to decouple citizenship from the formal rights associated with membership of the national community reflects a growing awareness that there are various social and institutional bases for claiming rights (e.g., relating to *universal* human rights; Soysal, 2000). It has also encouraged an interest in the variety of contexts (e.g., 'the global city'; Sassen, 2002) in which people's rights are claimed, negotiated and compromised. However, although the right to speak and be heard can be claimed on a variety of grounds not all of which equate to national identity (Barnes, Auburn, & Lea, 2004), the nation remains the most widely accepted political category that permeates everyday life (Billig, 1995). Certainly, many debates are framed in terms of debates about 'the national interest' (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2014; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), and analyses of political rhetoric highlight the ways in which those who would achieve influence routinely present themselves as members of the national community (Burns & Stevenson, 2013; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

For all these reasons, the nation remains an important category and it should come as little surprise that those seeking to claim all manner of rights should work with this identity rather than against it (on this latter, see Haslam, 2014). This is well illustrated if we consider how gay and lesbian activists in Ireland sought to build popular support for legal reform through a campaign under the slogan 'Proud to be Irish, Proud to be Gay'. This campaign characterised the Irish as 'naturally' tolerant and depicted homophobia as a legacy of British colonialism (Dunphy, 1997). In other words, although new rights – including sexual rights may be claimed on a variety of non-national bases

(Richardson, 2000), all manner of rights may be claimed through identity performances that assert one's full membership of the national community.

National Identities: Identification and Identity Claims-Making

Social psychological theorizing on group membership has long emphasized the importance of individuals' subjective self-definition. Thus, self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) maintains that defining oneself in terms of a group is the basis for group behavior (involving the conformity to group norms, etc.). Yet, one's subjective identifications are not always recognized by others. For example, American-ness is implicitly associated with being white (Devos & Banaji, 2005) and although Asian Americans do not report being any less American than White Americans, they frequently experience interactions in which their American identification is questioned or denied (Cheryan & Monin, 2005). Moreover, such experiences are distressing (Huynh & Devos, 2011).

Such findings hint at the complexity to group membership. Certainly, an individual's subjective identification with a group is important. However, as Jenkins (1996) puts it, "*social identity is never unilateral*" (p. 21, original emphasis) but requires validation by others. Drawing on this logic it follows that we can conceptualize social identity in terms of an identity claims-making process in which people actively lay claim to group membership and invite others to recognize such claims. This fits with research which shows that minority group members, aware that they may be judged 'aliens', display and perform their heartfelt identification with the national community (Cheryan & Monin, 2005). Such social identity performances can be complex, involving (among other things) decisions about their clothing (Hopkins & Greenwood, 2013) or food preferences (Guendelman, Cheryan, & Monin, 2011). However, such performances are not guaranteed acceptance. Indeed, the way in which minority group members perform their national identities may differ from how majority group members perform these identities, and these latter may well disparage the identity performances of the former (Joyce, Stevenson, & Muldoon, 2013).

When it comes to national identity, the claims-making process is particularly complex because the criteria for inclusion (e.g., ancestry, language, accent, subjective identification, cultural knowledge, etc.) are varied and contested. Some criteria (e.g., ethnic ancestry) are more deterministic than others (e.g., an individual's subjective identification with the nation's civic institutions), and although it is commonplace to differentiate between nations that prioritize either 'ethnic' or 'civic' criteria (the classic comparison being between Germany and France) the reality is that most countries use a mix of these criteria (Poole, 1999). This is well-illustrated in Scotland – the location for our research. Scottish surveys (McCrone & Bechhofer, 2008) show people endorse a range of more deterministic (ethnic) criteria (e.g., ancestry) and more open (civic) criteria in which, as Manzo puts it, membership is "handed out as a reward for loyalty and not on the basis of un-chosen criteria such as race" (Manzo, 1996, p. 19). Accordingly, national membership can be claimed on the basis of diverse criteria, and research shows that some people living in Scotland but born elsewhere and to non-Scottish parents (e.g., in England to English parents) claim a Scottish identity and do so through asserting their identification with Scotland, and its values and institutions (Kiely, Bechhofer, & McCrone, 2005; Kiely, Bechhofer, Stewart, & McCrone, 2001).

Yet, although such studies illustrate the point that claims to membership of the national community can be made on the basis of diverse criteria, there is little social psychological research concerning the reception of such claims and how they are socially consequential. Accordingly, our research addresses the degree to which majority group members differentiate between claims based on different criteria, and how this is consequential for the identity claimant's ability to be heard as a fellow national.

Identity-Claims Reception

In some respects it is easy to use questionnaire surveys to research the criteria people believe are important in judging group membership and social identity. When this is done in Scotland, Scottish-born respondents tend to endorse ethnic over civic criteria when judging national ingroup membership. Thus, survey data show that whilst 43% of English-born people living in Scotland felt that to be 'truly Scottish' it was essential to be born in Scotland, the corresponding figure for those born and bred in Scotland was 64% (Hussain & Miller, 2006).

However, gathering such information does not allow us to conclude that Scots would necessarily reject a claim to Scottishness by someone born in England. Nor can we assume that any such rejection would be consequential for that individual's treatment. Since LaPiere's (1934) pioneering research, we know that what people say when the question is posed in the abstract is not always what they practice when faced with a concrete instance. Moreover, in this context there are good reasons why this may be so.

First, surveys of opinion about the criteria defining national identity necessarily broach the issue in an abstract and impersonal manner. Yet, claims to group membership are personal and can entail a heartfelt plea that one's subjective identification be recognized. Accordingly, it is unclear whether abstract questions about the criteria for judging national inclusion necessarily predict behavioral responses to what can be impassioned, personalized identity claims.

Second, such identity claims are typically made in particular contexts (e.g., where one seeks to speak on a topic that one cares about and is of relevance to group members). Again, the reception of such context-bound claims cannot necessarily be predicted from de-contextualized weightings of various membership criteria. Moreover, questionnaire research which asks people to weigh the diverse criteria for group membership (e.g., ethnic heritage vs. civic commitment) is explicitly comparative which means we cannot know whether, in the absence of such an explicit comparative frame of reference, participants would actually differentiate between claims.

Third, when faced with a concrete instance of an identity claimant, people may be concerned about appearing exclusionary and narrow-minded (and thus apparently accept certain claims that they would actually rather not). Indeed, interview research with indigenous Scots suggests that in face-to-face interactions with incomers they find it hard to query 'civic' claims to Scottish national identification that are couched in terms of heartfelt identification with the nation and its culture (McCrone & Bechhofer, 2008). Such concerns may be particularly prominent if the reception of the claim carries any implication of differential treatment for different claims. Of course, it could be possible to present such claims in a context where the consequences of claims-rejection are zero. This could then allow participants to judge different claims without having to worry about there being any moral judgment of their response. However, this strategy immediately limits our ability to address a key issue motivating interest in claims-reception in the first place: whether the reception of such claims actually matters for the claimant's treatment.

With these methodological considerations in mind we investigated the reception of identity claims in an experimental design which allowed us to present personalized claims by a particular individual in different conditions and in the context of warranting the claimant's right to speak on a national issue.

The Present Research

We report three experiments conducted in Scotland, a country of a little over 5 million people which receives some 100,000 migrants per year, over half of whom are from England. English-born people are therefore easily the

largest migrant group, constituting some 10% of the overall population. The fact the English share UK citizenship with the Scots (and therefore have full and equal rights in Scotland) separates out the question of formal citizenship from everyday citizenship and thus makes Scotland a particularly favorable site for investigating informal everyday citizenship.

As noted above, survey and interview research shows it is commonplace for ‘incomers’ (notably English migrants) to claim Scottishness on the basis of their present and future commitment to the country: whatever their history, the important thing is that their destiny is Scottish (Kiely, Bechhofer, & McCrone, 2005; McCrone & Bechhofer, 2008). Such people are sometimes referred to as ‘new Scots’ (Maan, 1992) and such civic claims are often encouraged in political debate. For example, the leadership of the Scottish National Party proclaimed its ambition “to see the cause of Scotland argued with English, French, Irish, Indian, Pakistani, Chinese and every other accent in the rich tapestry of what we should be proud to call (...) ‘the mongrel nation of Scotland’” (cited in Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, pp. 163-164).

Survey research suggests indigenous Scots endorse the significance of both more inclusive criteria (e.g., a subjective identification with Scotland, its values and its institutions) and more exclusive criteria (e.g., having a Scottish ancestry), and that the latter have greater weightings (McCrone & Bechhofer, 2008). However, for all the reasons discussed earlier, the predictive utility of such weightings cannot be assumed. Accordingly, our research involved presenting Scottish participants with an individual brought up and educated in England who self-defined as Scottish. In one condition their claim to Scottishness was based on their Scottish ancestry (an *ethnic* claim), and in another, on their identification with Scotland and Scottish culture (a *civic* claim).

Study 1 was designed to provide experimental confirmation of the survey and interview findings that ethnic claims to nationhood are accepted more than civic claims. Studies 2 and 3 built upon Study 1 in three important ways. First, whereas the claims to identity in Study 1 were conveyed in a written description, those in Studies 2 and 3 were brought to life in an individual’s identity performance (presented *via* video). Second, the claims to identity were woven into a context. Specifically, the video showed the claimant speaking on a topic concerning Scotland and its future, and the identity-claim was worked into their speech as they explained their concern for the topic. This means that the claim was introduced in a context where it was meaningful and socially relevant. Third, the fact that the claim was introduced in the context of a speech allowed investigation of the degree to which different claims impacted upon the acceptance of the claimant’s ideas (indicating something of the social consequentiality of the reception of different identity claims).

Needless to say, as our work is rooted in the social identity tradition it follows that the reception of identity claims is likely to be affected by observers’ own level of identification with the group (on the grounds that group processes are more relevant for those with higher identifications). Indeed, it is possible that any differential evaluation of such claims would only be exhibited by those highly invested in the group identity and our analyses sought to address this issue.

Study 1

This study sought to confirm previous survey findings concerning the priority of ethnic over civic claims to nationhood in Scotland. Participants were given a written vignette in which an individual provided a self-description. Embedded

in this was a claim to Scottish identity based either (according to condition) on parentage and place of birth (*ethnic* condition) or commitment (*civic* condition). We predicted that, when asked to rate how Scottish the claimant was, indigenous Scottish respondents would provide higher ratings in the ethnic than the civic condition.

Method

Participants

Fifty-five Scottish-born undergraduate psychology students (male $n = 7$, female $n = 48$, age $M = 21.8$, $SD = 5.72$; civic = 27, ethnic = 28) acted as participants. Data were gathered in class time and participants received no compensation.

Materials

Participants read a passage reporting how someone working in Scotland described themselves. In both conditions they were described as having an English accent. In one (*ethnic* claim) he described how he was born in Scotland to Scottish parents who had then moved to England where he had been brought up and educated. In turn, he explained that he had now returned to Scotland. In the other (*civic* claim), he described how he was born in England to English parents but had chosen to move to live in Scotland and commit himself to Scottish interests. Both of these types of claim are commonplace in Scotland and their wording was based upon existing survey and interview data.

The text in the ethnic condition was as follows:

I was born in Scotland of Scottish parents. When I was young, my parents moved south of the border, but although I have lived most of life outside Scotland, I could not help but absorb the connection of my ancestors with Scotland's natural environment. Scotland and its environment are in my blood. So, when I was offered the opportunity to play a part in shaping Scotland's environmental future, I grabbed at the opportunity. It allowed me to give some tangible expression to my Scottish ancestry.

In contrast, the text in the civic condition was:

I was born in England of English parents. But from my earliest youth I felt a fascination and an affinity with Scotland and its natural environment. That is why I chose to study and to specialize in environmental issues. Scotland and its environment have always been on my mind. So, when I was offered the opportunity to play a part in shaping Scotland's environmental future, I grabbed at the opportunity. It allowed me to give some tangible expression to my commitment to Scotland.

After reading either paragraph, participants responded to a number of statements. In this and subsequent studies they used seven-point scales (anchored 1 = *strongly disagree* and 7 = *strongly agree*). Four statements (see [Appendix A](#)) concerned the claimant's Scottishness (*Cronbach's* $\alpha = .90$) with a higher score indicating greater acceptance. Participants also reported their nationality and completed four identification items (see [Appendix A](#)) which formed a scale ($\alpha = .90$) with a higher score indicating greater Scottish identification.

Results

The level of identification scores was high ($M = 5.86$, $SD = 1.12$) and non-normally distributed ($mode = 6.50$, $Mdn = 6.00$, skewness = -1.69 , kurtosis = 3.39). This precludes using participants' level of identification as a moderator in our analyses of the effect of condition on our dependent measures. Accordingly, as those identifying

as Scottish are most relevant to our hypotheses we report two sets of analyses. The first is for the full sample (regardless of identification level). The second excludes those exhibiting a lower identification and employed a criterion score of greater than 5.5 on a 7 point scale (this is the point at which, more often than not, people are expressing strong agreement with statements about their identification; see Reicher, Hopkins, & Harrison, 2006). This resulted in a sample size of 39 (civic $n = 16$, ethnic $n = 23$) with identification high in both conditions (civic $M = 6.44$, $mode = 6.50$, $Mdn = 6.50$; ethnic $M = 6.41$, $mode = 7.00$, $Mdn = 6.50$).

Using the full sample we found ratings of the claimant's Scottishness were higher in the ethnic condition (ethnic $M = 5.12$, $SD = 1.33$ vs. civic $M = 3.75$, $SD = 1.70$), $t(53) = 3.33$, $p = .002$, *Cohen's d* = .89. When the sample was restricted to the higher identification sample the effect of condition was repeated: ratings of the claimant's Scottishness were higher in the ethnic condition (ethnic $M = 5.12$, $SD = 1.32$ vs. civic $M = 3.70$, $SD = 1.76$), $t(37) = 2.88$, $p = .007$, *Cohen's d* = .91.

Discussion

In this first study we presented participants with an individual who had an English accent and had been raised outside Scotland. We found that such an individual was judged as having a stronger claim to membership of the Scottish ingroup if they could invoke the Scottishness of their parents and place of birth than someone whose claim rested on their subjective identification with Scotland. In our next studies we investigated if this difference was consequential for these two individuals' treatment.

Study 2

Much research shows influence to be moderated by group membership: ingroup members are more influential than outgroup members (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Turner et al., 1987). The moderating role of group membership is well-illustrated in research on the *intergroup sensitivity effect* which shows that the same criticism is more accepted when coming from ingroup members than outgroup members (Hornsey, Oppes, & Svensson, 2002). Furthermore, compared to criticism from an out-group member, criticism from a fellow ingroup member is viewed as more constructive, elicits less negative affect, and results in greater acceptance of the need for behavioral change (Esposito, Hornsey, & Spoor, 2013; Hornsey et al., 2002; Hornsey & Imani, 2004; Hornsey, Grice, Jetten, Paulsen, & Callan, 2007).

In Study 2 we presented the claims used in Study 1 in two films. In both, the speaker was the same (with an English accent) and the speech identical – except with regards to the identity claim. After viewing the film, participants then read criticisms of the Scottish ingroup ostensibly made by the speaker in a post-speech interview (with the cover story stating we were interested in how people form impressions of people). Participants then completed ratings of the claimant's criticisms. We predicted the nature of the speaker's identity claim would impact upon the reception of his criticisms (i.e., better reception in the ethnic than civic condition).

Method

Participants

Thirty-four Scottish born psychology undergraduate students participated (males = 11, females = 23; age $M = 18.3$ years, $SD = 1.21$; civic $n = 17$, ethnic $n = 17$). They took part in a practical class and received no compensation.

Experimental Materials

Participants watched one of two speeches presented in a video. Although filmed in a university seminar room with an experienced speaker (with an English accent) reading a specially prepared script, the cover story presented it as real. The camera focused on the speaker at a lectern but showed the heads and shoulders of an audience and so appeared entirely realistic. The speech concerned the Scottish environment and land access. In Phase 1 of the speech the speaker referred to the importance of the environment for Scottish identity (see [Appendix B](#)). In Phase 2 he made one of the identity claims used in Study 1.

After viewing the video, participants received a booklet containing an extract from an interview apparently conducted with the speaker they had just seen (in reality it was created by the experimenters). According to the cover story, the interview was conducted by one of the organizers of the conference where the speech was delivered. The interview was identical in both conditions and contained criticisms of Scottish people. Thus, in response to the question ‘how have Scottish people received your arguments so far, how have they reacted to your proposals?’ the speaker was reported as replying:

well there have been some positive reactions, but frankly mostly they were negative, which I .. um .. it .. reflects what you always find.. You know, to be honest .. we Scots can be quite conventional in the way we approach these things, you know, very inward looking. Most of the time not very flexible either, because we are .. um .. too bound up by Scottish traditions .. um .. very cautious. I believe Scots are too backward looking, you know, heritage can also be baggage. It can get in the way of building a modern Scotland, it can stop us thinking ... I guess what I am trying to say is that it would be nice if we Scots could be a bit less hung up on our past and a bit more imaginative and a lot more ambitious, you know.

Dependent Measures

After reading the interview, participants completed the dependent measures (seven-point scales anchored 1 = *strongly disagree* and 7 = *strongly agree*).

Agreement with speaker’s criticisms — This was measured by seven questions ([Appendix A](#)) which formed a scale ($\alpha = .89$) with a higher score indicating greater agreement.

Negative feelings — Participants’ feelings about the speaker’s comments in the interview were measured with nine items ([Appendix A](#)) which formed a scale ($\alpha = .95$) with a higher score indicating greater negativity.

Constructiveness of the criticism — This was measured by eight items ([Appendix A](#)) which formed a scale ($\alpha = .83$) with a higher score indicating the criticisms were judged constructive.

Behavioral reform — Support for behavioral reform amongst Scots was measured by three questions ($\alpha = .82$) concerning the degree to which participants thought Scottish people should follow the advice offered in the critical comments ([Appendix A](#)).

The speaker’s Scottishness — As in Study 1, four items concerned the degree to which the speaker was seen as Scottish ($\alpha = .74$).

Participants’ own Scottish identification — Again, this was measured by the same four items as in Study 1 ($\alpha = .76$).

Results

As participants' levels of Scottish identification were heavily skewed towards the upper end of the scale (mode = 7; *Mdn* = 6.75; *M* = 6.40, *SD* = 0.70; skewness = -1.88; kurtosis = 4.27) we again report two sets of analyses. The first is for the full sample (regardless of identification level). The second included only highly identified Scots (using the same criterion as in Study 1) for analysis. This reduced sample consisted of 29 Scots (ethnic *n* = 15, civic *n* = 14) with identification equally high in both conditions (civic *M* = 6.73, *mode* = 7.00, *Mdn* = 6.87; ethnic *M* = 6.60, *mode* = 7.00, *Mdn* = 6.75).

Evaluation of Speaker's Comments

Using the full sample we found that (as predicted) agreement with the speaker's criticisms was higher in the ethnic (*M* = 4.91, *SD* = 0.74) than civic condition (*M* = 3.76, *SD* = 1.11), $t(27.7) = 3.55$, $p = .001$, *Cohen's d* = 1.22 (equal variances not assumed). Similarly, and as expected, negative feelings in relation to the criticisms were less prominent in the ethnic (*M* = 3.03, *SD* = 1.24) than civic condition (*M* = 4.05, *SD* = 1.50), $t(32) = -2.15$, $p = .039$, *Cohen's d* = .74. Furthermore, reform was judged more necessary in the ethnic (*M* = 4.67, *SD* = 1.13) than civic condition (*M* = 3.53, *SD* = 1.34), $t(32) = 2.72$, $p = .01$, *Cohen's d* = .94. However, there was no effect on the perceived constructiveness of the criticism (ethnic *M* = 5.21, *SD* = .89; civic *M* = 4.85, *SD* = .84), $t(32) = 1.19$, $p = .24$.

When the analysis was restricted to the higher identification sample, these findings were repeated. Again, agreement with the speaker's criticisms was higher in the ethnic (*M* = 5.01, *SD* = 0.71) than civic condition (*M* = 3.64, *SD* = 1.15), $t(21.46) = 3.81$, $p = .001$, *Cohen's d* = 1.43 (equal variances not assumed); negative feelings were less prominent in the ethnic (*M* = 2.92, *SD* = 1.25) than civic condition (*M* = 4.17, *SD* = 1.45), $t(27) = -2.51$, $p = .018$, *Cohen's d* = .55; and reform was judged more necessary in the ethnic (*M* = 4.71, *SD* = 1.20) than civic condition (*M* = 3.45, *SD* = 1.42), $t(27) = 2.58$, $p = .016$, *Cohen's d* = .96. As with the full sample, there was no effect on the perceived constructiveness of the criticism (ethnic *M* = 5.15, *SD* = .93; civic *M* = 4.91, *SD* = .86), $t(27) = .72$, $p = .48$.

Overall then (and regardless of the sample employed), on three of the four measures, criticism was received better when coming from the ethnic claimant. That is, the treatment of the claimant invoking ethnic criteria of belonging was better than the treatment of the claimant invoking civic criteria.

The Speaker's Scottishness

Using the full sample we found no effect of condition on ratings of the claimant's Scottishness (ethnic *M* = 3.69, *SD* = 1.20 vs. civic *M* = 3.15, *SD* = 1.08), $t(32) = 1.39$, $p = .175$. This was also the case when we focused on the higher identification sample: ethnic *M* = 3.58, *SD* = 1.23; civic *M* = 3.00, *SD* = 1.13, $t(27) = 1.33$, $p = .19$.

Discussion

As predicted, a speaker criticizing the Scottish ingroup received more positive reactions when they claimed national identity on the basis of place of birth and family heritage than on the basis of choice and commitment. The ethnic claim elicited more agreement, better emotional reactions, and greater endorsement of the need for behavioral change. The one dimension where our hypotheses were not confirmed concerns the perceived constructiveness of the criticisms. However, given the design to our study, the absence of a condition effect is understandable. The critical comments occur after participants had seen a film in which the interviewee had spoken enthusiastically

about the need for imaginative measures to protect the Scottish environment. It is therefore quite understandable that both speakers would be judged as attempting to be constructive (the cell means on the constructiveness scale were above the midpoint, revealing the speakers to be judged as well-intentioned).

It is also noteworthy that although participants differentiated between the two claimants on these three measures, they did not do so when asked explicitly about the claimants' Scottishness. This might reflect participants' concerns about explicitly questioning another's heartfelt declarations of identification. If so, this underlines the importance of having less obvious indices of inclusion (in this case, indices of agreement with the claimant's criticisms). However, it might also reflect the fact that the questions came at the end of the study.

Although the findings on the three criticism-related measures (i.e., agreement, affect, and endorsement of the need for behavioral change) are as predicted, it is possible to question whether they really reflect the relative successes of these claims to community membership. Perhaps the negative reactions to criticism in the civic condition were driven more by dislike (associated with features of the speaker's personal narrative) than by judgments of group membership *per se*. Fortunately, another established effect can be used to confirm our interpretation. This effect is the so-called *black sheep effect* (e.g., Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000) and it is useful here because it allows us to untangle whether the differential treatment of the claimants in Study 2 is really bound up with judgments of group membership or a more general dislike of the speaker in the civic condition. That is, it allows us to untangle ingroup treatment and positive treatment.

Study 3

Research shows that when it comes to pointing out shortcomings among group members, ingroup members are accorded more authority to speak than outgroup members (Hornsey et al., 2002). However, research also shows that when there is an agreed-upon ingroup norm, attitudes and behaviors that contradict that norm are judged more harshly if the deviant is a member of the ingroup rather than the outgroup (Abrams, Marques, et al., 2000). Indeed, it seems an ingroup member's counter-normative position attracts more censure because it subverts the integrity of the group's identity.

In the current context, this logic implies that a proposal discrepant with ingroup norms would elicit a harsher reaction when articulated by someone with a stronger claim to group membership. Thus, with the same identity claims used in Studies 1 and 2, it follows we could predict more negative reactions to a counter-normative position advocated by the person claiming national identity on ethnic as opposed to civic criteria. If confirmed, this would counter the idea that Study 2's results simply show that certain claims are more attractive and result in better treatment for reasons unconnected with the judgments of group membership.

Study 3 used a film and script that started in exactly the same way as Study 2 (see Appendix B). As in Study 2, Phase 1 contained the speaker's explanation of the importance of the environment to Scotland and Phase 2 contained the identity claim (ethnic/civic). In addition two further phases of the film were shown (see Appendix C). In Phase 3, the speaker argued for the need to protect the environment through responsible land access – a position which, based on existing evidence (e.g., McCrone, Morris, & Kiely, 1995) we expected to be highly normative for Scots. In Phase 4, the speaker argued for giving landowners the right to control access (which runs counter to Scottish traditions – see the Scottish Government's Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003).ⁱ

Whilst watching the speech, participants provided real-time evaluations via a hand-held dial linked to a computer. This allowed fine-grained analyses that not only shed light on whether identity claims have an effect on the reception of the speaker's message, but also, when they have an effect.

We expected no effect of condition in Phases 1 or 2 (as there is little to agree or disagree with). Nor did we expect an effect in Phase 3 where the text is so normative that we expected high levels of agreement regardless of the speaker's identity. Our key predictions, then, concern what happens in Phase 4 and in the relationship between Phases 3 and 4. Assuming ethnic claims to Scottishness are stronger than civic claims, the logic of the *black sheep effect* predicts harsher Phase 4 judgments in the ethnic compared to the civic condition. In turn, it predicts the decline in evaluation from Phase 3 to Phase 4 to be greater in the ethnic than civic condition.

Method

Participants

Fifty-seven Scottish psychology undergraduates participated (males = 28, females = 29; age $M = 26.10$ years, $SD = 9.3$; civic $n = 30$ ethnic $n = 27$). Participants were recruited through invitation and received no compensation. Data were gathered in a laboratory.

Experimental Materials

The speech lasted just over seven minutes and had four Phases. Phases 1, 3 and 4 were constant across conditions. Phase 1 was identical to that in Study 2 ([Appendix B](#)). Phase 2 contained the identity claims (identical to those in Studies 1 and 2). In Phase 3 the speaker argued for responsible public access to the land in Scotland and in Phase 4 he argued for a policy option giving private landowners powers to limit access to the land (see [Appendix C](#)).

Throughout the course of the speech participants used a handset dial to record their evaluation. Turning the dial to the left indicated a negative evaluation and to the right a positive evaluation. The two extremes and the midpoint were marked on the dial. Piloting the use of the handset procedure showed people used the dial in two different ways. Some kept the dial at the midpoint and only responded when they agreed or disagreed with a particular aspect of the speech. When doing so they typically turned the dial to an extreme before quickly returning it to the midpoint. When graphed over the course of the speech these traces showed that for much of the time the dial remained at the midpoint and that points of agreement or disagreement were marked with sharp upward and downward 'spikes'. Others used the dial to show their ongoing evaluation of the speech. When graphed these traces showed more gradual changes in evaluation. This latter usage was that envisaged in our design and we therefore guided our participants to use the dial in this manner. Following presentation of the speech, participants completed the questionnaire measures.

Dependent Measures

Participants' real-time evaluations were recorded every .25 second in the form of numerical values ranging from zero (maximum disapproval) to 4000 (maximum approval) (2000 was the midpoint). Data were stored electronically. After the speech finished, participants completed a brief questionnaire including items concerning the speaker's level of Scottishness (*The speaker's claim to be Scottish was very unconvincing; The speaker was very Scottish; $r = .55$*) and their own level of Scottish identification (*I see myself as being Scottish; I am pleased to be Scottish; I am a person who feels strong ties with the Scottish; I identify with other Scottish people; $\alpha = .83$*).

Preliminary Analyses

To check participants used the dial as instructed, we printed each participant's trace and gave it to two independent judges who were blind as to the nature of the study. The judges were given the same instructions as the participants (when they were trained in the use of the dial) and were asked to identify any departing from these guidelines. Both judges identified one such case which was excluded from analysis. One further participant was excluded because he/she lived on a farm which could impact upon their evaluations for reasons unconnected with their Scottish identity. This resulted in a sample of 55 (civic $n = 28$, ethnic $n = 27$).

For statistical analysis we obtained mean levels of endorsement for each of the four phases of the speech. Specifically, we obtained mean levels of endorsement through averaging each individual's dial-rating over the last 20 seconds of each phase (and then averaging these to obtain condition means). The logic to the selection of this 20 second period for statistical analysis was simple. Speeches unfold over time and it therefore takes a while for audiences to discern the shape, form and direction to a speaker's argument. Moreover, our instructions on use of the dial asked participants to show their ongoing evaluation of the speech which means changes in the evaluation of the speech would emerge gradually. We therefore reasoned that selecting the last 20 seconds of each phase was appropriate as it would allow time for participants to evaluate the emerging argument.ⁱⁱ

Results

Again participants' Scottish identification was heavily skewed towards the upper end (mode = 7, $Mdn = 6.5$, $M = 6.34$, $SD = .70$, skewness = -1.12 , kurtosis = $.80$). Accordingly, we again report two sets of analyses. The first is for all, regardless of identification-level. The second is for the higher identifiers (as in Studies 1 and 2 we employed a criterion of over 5.5 on a 7-point scale). This reduced sample comprised forty-six Scots (ethnic $n = 22$, civic $n = 24$) with Scottish identification being equally high in both conditions (civic $M = 6.70$, $mode = 7.00$, $Mdn = 6.87$; ethnic $M = 6.47$, $mode = 6.50$, $Mdn = 6.50$).

Evaluation of Speech

The average evaluations of the speech during the last 20 seconds of each phase of the speech are presented by condition in [Table 1](#). The upper panel (A) provides these data for the whole sample. The lower panel (B) provides these data for the more highly identifying sample. The most basic test of our prediction (a harsher response to the counter-normative response in the ethnic condition) is to compare the Phase 4 cell means. For the full sample this comparison showed no effect of condition (ethnic $M = 1854$, $SD = 1273$; civic $M = 2313$, $SD = 1432$), $t(53) = 1.25$, $p = .215$. However, for the sample that excluded lower identifiers we found a stronger trend for the ethnic claimant ($M = 1682$, $SD = 1278$) to receive a more negative evaluation than the civic claimant ($M = 2322$, $SD = 1425$), $t(44) = 1.60$, $p = .06$ *one-tailed*, *Cohen's d* = $.47$). Accordingly, our subsequent analyses focused on this sample's data (panel B of [Table 1](#)).

Table 1

Study 3: Audience Response During the Last 20 Seconds of Each Phase

Condition		Phase			
		1.	2.	3.	4.
A. All participants					
Civic (<i>n</i> = 28)	<i>M</i>	3110	2532	3089	2313
	<i>SD</i>	858	1067	954	1432
Ethnic (<i>n</i> = 27)	<i>M</i>	3165	2717	2948	1854
	(<i>SD</i>)	802	1034	849	1273
B. Higher identifiers only					
Civic (<i>n</i> = 22)	<i>M</i>	3038	2442	2957	2322
	<i>SD</i>	884	1091	966	1425
Ethnic (<i>n</i> = 24)	<i>M</i>	3251	2836	3022	1682
	<i>SD</i>	839	1064	803	1278

We investigated the data in the lower panel (B) of Table 1 with analyses that focused on Phase 3 and 4 (corresponding to the normative and counter-normative phases respectively). We conducted two analyses. Our first analysis compared the evaluations in Phase 4 whilst taking into account the evaluations made by the same participants in Phase 3. This was done through using the Phase 3 evaluations as a covariate (which, as it allows us to take into account participants' different usage of the dials, is statistically more powerful than simply comparing the Phase 4 cell means). When this was done we found the covariate had a significant effect, $F(1, 43) = 19.25$, $p < .001$, $\eta p^2 = .31$, as did condition, $F(1, 43) = 4.26$, $p = .045$, $\eta p^2 = .09$. That is, there was a more negative response in the ethnic condition (estimated marginal means and standard errors: ethnic $M = 1653$, $SE = 243$, civic $M = 2348$, $SE = 233$).

The second analysis compared the Phase 3 and Phase 4 cells in a 2 (Condition: ethnic, civic) x 2 (Phase: Phase 3, Phase 4) repeated-measures ANOVA. As should be apparent, as the speech moved from Phase 3 to Phase 4 (in which counter-normative proposals were espoused) we expected agreement with the speech to decline. However, following the logic of the black sheep effect we predicted a steeper decline in the ethnic than civic condition. The decline in agreement from Phase 3 to Phase 4 was apparent in both conditions (civic M Phase 3 = 2957, $SD = 966$; civic M Phase 4 = 2322, $SD = 1425$, $t = 2.86$, $p = .009$; ethnic M Phase 3 = 3022, $SD = 803$, ethnic M Phase 4 = 1682, $SD = 1278$, $t = 5.30$, $p = .001$). However, what is most relevant here is our finding of a significant interaction, $F(1, 44) = 4.42$, $p = .041$, $\eta p^2 = .091$. Inspection of the means in the lower panel (B) of Table 1 shows this is because relative to Phase 3, evaluations in Phase 4 fell more steeply in the ethnic condition. This interpretation is supported from inspecting Figure 1 which presents the (mean) continuous evaluation of the speaker throughout the speech (higher identifiers only). For information, when these analyses were conducted with the full sample, none of the above effects were significant.




Figure 1. Study 3: Continuous (mean) evaluations of the speaker in the ethnic and civic conditions throughout the four phases of the speech (higher identifiers only).

The Speaker's Scottishness

Judgments of the speaker's claim to be Scottish did not vary according to condition for the full sample (M ethnic = 3.23, M civic = 3.02), $t(51) = .50$, $p = .62$. Nor did it differ for the more highly identified sample (M ethnic = 3.30, M civic = 2.80), $t(43) = 1.06$, $p = .30$.

Discussion

Whereas the logic to the *intergroup sensitivity effect* (used in Study 2) is that ingroup critics should receive a more positive reception than outgroup critics, there are some situations in which ingroup members receive a more negative response. Specifically, in a context where a position is established as normative and identity-defining, deviance elicits a more negative response when it comes from an ingroup rather than out-group member (the *black sheep effect*). Following this logic, in Study 3 we predicted more negative responses to the speaker's proposals for land access when the speaker had a stronger claim to Scottishness. In support of this we found that for participants with a stronger national identification, the Phase 4 evaluations of the speaker's proposals tended to be more negative in the ethnic than civic condition. More importantly, we found that the decline in agreement from Phase 3 to Phase 4 (corresponding to the transition from normative to counter-normative arguments) was steeper in the ethnic than in the civic condition. This confirms that different claims elicited different responses. Moreover, following the logic of the *black-sheep effect* these data confirm a greater acceptance of the ethnic over the civic claim.

More generally, it is appropriate to note these results complement existing research into the *black sheep effect*. Typically, investigations of group members' reactions to ingroup deviance employ between-subjects designs in which the group membership of the target individual is manipulated. As we recorded participants' reactions across both normative and counter-normative phases of a speech we have a repeated-measures design allowing us to

document the temporal course to participants' responses and this suggests that the effect really does emerge when ingroup members advocate identity-incongruent positions.

General Discussion

Our research addressed the issue of who is judged as a co-national. We were particularly interested in immigrants who identify strongly with their nation of destination and whether this identification allowed them to be heard as full members of the national community.

Our first study was simple and showed that a claim to national inclusion in terms of place of birth and ancestry was judged stronger than a claim based on subjective identification. Studies 2 and 3 showed that these different claims elicited different responses. Study 2 tested predictions derived from the literature concerning group members' responses to criticism of their group (in which an ingroup member's criticisms are better received than an outgroup member's). We found that a claim invoking ancestry and place of birth resulted in a more sympathetic reception of the claimant's criticisms than a claim invoking subjective identification. Specifically, the levels of agreement with the criticisms and endorsement of the need for behavioral change were greater when ancestry and place of birth were invoked. So too, the affective response to the criticisms was better when the claim to national inclusion was couched in more ethnic terms.

Study 3 complemented this finding through employing one of the few effects in which ingroup members are treated worse than outgroup members – the *black sheep effect* (Abrams, Marques, et al., 2000). This allowed us to show that the more positive response to the ethnic claimant in Study 2 reflected their categorization as ingroup (rather than something else – e.g., interpersonal liking). Amongst high identifiers, we again found that agreement with the claimant depended on the nature of the identity claim with the views of the identity claimant invoking ethnic heritage being judged more problematic than the views of the claimant invoking civic commitment. At first sight this might appear to imply that the civic claimant was advantaged. However, the dynamics to the *black sheep effect* reflect the idea that the degree to which one's views matter is a function of one's identity. When there is uncertainty about what the group thinks on a particular issue, ingroup members are more influential (Abrams, Wetherell, et al., 1990; Turner et al., 1987). However, when there is a consensus (such that an attitudinal position is normative), then ingroup members who deviate from that norm are judged more negatively, and again this is because they and their opinions count (Abrams et al., 2000). That is, counter-normative opinions can be tolerated when coming from outgroup members rather than ingroup members because the opinions of the former do not matter in the same way as those of the latter; it is only when counter-normative positions are adopted by ingroup members that we care enough to take them seriously, experience them as threatening ingroup identity, and respond accordingly (i.e., negatively). Thus, Study 3's results (showing less negative judgment of the civic claimant's proposals) underline the marginality of the civic claimant. Studies 2 and 3 (when we focus on higher identifiers) therefore provide clear, complementary and consistent support for the hypothesis that in the Scottish context, claims to national inclusion are more potent when couched in terms of place of birth and ancestry rather than choice and subjective identification, and that this impacts on the degree to which the identity claimant's opinions are taken seriously.

At the outset to this paper we explained our motivation for this research was to begin to explore the degree to which different claims were accepted, and whether such acceptance was socially consequential. Given research

shows that ethnic definitions of the ingroup can result in hostility to migrants (e.g., Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009), the outcomes investigated here may seem trivial. However, work focusing on the commission of negative acts of discrimination needs complementing with studies of how individuals may miss out on the benefits of community membership (Wakefield et al., 2011). One of these benefits – of obvious significance for everyday citizenship – is of being heard as a community member and of having one's opinions taken seriously. For high identifiers we found a coherent pattern in which a claim based on ancestry and place of birth was stronger and impacted upon the degree to which the claimant was taken seriously.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

With regards to the limitations of our research, the restricted variation in participants' own national identification meant we could not properly investigate whether higher levels of identification moderated the effects we found. Some research suggests high identifiers might be inclined to be more restrictive as to who they accept as ingroup (Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon, & Seron, 2002; Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2010). Yet, other work suggests that there may be no simple relationship between national identification and exclusionary attitudes. For example, Pehrson, Brown, and Zagefka (2009) found that the relationship between English people's level of national identification and prejudice towards asylum seekers was moderated by the criteria participants employed in group definition: high identifiers were only more negative if they held more essentialist (i.e., ethnic) conceptions of Englishness. This implies that those identifying strongly with their nation can be identifying strongly with an inclusive conception of the criteria for belonging and that this could be addressed in future studies of how identification level impacts on the findings reported here.

It should also be clear that our analyses do not mean ethnic claims will always trump civic claims to group membership, whatever the nation. Nations differ in the degree to which they are defined in ethnic terms and such differences are consequential (Pehrson & Green, 2010; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009). Moreover, it is important to note that what we have termed 'civic' criteria can themselves involve a mix of elements and some of these may actually be quite restrictive. For example, Reijerse, Van Acker, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, and Duriez (2013) note that non-ethnic definitions of belonging which emphasize a common cultural tradition can be bases for exclusion rather than (as has often been assumed) bases for inclusion. Future research should therefore consider in more detail the different ways in which non-ethnic conceptions of the nation can have mixed effects.

More generally, future research concerning social identity processes could complement the emphasis on subjective self-definition as a group member (Turner et al., 1987) through exploring the experience of how one's claims to identity are received. Indeed, there is a sense in which if we are to speak of a person as 'having an identity' it is important that others treat that person as having that identity (Jenkins, 1996) and social identity research could usefully consider how the experience of an identity is bound up with its social recognition by others (see Hopkins & Greenwood, 2013). With regard to what we have termed 'everyday citizenship', future research concerning the making and receiving of claims to national group membership should consider the acculturation attitudes of majority group and minority group members and how these are shaped by official (state) policies on citizenship (Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Sénécal, 1997). Indeed, much may be gained though considering the ways in which notions of citizenship are communicated and received in official programmes such as 'citizenship tests' (see Gray & Griffin, 2014). Building upon this, citizenship research could also consider minority group members' experiences of how their attempts to be heard as co-nationals are received. Certainly, rejection can be painful. For example, British Muslims sometimes report feeling that their criticisms of British foreign policy in Afghanistan, Iraq and

Palestine are disregarded because these criticisms are heard as motivated by Muslim rather than British identity commitments (Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011). Obviously, this can be experienced as denying these individuals' Britishness. In addition, as such reactions imply that Islam is an alien faith that is 'out of place' Muslims may also feel that their own understanding of their faith (as a universal religion capable of taking on a local hue) is denied (Hopkins, 2011).

Future research could also examine the everyday encounters in which identity claims are made. Sporting events and festivals (e.g., St Patrick's Day) are obvious occasions for the claiming of national identity, and, despite the appearance of fun and care-free solidarity can be experienced by ethnic minorities as contexts where they are judged as outsiders (Pehrson, Stevenson, Muldoon, & Reicher, 2014). Other contexts include those where surveillance is routine (e.g., airports) and where the pain of misrecognition may be particularly high because it is perceived as carrying the weight of authority (e.g., the police; Blackwood, Hopkins, & Reicher, 2013a, 2013b).

Conclusion

The work reported here suggests that contemporary analyses of citizenship can benefit from exploring the factors impacting upon everyday identity claims-making. It is in the claiming of identities and in the reception of such claims that the right to be heard and have one's views considered is adjudicated.

Notes

i) Scottish undergraduates' evaluation of the policy proposal to give landowners these rights to control access was investigated in a pilot survey ($N = 141$, male $n = 42$, female $n = 99$, M age = 19.3). Compared to the scale midpoint (4) participants judged protection of the land (4 item scale, $\alpha = .68$) to be relatively important to Scottish people ($M = 5.29$, $SD = .84$), $t(139) = 18.19$, $p = .001$, and tended to disagree (6 item scale, $\alpha = .82$) with proposals to let farmers restrict land access ($M = 3.52$, $SD = 1.10$), $t(140) = -5.15$, $p = .001$. Although level of Scottish identification (4 item scale, $\alpha = .90$) was non-normally distributed ($M = 6.01$, $Mdn = 6.25$, $mode = 7.00$, skewness = -1.59, kurtosis = 3.14) the sample size allowed a crude investigation of the relationship between identification and scores on these two scales. Scottish identification tended to correlate positively with ratings of the importance of land protection in Scotland, $r(140) = .165$, $p = .052$, and correlated negatively with endorsement of the proposals to give farmers the right to restrict land access, $r(140) = -.18$, $p = .038$. These data confirm our assumptions about the normativity of Phase 3 and the counter-normativity of Phase 4 of the speech.

ii) In some respects the decision to take a 20 second period as the basis for deriving an average is arbitrary: it could have been a little shorter or a little longer. As there are dangers in exploring the data using several time periods (increasing the chance of Type 1 errors) we decided to select only one time period (20 seconds) and use this in our analysis.

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Competing Interests

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Appendices

Appendix A

Study 1: Scale items

The claimant's Scottishness

1. Such a person can be thought of as being Scottish
2. For such a person to claim to be Scottish is unconvincing (reversed)
3. People like this are as Scottish as anyone else here
4. I see this person as a member of the Scottish national group

Participants' Scottish identification

1. This nationality is very important to me
2. This nationality means little to me (reversed)
3. I feel proud to have this nationality
4. This national identity has no emotional significance for me (reversed)

Study 2: Scale items

Agreement with speaker

1. I agree with the speaker's views put forward in the interview
2. The speaker's comments were inappropriate (reversed)
3. The views of the speaker expressed in the interview are true
4. I think the comments put forward in the interview are unjustified (reversed)
5. The speaker's comments in the interview were spot-on
6. The speaker's comments in the interview were unfair (reversed)
7. The speaker's comments were well-informed

Negative feelings

1. The speaker's comments in the interview were irritating
2. The speaker's comments in the interview were annoying
3. The speaker's comments in the interview were judgemental
4. The speaker's comments in the interview were disappointing
5. The speaker's comments in the interview were offensive
6. The speaker's comments in the interview were insulting
7. The speaker's comments in the interview were arrogant
8. The speaker's comments in the interview were hypocritical
9. The speaker's comments in the interview were ungrateful

Constructiveness of criticism

1. The speaker intended his comments to be constructive
2. The speaker intended his comments to be helpful
3. The speaker intended his comments to be critical (reversed)
4. The speaker intended his comments to be useful
5. The speaker intended his comments to be destructive (reversed)
6. The speaker's comments were made in the best interest of Scotland and its people
7. The speaker cares about Scotland and its people
8. The speaker's comments were intended in a positive way

Behavioral Reform

1. I think Scottish people should be more flexible
2. I think Scottish people should be less conventional
3. I think Scottish people should be more forward-looking

Appendix B**Text of the speech employed in Study 2****[Phase 1. The land: Integral to Scotland's identity and under threat]**

Good evening, let me start by saying what a pleasure it is to be here. This is an area which I get to visit all too rarely. Indeed I haven't managed to get here for a number of years. However it is particularly close to my heart since, as a boy, I spent a number of very happy family holidays nearby. In fact, as I drove up here this afternoon, I had that wonderful feeling of recognition – seeing places that I hadn't seen for so long but which instantly evoked the most vivid memories: I remembered the beaches we used to sit on, I remembered the cafes we used to huddle in when it was raining and we couldn't go to the beach (or at least when my parents didn't want to get wet – at the age of 10 I would have been out there even when it was snowing!). And of course I remembered instantly the wonderful views; the glorious hills and forests and lakes; the beautiful countryside that I am here to talk about today.

You will know better than me what the environment means to us in Scotland. In part it brings us our livelihood whether through agriculture or through tourism. In part it brings us together since generations through the ages have walked the same hills and taken inspiration from the same glens. In part the beauty and the climate form our character and are simply part of who we are. To preserve our environment is therefore an issue that is particularly important to us as Scots.

The issue is all the more important because, as we all know, our environment is under threat. Pollution leads to acid rain that damages the trees. New building developments cut into the land. But perhaps the biggest and most immediate threat is simply the way more and more people are visiting the countryside with less and less respect. Sheer weight of numbers is leading to the erosion of fragile environments as paths become like ugly and growing gashes on the land. Worse still, people trample through the country, damaging rare vegetation, picking wild flowers, and turning once widespread flora into a rarity. Equally, they go too near nest sites, they ignore breeding seasons of birds and animals, they endanger the unique fauna which once not only symbolised Scotland, but could be seen all the time in all their magnificence.

I think everyone will agree that we must protect our environment as a heritage which we hand down to our children and generations beyond. Our countryside is something we cannot see damaged without damaging a little bit of ourselves – and

therefore these environmental issues are not a special interest, and I am not involved in special pleading, but rather addressing something that should be close to the heart of every Scot, and I very firmly count myself amongst that number.

[Phase 2. The speaker's identity claim]

(During this phase participants heard one of the two identity claims used in Study 1).

Appendix C

Additional text of the speech employed in Study 3

In Study 3 the speech comprised the text in Appendix B and the additional text below.

[Phase 3. The need to control land access]

So what can we do? Well the one thing we cannot do is spend so long deciding that, by the time we make our minds up, Scotland has nothing left to save. Plant and animal species are dying at an alarming rate. We must take decisive action and we must take it now. That is why the Scottish Council for the Protection of Rural Scotland is calling on the Scottish Parliament to pass legislation that will protect our countryside, our flora and our fauna by limiting access to fragile environments at critical times. It will allow for footpaths to be closed during breeding seasons if they go close to sensitive nesting sites. It will also allow the closing of paths at critical times if they go through areas of endangered flowers or plants. In other places, it will make it an offence to stray from paths in areas that are designated 'of special environmental significance'. It will ensure that Scotland's unique heritage remains just that – something that will be inherited.

These are tough decisions. Access is an important right. We believe in the right of access to the environment. Indeed we encourage people to access and experience the countryside more. However there is little point granting access if there is nothing to access. That is why we believe these measures, which are no more than ensuring responsible access, will actually increase the rightful pleasure which all Scots get from our beautiful land.

I hope, then, you will agree that these ideas make sense. However sensible ideas are no good unless they work practically. It is no good obtaining the right to protect sensitive sites unless the protection is put in place quickly and efficiently. It would be absurd to say paths can be closed but then erect a bureaucracy which takes so long to respond that, by the time an order has been granted, the damage has already been done. We need a quick and efficient mechanism which identifies problem areas without delay and can immediately enforce decisions about access.

[Phase 4: The speaker's solution]

Now, we could have committees of local councilors making such decisions. We could have committees made up of representatives from the many environmental and wildlife agencies meeting together. Or, we could do what we propose: give decision-making powers to those who are closest to the land - the farmers and local landowners. They should have the right to restrict access to the land. There will be no red tape and no delay. There will be no drawn-out enquiries. No investigations by councilors or officials. People know their own property better than anyone else. Farmers know their own land. They see it more often, they walk through it every day. They can see the first signs of damage that councilors, civil servants or outsiders would miss. What is more, they have more pressing reasons to preserve their own land than anyone else. We need decisive action and those best placed to make quick decisions are those closest to the ground. Farmers and landowners need to be able to restrict access for environmental reasons and should have the authority to do so through signing an 'Environmental Closure' notice that would have immediate effect. Only if closure exceeds a certain period, say a month or more, should others – perhaps a committee of local councilors – be asked to review such decisions. Let's get real about the issues and deliver a mechanism for efficient action. So please, I ask you to support this call for new legislation. Please sign the petition, write to your MSP's (Members of the Scottish Parliament). Talk to your friends and workmates and get them to sign and write. Our message is very straightforward and very simple: 'Move now to protect our land – for Scotland's sake'.



A journey to citizenship: Constructions of citizenship and identity in the British Citizenship Test

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The British Citizenship Test was introduced in 2005 as one of a raft of new procedures aimed at addressing the perceived problems of integration and social cohesion in migrant communities. In this study, we argue that this new citizenship procedure signals a shift in British political discourse about citizenship – particularly, the institutionalization of a common British citizen identity that is intended to draw citizens together in a new form of political/national community. In line with this, we examine the British Citizenship Test from a social psychological perspective to interrogate the ways in which the test constitutes identity, constitutes citizenship, and constitutes citizenship-as-identity. Analysis of the test and its associated documents highlights three ways in which Britishness-as-identity is constituted, that is, as a collective identity, as a superordinate and national identity, and finally as both a destination and a journey. These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for models of citizenship and models of identity.

Citizenship, as one writer suggests, is ‘on everyone’s minds today’ (Joppke, 1999, p. 629); a statement which is borne out by the considerable focus on citizenship in both political discourse and social scientific enquiry. Of particular concern, is the relationship between citizenship and immigration, with many pointing out that a significant dilemma facing many modern states is the need for migration to meet labour needs, amid concerns about integration and social cohesion (Joppke, 2007; Yuval-Davis, Anthias, & Kofman, 2005). In response, the UK government (under New Labour) introduced mandatory citizenship tests, in which migrants are required to demonstrate that they have ‘sufficient knowledge of English, Welsh or Scots Gaelic’ and ‘sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom’ before being granted citizenship (Home Office, 2002).^{1,2}

In this study, we argue that this new citizenship procedure forms part of a broader citizenship agenda aimed at reconceptualizing British citizenship as a civic identity, centred on core values emblematic of British society. As such, we explore the Citizenship

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¹ Immigrants who seek ‘indefinite leave to remain’, that is, apply for permanent settlement status in the United Kingdom, also have to pass the Citizenship Test or complete a pertinent ESOL course.

² This is alongside already existing requirements that applicants must have 5 years more or less continuous residence, stay ‘closely connected to the United Kingdom,’ and have no serious criminal record. It should be noted that previous to this rule there was an English language requirement for citizenship. However, this was never formally tested and has been described as ‘undefined... often perfunctory and sometimes uselessly minimal’ (Home Office, 2003, p. 4).

Test from a social psychological perspective, with the aim of interrogating the way in which this policy discourse of citizenship-as-identity is instituted both in, and through, this new citizenship practice.

Theorizing citizenship and identity

In recent years, debates about citizenship have become increasingly dominated by discussions of identity; although there is little agreement about how these concepts are (or should be) related. For some, identity is central to understanding how people experience their rights and obligations, whether they participate, in what form, and why (Isin & Wood, 1999; Pell, 2008; Werbner & Yuval-Davis, 1999; Taylor, 1994; Turner, 1999). Others, however, argue that citizenship and identity are antinomic attachments because citizenship is universal, whereas identity is particular (Littleton, 1996; Morley and Robins, 1995). That is, people's identities and memberships of particular groups (and the assertion of their rights as members of these groups) are seen to be at odds with the promotion of universal human rights at the level of nation state.

Central to these debates is the recognition that identity (much like citizenship) is an 'essentially contested construct' (Gallie, 1955, p. 169) – the subject of a fundamental dispute between those who wish to identify essential attributes of persons or groups, and those who claim that there are no durable attributes at all (Howard, 2000). Post-modern theorists have sought to destabilize the idea that there is some 'authentic' or essential content to any identity, for example, as defined by a common experience, a common origin, or both (Bruner, 1990; Hall, 1996; Howard, 2000). They posit instead that identity is a relational concept, as the boundaries and meanings of identities and social categories are constructed and reconstructed through talk and social interaction (Bruner, 1990; Gergen, 1991, 1994; Hall, 1996; Shotter & Gergen, 1989). Importantly, this re-theorization of identity has profound consequences for citizenship, as it moves beyond models where individuals are assumed to practice and experience citizenship in the same way. Leading to the development of anti-essentialist concepts such as Diaspora, which represents the identities of those moving between cultures (Clifford, 1994); or hybridity, which has been used to destabilize traditional binaries and myths around cultural homogeneity (Bhabha, 1996). These concepts present radically re-conceptualized notion of citizenship – one that deals with 'the diverse communities to which we belong, the complex interplay of identity and identification in modern society, and the differentiated ways in which people now participate in social life' (Hall & Held, 1989, p. 4). In this way, identities have come to be constituted as a problem of (and for) citizenship, by fundamentally challenging our conceptualization of what citizenship is (or should be) in a post-modern world (Howard, 2000; Isin & Wood, 1999; Mouffe, 1993, 1995).

Social psychological approaches to citizenship and identity

Social psychologists have only recently begun to address these questions about the relationship between identity, citizenship, and the meaning of belonging (Barnes, Auburn, & Lea, 2004; Condor, 2011a; Condor & Gibson, 2007; Haste, 2004). Indeed, psychologists have paid relatively little attention to citizenship, and where attention has been paid it has focused primarily on the nature and extent of citizen behaviours, for example, by characterizing those who participate in politics, or by looking at processes of political decision making (e.g., Tyler, Rasinski, & Griffin, 1986). However, while little

attention has been paid to citizenship, social psychologists have contributed much to anti-essentialist theorizations of the self. In particular, many social psychologists have sought to relocate identity from the private realm of cognition to the public realm of discourse, arguing for a focus on language and dialogue – not just as a channel to underlying mental processes, but rather talk and text studied as situated social practices (Billig, 1996a; Gergen, 1991, 1994; Potter, 2000).

In treating talk as a ‘performative discourse’ (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 218), researchers have begun to critically re-examine the nature of political subjectivities – demonstrating the ways in which the boundaries and meaning of the nation are constituted in and through discourse – for example, in political speeches (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996; Wodak, De Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 2009), in the social memories of national groups (Lyons, 1996), and in racist discourse (Gray, Delany, & Durrheim, 2005; Lynn & Lea, 2003; van Dijk, 2000). These studies demonstrate that nationhood is not simply a ‘top-down’ political strategy but also a socio-historical process residing between members of nation. Moreover, this work addresses the ideological processes involved in the production and maintenance of ‘nation-ness’. A key example being the work of Billig (1995, 1996b) who examines the ways in which ‘nation-ness’ is continually reproduced through mundane reminders or ‘ideological habits’ (e.g., postage stamps or national newspapers). Billig (1995) argues that explicit appeals to national identity are rendered possible by these mundane reminders that sustain the concept of the nation (in a world of nations) as the natural order of things.

In her work on the ways in which ‘ordinary actors’ construct themselves as nationalized subjects, Condor (1996, 2000) argues that top-down assumptions about political subjectivity do not always correspond well to everyday accounts of selfhood, nationhood, and civil society. For example, in a study of English respondents’ talk about ‘this country’, Condor (2000) demonstrates that – far from being an unproblematic basis for subjectivity – national categories can be orientated to as a matter of intolerance and prejudice. In addition, studies of English and Scottish national identity have demonstrated that constructions of nationhood can vary across different national contexts, and across normative and rhetorical requirements. For example, Condor and Abell (2006a) highlight that ‘nation-ness’ is constructed as a progressive moral value in Scotland, but as retrogressive in England. Moreover, Condor and Abell (2006b) demonstrate the ways in which citizenship is constructed in communitarian terms in Scotland, and in terms of liberal individualism in England. Finally, questions have been raised about the degree to which national categories are necessarily realized as a form of collective ‘identity’, as the boundaries of the political community can also be constituted in institutional, geographic, or territorial terms (Abell, Condor, & Stevenson, 2006). Similarly, it is not clear that people will automatically construct citizenship at the level of the nation state (Condor & Abell, 2006a; Condor & Gibson, 2007). Thus, rather than assume that citizenship is always understood as a form of (national) political subjectivity, it may be more useful to ask when (and why) different forms of representation are used.

Condor (2011a) argues that the questions posed here require a new social psychology of citizenship – one that explores the *practice* of citizenship as manifest in and through discursive action. This is echoed by Haste (2004) who argues that the relocation of subjectivity from the cognitive to the discursive realm undermines the idea that citizenship resides in people’s heads (see also Barnes *et al.*, 2004). Similarly, Shotter (1993) argues that political objects do not exist in some objective sense; rather citizenship always entails the members of a community debating the meaning and scope of ‘who should belong and why’ (p. 193). Thus, he argues that citizenship

is not automatically conferred upon individuals, but is always being revised and argued over as part of the 'cultural politics of everyday social life' (p. 187). This means that it is something of a simplification to assume that certain entitlements will unproblematically flow from establishing oneself as a citizen. Instead, what really matters is the process of negotiation and contestation in which these identities are mobilized.

Citizenship and identity in political discourse

In this study, we draw on – and hope to extend – this contemporary social psychological work on citizenship by examining the ways in which citizenship and identity are constituted in the British Citizenship Test. We have focused here on the Citizenship Test as a paradigmatic example of an broad shift in (British) political discourse about citizenship – particularly, a shift away from models which conceptualize citizenship as a set of universal rights or responsibilities (e.g., Marshall, 1950), and towards a model which explicitly defines citizenship as civic identity that is produced by (and productive of) a sense of belonging and loyalty to a political community. Indeed, a stated aim of the British Citizenship Test is to give deeper and broader substance to the formal status of citizenship by 'strengthening active participation...and a sense of belonging to the wider British community' (Home Office, 2003, p. 29).

This reconceptualization of citizenship highlights a set of wider concerns about integration and social cohesion in migrant communities. Many governments have actively promoted citizen identities in an attempt to respond to these concerns about cultural and ethnic difference (Meekosha & Dowse, 1997; Seidman, 1999). Likewise, the notion of a unified (and unifying) British citizen identity is clearly intended to address the perceived failures of multiculturalism (Lewis & Neal, 2005; Yuval-Davis *et al.*, 2005). Critics of multiculturalism have long argued that a commitment to cultural diversity has allowed cultural differences to proliferate at the expense of solidarity (Greenwood & Robins, 2002; Kundnani, 2007; Young, 2003). This polarization of diversity and solidarity means that terrorism and 'disorder' can be attributed to problems of cohesion and integration (rather than structural issues like racism or deprivation). A common citizen identity is then proposed as a solution to the problems of integrating migrants into a 'national collective' (Kundnani, 2007; Young, 2003); the intention being to foster a diverse mosaic of cultures with a 'thick' framework of citizenship (Etzioni, 1995). Thus, rather than multicultural citizenship which encouraged the right to be different, this new citizenship-as-identity encourages variety within a framework of national sameness.

Citizenship tests are the practical way in which this new citizen identity is to be instilled by contributing, on a symbolic level, to the significance of becoming a British citizen. That is 'citizenship is more esteemed and valued when it is earned, not given' (Home Office, 2003, p. 4). It is argued that knowledge of the English language and UK life will allow citizens to engage in public life and accept their citizen responsibilities (Kiwani, 2007). In this way, the citizenship test explicitly links ideas of identity to active participation and active citizenship (see Oldfield, 1990). Concepts which are in turn linked to diversity and integration, in the sense that 'the more we know about each other, the less likely are serious problems to arise' (Home Office, 2003, p. 8). Thus, citizenship tests become tools for embedding integrative citizen identities, in that they teach migrants about the 'values and principles at the heart of being British' and 'encourage participation in British life' (Home Office, 2013).

In the United Kingdom – as in other countries in Western Europe – the practice of citizenship testing has been widely debated in both academic and non-academic arenas (e.g., see Sales, 2005; Worley, 2005; Yuval-Davis *et al.*, 2005). The test has also undergone several revisions; highlighting the ways in which such policies inevitably reflects the ideological commitments of governments – those of New Labour and the Coalition Government. However, to date, there has been little research on the Citizenship Test, and none on the ways in which this discourse of citizenship-as-identity is constituted in this context, and with what impact. We argue that this represents an important gap, in the sense that the British Citizenship Test provides a useful case in point for understanding how citizen identities are constructed in political discourse, and how this relates to current theoretical understandings of citizenship and identity. Moreover, we argue that the Test provides an important case for exploring the discursive practice of citizenship (cf. Condor, 2011a), insofar as the Test sets out the (normative) boundaries and meanings of citizenship, as well being an important arena within which social actors are positioned as politicized (and nationalized) subjects. As such, we present here a discursive analysis of the British Citizenship Test, with the aim of examining the ways in which the Test constitutes identity, constitutes citizenship, and constitutes citizenship-as-identity. The methods of this study, the data, and our analytic strategy are discussed in more detail below.

Method

The data corpus for this study comprised the various books, study guides, and web resources provided by the Home Office and UK Borders Agency. This corpus was chosen to reflect those sources of information recommended by these agencies to all applicants, and therefore represents all official documentation available on the Citizenship Test at the time of analysis. This includes:

1. *Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship*. This is the official handbook for the Citizenship Test, which all applicants are required to learn. Analyses focused on the second edition of handbook, which covered the periods April 2007 to April 2013. The handbook contains nine chapters covering a variety of topics, all of which were included in the analysis.
2. *The Official Citizenship Test Study Guide* and *Passing the Life in the UK Test: Official Practice Questions and Answers*. These two handbooks contain practice tests and questions based on the content of the Life in the UK Handbook. All material in these two books was included in the analysis.
3. *The Life in the UK website* (<http://lifeintheuktest.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk>). This website contains additional resources and information for applicants. All material from the website was downloaded (21 April 2012) and included in the analysis.

The data were analysed using a discourse analytic method, drawing on both discursive psychology (cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and rhetorical psychology (cf. Billig, 1991, 1996a). These two approaches are broadly concerned with the action orientation of talk – that is, the ways in which particular versions of social reality are constructed through discourse and rhetoric, and the practices that are enabled (or disabled) by such constructions. To this end, we first conducted a close textual analysis where data were coded on a concept-by-concept basis, looking at particular discursive practices and rhetorical strategies used to present

particular constructions and/or meanings of citizenship and belonging. Secondly, we revisited the data looking at the functions of such constructions. Function was considered both in terms of the local context – for example, fact construction (e.g., Potter, 1996) and the management of stake and interest (e.g., Edwards & Potter, 1992) – and in terms of their wider ideological implications. Thus, we were not only concerned with the particular discursive and rhetorical practices involved in constructing citizenship-as-identity, but also how these related to current socio-political contexts and debates in the United Kingdom (cf. Billig, 1991). The value of this approach for this study is that it enabled us to explicitly consider how particular constructions of citizenship-as-identity relate to particular ways of organizing the world or structuring society, for example, in terms of regulating access to citizenship and the notion of belonging. Finally, we also drew analytic direction from previous social psychological work on citizenship and nationhood (e.g., Abell *et al.*, 2006; Barnes *et al.*, 2004; Condor & Gibson, 2007) to situate the analysis within a broader theoretical framework.

Analysis

In summarizing our findings, we focus on three ways in which British citizenship-as-identity is constituted across the data, that is, that citizenship is constituted as a collectively defined identity, that citizenship is contextually located as a superordinate and a national identity, and finally that the process of acquiring citizenship-as-identity is constituted as both a destination (i.e., as a cognitive accomplishment) and as a journey (i.e., as a practical accomplishment).

Citizenship as a collectively defined identity

Ultimately, one of the main functions of the British Citizenship Test is to articulate and regulate what it means to be a British citizen, both in terms of the values and traditions that constitute a British citizen identity, as well as the practices and procedures that enable one to be called a ‘good citizen’. In this way, the Test discursively constitutes the *content* of Britishness as a citizen identity, and constitutes Britishness as comprising factual content that can be learnt. Importantly, this is positioned as a collective activity. That is, Britishness as a citizen identity is constituted as being socially articulated and as collectively defined. Consider the following extracts, all of which are taken from the *Life in the United Kingdom Handbook* (hereafter referred to as LITUK).

Extracts 1–4: ‘Constituting a Consensus’

1. Many parents believe that part-time work helps children to become more independent as well as providing them (and sometimes their families) with extra income (LITUK Handbook, p. 31).
2. Many parents are involved with their child’s school (LITUK Handbook, p. 33).
3. Research shows that very few people today believe that women in Britain should stay at home and not go out to work (LITUK Handbook, p. 29).
4. All good citizens are expected to help the police prevent and detect crimes whenever they can...If you are stopped by the police you should give the officer your name and address. You do not need to answer any more questions, although usually people do (LITUK Handbook, p. 88).

These extracts highlight a number of the issues that aspiring citizens are required to learn about for the Citizenship Test, for example, about the role of women, parenting, and policing. However, beyond this, they also highlight a prevalent discursive strategy found across the data corpus – one which we have labelled ‘most people believe that’. This strategy takes several forms throughout the data, but generally involves the dictation of a set of actions or values that many, most, few, or all people in the United Kingdom ascribe to. For example, in Extracts 1 and 2 we see that ‘many’ people in the United Kingdom allow their children to work, and are involved in their child’s education, whereas in Extract 3 it is claimed that ‘few’ people in the United Kingdom believe that women should not go out to work. Importantly, these claims are rendered factual through recourse to ‘research’ – something which was widespread across the data set where ‘facts’ were often taken from sources of representative accounting, for example, the Census or the British Social Attitudes Survey. Finally, Extract 4 uses an extreme case formulation to make the claim that ‘all good citizens’ are expected to help the police to solve crimes (Pomerantz, 1986). This goes beyond the rights and obligations of citizenship, as a citizen’s right to silence when questioned by the police is posited against what (good) citizens ‘usually’ do in circumstances like these. In this way, the Test constructs British citizen identity as being about different forms of collective agreement about what citizens should and should not value, and what citizens should and should not do.

Several discursive studies have highlighted the way that discourses of consensus can act to produce ‘out-there-ness’ (Potter, 1996, p. 150), insofar as they construct accounts as being shared across producers. These ‘externalising devices’ are often considered to have the function of fact construction, as accounts are formulated in such a way as to appear independent of the producer, thereby resolving dilemmas of both stake and accountability (cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996). Looking at the extracts above, this discursive strategy of ‘most people believe that’ has this function, in the sense that agency (and therefore accountability) for articulating a citizen identity is transferred from the producers of the account (in the case the Government) to the ‘many people’. Thus, it is not the government who has defined (good) citizenship as being about independence, active parenting, tolerance, and participation in the processes of policing. Instead, these are reformulated as values that are defined by the wider British community of citizens.

However, mobilizing this discursive strategy of ‘most people believe that’ is not only related to the construction of ‘out-there-ness’ but also to the construction of ‘in-here-ness’ – most obviously in the way that the values and practices articulated in the Test are constructed as reflecting what the majority of people in the United Kingdom unproblematically believe. Thus, the Test does not articulate what ‘in here’ should look like, but rather what ‘in here’ already does look like, in that it is based on a set of normatively agreed principles. This discursive strategy is only drawn on in certain contexts. For example, the Test is silent about what ‘most people’ in the United Kingdom believe about immigration, despite this being a substantial portion of the handbook. Thus, some government and policy goals are reformulated as social and citizenship goals, through positioning particular ideological values about tolerance, diversity, and liberal independence as being what ‘most people’ would believe or what ‘most people’ would do. Moreover, the values of citizenship are legitimated in terms of a normative consensus of views and/or practices, as opposed to the perspective of the powerful elite.

Citizenship as a superordinate and national identity

A second key finding from our analysis is that citizenship-as-identity is located at a variety of levels – including both at a superordinate and at a national level. In this way, the Test articulates not only the *content* of Britishness as an identity but also the *contexts* within which this identity can (or should be) realized:

Extracts 5–6: ‘A Super-ordinate Identity...’

5. The UK has been a multi-national and multicultural society for a long time without this being a threat to its British identity, or its English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish cultural and national identities (LITUK Handbook, p. 25).
6. The adjective ‘British’, however, usually refers to everyone in the UK...In the United Kingdom, national identity and citizenship do not mean the same thing. The Scottish and Welsh will usually say that they have British (or UK) citizenship, but that their nationality is Scottish or Welsh. In Northern Ireland some people say they are British, some people say they are Irish and some people say they are both. This depends on their political and cultural allegiances. People born in England will more often say that their nationality as well as their citizenship is British (LITUK Handbook, p. 7).

These two extracts demonstrate the positioning of citizenship as a superordinate identity that is deliberately divorced from identities of nation or culture. That is, Britishness as a citizen identity is carefully located as a supranational form of collective belonging that is different from, and irreducible to, ‘Englishness’, ‘Scottishness’, ‘Welshness’, or ‘Irishness’; which in contrast are constituted as particularistic forms of national (or in some cases cultural) identity. As in the extracts above, this superordinate location of citizenship is often achieved discursively by the explicit invoking of a categorical distinction between citizenship and nationality (Billig, 1995, 2003) – that is, that ‘national identity and citizenship do not mean the same thing’. However, across the data this is also achieved more implicitly. For example, as in Extract 7, through the establishment of Britain and the United Kingdom as ‘multi-national society’, and by consequence ‘British’ as a multi-national identity.

This location of ‘Britishness’ at a superordinate level performs important discursive work. For example, as in Extract 5, such positioning allows for a critique of (often unstated) arguments about how multiculturalism poses a threat to British identity (usually articulated around ‘race’). Moreover, such positioning constitutes British identity as inclusive rather than exclusive (as in Extract 6), by detaching citizenship from notions of ‘race’ and descent (anyone can be British no matter what country of the United Kingdom they are born in), and by detaching citizenship from notions of national territoriality (‘the adjective “British” usually refers to everyone in the UK’). In this way, the Test side-steps ethno-nationalist understandings of Britishness and avoids politically charged accusations of Anglo-centrism. Instead, Britishness is located as a more inclusive form of commonality (see Abell *et al.*, 2006). Conversely this means that national identity (in relation to English, Scots, or Irish identity) often becomes implicitly constituted in ethnic (and more exclusive) terms, for example, as being about shared descent.

Across the data this careful location of ‘British’ as a superordinate category of identity is far from unproblematic. In almost direct contrast to the descriptions outlined above, there are numerous examples across the Test documents where the United Kingdom is constituted in explicitly national (rather than multinational) terms:

Extract 7: 'Nations and Regions...'

7. The UK is a medium sized country. The longest distance on the mainland, from John O'Groats on the north coast of Scotland to Land's End in the south west corner of England, is about 870 miles (approximately 1,400 km). Most of the population live in towns and cities. There are many variations in culture and language in the different parts of the United Kingdom. This is seen in differences in architecture, in some local customs, in types of food, and especially in language. The English language has many accents and dialects. These are a clear indication of regional differences in the UK (LITUK Handbook, p. 37).

In this extract, the United Kingdom is located very differently to in Extracts 5 and 6 above. Rather than being positioned as a multinational entity, the United Kingdom is instead located as a 'country' made up of 'regions' – a descriptor which was prevalent across the data corpus. Moreover, it is described as having a land mass, as well as territorial and geographic boundaries, which define it (and its limits) in relation to other countries, for example, the United Kingdom is classified as medium sized, presumably in comparison with other countries in the world (Wallwork & Dixon, 2004). Through this use of geographic referents, the United Kingdom is discursively constructed as a singular (and perhaps national) entity, a description which is in stark contrast to the idea of multinationalhood presented above (see Abell *et al.*, 2006). In addition, in other parts of the LITUK test handbook, United Kingdom is described as having a 'national spirit' (p. 22), a 'national leader' (p. 24), and also national institutions such as 'national banks' (p. 60). In this way, the United Kingdom is constituted as a 'nation in a world of nations' (Billig, 1995).

In many ways, this location of Britishness as both a superordinate and a national identity is indicative of a wider debate about the correct meaning and use of the terms 'Britain' and the 'UK' (see Condor & Abell, 2006a). Indeed, it has been pointed out that even academic research often employs highly variable accounts of nationhood (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). However, these different ways of locating citizenship are orientated to the management of accounts of diversity and accounts of sameness. That is, these test documents are clearly orientated towards providing celebratory accounts of diversity – something which has been identified as a key element of appeals to British identity in formal political rhetoric (e.g., see Condor, 2011b). However, these documents are also orientating to the need to articulate a singular and enduring 'national character' (cf. Billig, 1995; Condor, 2011b; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) that promotes unity. Thus, the endorsement of values of cultural and racial diversity does not preclude the need for some kind of account of enduring national sameness.

This tension is managed in different ways across the data. For example, in Extract 5 the endorsement of plurality is positioned not as a value, but as an enduring property of the United Kingdom, and hence a key feature of *what is means to be like us* (i.e., 'UK has been a multi-national and multicultural society for a long time'). In addition, in both Extracts 5 and 6, the singularity of a British identity is juxtaposed against the fluidity of 'English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish' cultural and national identities. For example, it is noticeable in Extract 6 that while people's national identification is described as changeable, Britishness as a citizen identity is not. Finally, in Extract 7 these accounts of diversity are managed by shifting from a multinational to a national framework – which also allows a shift from descriptions of national variation within a supranational framework to descriptions of regional variation within a national 'country' framework. Abell *et al.* (2006) point to the ways in which geographic referents (such as 'country') can be used to depopulate national categories – for example, by constituting the population as inhabitants of a common place, rather than

as having a common social/national identity – and such concerns are clear here. Indeed, Extract 7 presents the United Kingdom as a singular ‘country’, but not as having a singular identity. Instead, it is positioned as a geographic container of difference – ‘in architecture, in some local customs, in types of food, and especially in language’. In this way, the United Kingdom is constructed as a container or wrapper of diversity, rather than something which is in itself diverse.

A journey to citizenship

In this final section, we focus on the ways in which the Test discursively constitutes the *process* of acquiring British citizenship-as-identity, and hence the ways in which a person comes to be called (and call themselves) ‘British’. In particular, analyses reveal two contrary constructions across the data – namely, that citizenship is constituted as a destination, in the sense that it is constituted as an identity that is arrived at through *knowing*, and as a journey, in the sense that it is constituted as an on-going process based on *doing*. Consider the following scenarios.

Extracts 8–12: ‘Citizenship as a Destination’

8. By passing the Life in the UK Test, you will show that you have the knowledge of English and of UK life that you need for citizenship (LITUK Website, Introducing the Test).

9. Which of the following statements is correct?

- A. The UK was a founder member of the European Economic Community
- B. The UK was a founder member of the Council of Europe

(Official Test Practice Booklet Page 13)

10. At what age do children in Scotland start secondary school?

- A. 10
- B. 12
- C. 13
- D. 14

(Official Test Practice Booklet Page 104)

11. How many women with children are in paid work?

- A. Nearly a quarter
- B. Nearly a half
- C. Nearly two-thirds
- D. Nearly three-quarters

(Official Test Practice Booklet Page 14)

12. Which of these statements is correct?

- A. Many people from Liverpool speak with a Scouse dialect
- B. Many people from Tyneside speak with a Scouse dialect.

(Official Test Practice Booklet Page 74)

These extracts demonstrate many of the findings discussed above, for example, the concern with what ‘most people do’ (Extract 10), and the location of citizenship at supranational (Extract 8) and national (Extract 10) levels. This, along with the ‘most people’ discourse of consensus, invokes a strong sense of the power of the normative in the constitution of Britishness. However, beyond this, these extracts demonstrate the ways in which citizenship-as-identity is constituted as a destination – as a series of ‘facts’ that can be learned, passed, or failed. Indeed, citizenship here is constituted as an identity that one can have (or achieve) as a result of learning (and showing that one has learnt) the ‘knowledge of English and of UK life that you need for citizenship’ (Extract 7). This is despite the fact that some of the ‘facts’ presented in the LITUK Handbook are incorrect – particularly given governmental structure and policy changes introduced by the Coalition Government. In this way, the Citizenship Test explicitly constructs citizenship-as-identity as being about *knowing*, as it is only through knowing about women and work (Extract 10), the relationship between the UK and Europe (Extract 8), national differences in education (Extract 9), and local dialects (Extract 11) that people can access citizenship. In addition, British citizen identity is primarily constructed as a cognitive accomplishment – as a set of facts to be learnt and as a test that can be passed or failed – as it is only through internalizing this knowledge that one can move from ‘out-there’ to ‘in-here’. This is in contrast to the notion of citizenship as a ‘right’, a legal status, or as a felt allegiance to a nation.

Across the data corpus, this understanding of citizenship as a destination is contrasted with the construction of citizenship as a journey – as being more than passing the Citizenship Test. Instead, citizenship is constituted as an on-going process that is reliant not on *knowing*, but on *doing*, as it is through participation that citizenship is realized. Thus, alongside this construction of citizenship as a cognitive accomplishment, citizenship-as-identity is also constituted as a practical accomplishment.

Extracts 13–14: ‘Citizenship as a Journey’

13. The purpose of this book is to help new migrants who want to become British citizens to become more aware of the laws, customs and traditions here. Knowing about these things will make it easier to become a full and active citizen, but reading a book is no substitute for being a part of society. By getting to know and understand your community, life will be better for everyone. (LITUK Handbook, p. 107).
14. English-speaking friends, neighbours or people at work might be able to help you. This is also a good way to get to know people better, because even British people don’t know all the answers (LITUK Study Guide, p. 9).

In these Extracts, we see a very different understanding of citizenship to those presented in Extracts 7–11 above. Extract 13 shows an interesting discursive shift, in the sense that the Test is no longer described as providing the knowledge that is needed for citizenship (as in Extract 7). Nor is such knowledge enough to become a ‘full citizen’. Instead, it is participating in society that enables one to claim this status, and knowledge is constructed as enabling this process to occur. This extract also makes an implicit distinction between knowledge gained through books and reading, and knowledge gained through participation and doing. Thereby retaining the link between knowledge and citizenship – although, clearly it is the participatory form of knowledge which is prioritized, as it is only knowledge gained through *doing* that makes ‘life better for everyone’ (Extract 13).

Interestingly, Extract 14 also contains the claim that ‘even British people don’t know all the answers’. A claim which runs contrary to Extract 7 above, where knowledge is constructed as essential to the category ‘citizen’. This undermines the claim that passing the Citizenship Test can be taken as evidence of citizenship status and, instead, references another potential meaning of citizenship – as a felt allegiance linked to national identity. Moreover, it creates a hierarchy of citizens, differentiating between those who are required to pass the Test and already existing citizens who do not need to even take it (or have the knowledge to take it).

According to Billig *et al.* (1988), these contrary constructions of citizenship-as-identity can be taken to indicate a wider ideological dilemma – in this case a dilemma of citizenship. This is perhaps not too surprising given that citizenship is a contested concept in both formal and everyday discourse (cf. Condor, 2011a; Condor & Gibson, 2007). Moreover, the distinction between citizenship as knowing and citizenship as doing echoes wider debates about the degree to which citizenship should be conceptualized as a set of unconditional rights, as opposed to political participation meaningfully constituted in interaction (e.g., see Isin & Wood, 1999; Oldfield, 1990). However, these contrary constructions of citizenship also relate to an underlying tension within the Citizenship Test itself, between the regulatory function of the Citizenship Test (determining who is able to call themselves a British citizen) and its identity function (instilling a sense of belonging to the British community). The regulatory (and legal) function of citizenship testing requires that a set of criteria be established that allows someone to be granted citizenship status. However, the identity function of citizenship testing requires that people not only have this knowledge but to use it to claim a British citizen identity that enables them to integrate into British society. These two functions are contradictory, and lend themselves to similarly contradictory constructions of citizenship as knowing and doing.

Discussion

In this study, we have argued that the introduction of citizenship testing in the United Kingdom represents a fundamental change in political discourse about citizenship, insofar as it institutes (and institutionalizes) the notion of citizenship as a form of identity that migrants can attain by ‘internalising’ a set of ‘core values’. The Test is also based on a concept of citizenship identity that can be learned (and not just ‘felt’ or ‘claimed’). In our analyses, we have outlined the parameters of this citizen identity, focusing on the ways in which the Test and its associated documents constitute citizenship as a collectively defined identity, as a superordinate and nationally located identity, and as both a cognitive and a practical accomplishment. In this way, the procedures and processes of attaining citizenship are reformulated as identity practices – as a way of articulating, instilling, and testing whether someone has assumed the core national values or sense of belonging to the British national collectivity, which is now a pre-condition for gaining formal British citizenship.

This (re)conceptualization of citizenship-as-identity raises a number of key concerns. For one thing, defining citizenship as a collectively agreed identity constructs it as a form of democratic practice that represents, and emerges from, the values and actions of the majority. However, this raises questions about the right for minority values to be ‘heard’ within a citizenship framework, or to be part of a British citizen identity. Indeed, it has been argued that such claims move us away from affirmations of multiculturalism towards demands for cultural sameness – albeit within a newer language of community (Kundnani, 2007; Worley, 2005). The onus is on immigrant communities to ‘subsume their cultural heritage within Britishness’ (Kundnani, 2007, p. 26), as it is the lack of integration in these

communities that is linked to extremism. However, it has been argued that it is not a lack of acquaintance with British values that is to blame. Instead, many have argued for the reverse, that is, that widespread cultural inclusion, followed by structural exclusion create conditions for protest (Young, 2003). As these institutional and interpersonal forms of discrimination are not addressed by the Citizenship Test, many argue that it can do little to promote cohesion and, instead, will merely promote the hegemony of White (male) Britishness (Kundnani, 2007).

Likewise, there are issues with the ways in which the form of 'Britishness' presented in the Test relates to wider social understandings of the meanings and practices associated with being a British citizen. For example, it has been argued that the 'core of Britishness' arguments ignore the centrality of both ethnicity and religion to the cultural construction of British identity (Greenwood & Robins, 2002; Sales, 2005). However, it is precisely these issues which undermine the claim that anybody, insofar as they pass their Citizenship Test and meet the criteria of entry, can have unproblematic access to citizenship-as-identity (Sales, 2005; Yuval-Davis *et al.*, 2005). Similarly, attempts to locate citizenship as either a 'superordinate' or a 'national' identity ignores the ways in which such identities are mobilized within and across particular contexts. For example, while people in England tend to construct Britishness as a form of 'national' identity, people living elsewhere in the country typically dissociate their British citizenship from their (e.g., Scottish or Welsh) national identity (Abell *et al.*, 2006; Condor & Abell, 2006a). This highlights that these identities cannot be unproblematically 'taken up', but rather are contested and negotiated at all levels (see Shotter, 1993). Overall, this is a question of identity legitimacy, and whether the version of 'Britishness' provided here provides people with the ability to account for themselves in ways that others find legitimate (cf. Bruner, 1990; Shotter, 1993).

Central to these concerns is the notion of citizenship (and citizen identities) as something which can be learned – transforming citizenship from a set of universal rights to a matter of technical expertise, where individuals 'levels' of attainment can be tested, passed, and failed. This conflation of citizenship with knowledge is a problematic construction of citizenship, as it constitutes some citizens as more 'qualified' than others, enabling arguments that political decision making should be rightly devolved to those with domain-specific expertise (see Condor & Gibson, 2007). Likewise, it is also a problematic understanding of identity, in the sense that the Citizenship Test broadly equates knowledge of values with the internalization of those values in some form of identity process. However, the Citizenship Test cannot determine the degree to which a citizen identity has been instilled – all it can indicate is the degree to which knowledge has been acquired; something which is problematic given that the stated aim of the Citizenship Test is explicitly focused on identity as a means to integration. It could be argued that the aim is to promote some form of 'trickle up' effect, in the sense that the Test assures a level of knowledge that then promotes the process of identity construction – hence the constitution of citizenship as 'doing' as well as 'knowing'. However, it remains unclear how migrants would negotiate constructions of citizenship as an emergent and on-going process that extends beyond the formality of becoming a British citizen.

Citizenship tests were formally introduced in 2005. However, since then there has been very little research on how newly instituted processes for becoming British play out 'on the ground' and among different sections of the population. As a result, there is little understanding of how these citizenship processes are negotiated and understood, or of how these practices relate to the particular ways in which people are constructed, and construct themselves, as citizens or as members of a national community. Further research in this area is required, particularly given that the idea of identity is becoming

further entrenched in the process of acquiring legal rights in Britain. For example, the extension of testing to those seeking indefinite leave to remain, alongside recently instituted changes to the Test content (from April 2013) which require migrants to pass 'tougher tests' that focus more on British history and culture (Cameron, 2011). As such, the consequences of asking people to 'sign up to' these values and/or pass a test of identity need to be explored in light of other possible ways that the identity, and its boundaries, can be constructed. Without this, we necessarily have an incomplete account of how people negotiate such citizen identities across different contexts and conditions, and with what impact.

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Special Thematic Section on "The Social Psychology of Citizenship, Participation and Social Exclusion"

The Social Psychology of Citizenship, Participation and Social Exclusion: Introduction to the Special Thematic Section

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Abstract

The aim of this special thematic section is to bring together recent social psychological research on the topic of citizenship with a view to discerning the emerging trends within the field and its potential contributions to the broader interdisciplinary area of citizenship studies. Eight papers spanning diverse theoretical traditions (including social identity, social representations and discursive approaches) apply an array of methods to consider different aspects of citizenship across a variety of cultural and national contexts. Some focus on individuals' perceptions and discussions of citizenship, others examine the group dynamics which flow from these understandings, and the rest examine the potential for citizenship to exclude as well as include marginalised communities. While diverse, the contributions share some core commonalities: all share a concern in trying to understand citizenship from the perspective of the citizen; all conceptualise citizenship as an active and reflective process occurring between members of a community; and all highlight the irreducibly social and collective nature of the experience and practice of citizenship in everyday life. We propose that these elements of convergence have the potential to give the social psychology of citizenship a solid basis and recognisable profile in order to contribute to the broader arena of citizenship studies.

Keywords: social psychology, citizenship, social identity, social representations, discursive psychology, citizenship studies

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In the decades after [Kymlicka and Norman \(1994\)](#) announced an explosion of research on the topic of citizenship across the social sciences, a ripple appears to have passed through the discipline of social psychology. Two special issues ([Condor, 2011](#); [Sanchez-Mazas & Klein, 2003](#)), an edited volume ([Borgida, Federico, & Sullivan, 2009](#)) and a variety of individual contributions (e.g., [Andreouli & Howarth, 2013](#); [Barnes, Auburn, & Lea, 2004](#); [Condor & Gibson, 2007](#); [Haste, 2004](#)) have reflected upon the social psychology of citizenship and appear to provide sufficient empirical work to provide critical mass to the area. The present collection of papers aims to in-

crease this momentum by bringing together more recent advances across the social psychology of citizenship with a view to consolidating and focusing research in this area as well as identifying future avenues of research.

In addition, we chose to focus the special section on the aspects of citizenship pertaining to participation and exclusion as we felt that these areas in particular capture the uniqueness of the social psychological literature on this topic. In doing so we hope to begin the process of outlining how our discipline can contribute toward cross-disciplinary understanding of citizenship within the social sciences. The following papers provide a good starting point for this as, in line with previous special issues, they span the theoretical approaches, epistemologies and methods of our discipline. They illustrate the range of topics and issues to which social psychology can usefully contribute, and they identify some points of convergence with other disciplines.

Yet, it becomes readily apparent that each paper included within this thematic section starts afresh in outlining the conceptual basis upon which it is based. Several hark back to the definitive work of T. H. [Marshall \(1950\)](#) on the civil, political and social rights underpinning citizenship, or classic theories of republicanism and liberalism. Others borrow from more recent cross-disciplinary movements such as discursive and ecological approaches to highlight the limitations of extant social psychological paradigms. A few reference the small fragmented body of previous work within social psychology to date. In effect, social psychology has had no recognisable tradition on which to build our work.

In part this is due to the diversity of methods and epistemologies within social psychology that makes the articulation of a single position difficult, if not impossible. Indeed one response has been to make a virtue of this diversity and present it as resonating with the increasing array of poststructuralist and postmodern approaches in sociology and political theory ([Condor, 2011](#)). Another has been to promote a single theoretical paradigm as the basis for the social psychology of citizenship ([Sanchez-Mazas & Klein, 2003](#)). A further, more recent, attempt has been to draw from eclectic sources across political, developmental, community and social psychology to produce a single integrated model of citizenship and civic engagement ([Pancer, 2014](#)).

The present special thematic section presents an alternative approach which neither reduces the contribution of social psychology to a single model nor leaves the disparate strands isolated and separate. We suggest that the papers here, while diverse in nature, share a common set of values, concerns and interests that derive from a shared history. Together they arguably form the basis of a coherent and recognisable social psychology of citizenship, making a substantive and distinct contribution toward broader citizenship studies. This distinctiveness can be enhanced by reflecting upon the historical genesis of the concept of citizenship within our discipline and how this has been informed by its various traditions. We attempt to do so below. We then, through considering the papers included in this thematic section, attempt to discern common aims and values across the current social psychology of citizenship. We conclude with some reflections on how, as academic citizens, social psychologists can participate in the community of citizenship studies scholars.

Previous Approaches to Citizenship in Social Psychology: Positivism, Activism, Constructionism

Early Roots: The Participating Citizen

As [Loredo-Narciandi and Castro-Tejerina \(2013\)](#) point out, while many scholars lament the relative absence of the study of citizenship in earlier epochs of social psychology, it is surprising to see early 20th century texts dedicated to the topic. It seems that the study of citizenship within psychology was part of a broader agenda of progressive social reforms to which the discipline contributed (in this they include the work of [Crane, 1928](#); [Garnett, 1921](#); [Johnston, 1927](#); [Weeks, 1917](#)). While the approaches to citizenship advocated by these early 20th century authors reflect the emphasis on drives, habits and mental capacities current at that time in psychology, their foci of inquiry remain remarkably relevant: for example, [Weeks \(1917\)](#) considered citizenship education, participation at work, voting behaviour as well as engagement with the legal system and property ownership among his topics. In effect, Weeks' model of the citizen (though limited by the theoretical and methodological constraints of the time) is a rich and detailed one with direct parallels and links to contemporary sociological understandings of the citizen. It is pertinent to note that these topics are classically 'liberal' in nature ([Schuck, 2002](#)). The focus lies primarily on individual economic, social and political engagement as sources of personal as well as societal improvement. Yet, a 'communitarian' focus is also somewhat evident, in that participation as part of a broader collective was seen as a key ingredient of citizenship behaviour.

In the post-war era, the issue of citizens' participation as the basis for democratic society remained a salient issue within social psychology. For example, Gordon Allport used his 1944 presidential address to the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues to outline an agenda for the study and promotion of citizen participation ([G. Allport, 1945](#)). He argued in favour of psychology addressing challenges faced by the populations of increasingly bureaucratised, industrialised and secularised modern societies so as to prevent political and social disengagement among them. He contrasted two broad conceptualisations of citizenship within the discipline as a means to achieve this. The first, attributed to John [Dewey \(1927\)](#), was concerned with engaging citizens in meaningful participation in the local practices and decisions that shaped their lives. From this perspective, citizenship was aligned with participation at a community level in order to protect and advance citizens' interests within broader society. The second, from the work of Floyd [Allport \(1933\)](#), was concerned with active citizenship as a reflective, critical process that draws on individual agency within the broader social system. Citizens' interests were to be furthered through the development of critical faculties whereby each citizen could interrogate and challenge the received wisdom of society. Reflecting social concerns in U.S. society at the time, both approaches foregrounded the role of the individual in shaping their own place within society and resisting the excesses of authority. Also, notably each emphasised participation at the expense of citizenship status or social rights.

From these perspectives of the 'engaged' and 'reflective' citizen, Gordon Allport set out a programme of research and practice for psychologists to better facilitate citizens' participation within their societies. Its goals included: the design of public service delivery to better engage the citizenry; the development and refinement of different understandings of citizen participation and engagement to better harness the various abilities of individual citizens; the improvement of participation in the workplace through better organisational design; the enhancement of participation in community and neighbourhood fora; and the engagement of the public in scientific activity (including in psychological research). Furthermore, this programme of research outlined a role for social psychologists in en-

gaging with policy-makers and users of research through what would, in today's parlance, be termed 'an impact agenda'. In other words, he argued that social psychology needed to reflexively apply a model of active citizen engagement to its own activities in order for it to have a positive effect upon society.

This early flourishing of ideas reflected the post-war concern with enhancing and preserving the variant of liberal, democratic values current within the United States. It posited a universalistic model of individual citizenship which largely ignored the uneven distribution of rights on the basis of race and gender and neglected issues of social or welfare rights. However, it did not, in the end, result in a continuous programme of citizenship studies within 20th century social psychology. Later core texts in social psychology do mention issues of socialisation, social structure and collective action (e.g. [Brown, 1965](#)), but the topic of citizenship itself slides from view. This reflects the move in social psychology away from sociology towards a more universalistic, reductionist, cognitive model of the individual and a corresponding increase in the emphasis on the exclusive use of the laboratory experiment. Consequently, an understanding of 'society' became increasingly absent from social psychological accounts.

However, the legacy of these early concerns with the participatory nature of citizenship, its community focus and its engaged and critical dimensions can be traced through three traditions in which the concept of citizenship later flourished: organisational psychology, community psychology and discursive psychology. This selection is not intended to exhaust all areas of psychology cognate to the study of citizenship (after all, most areas of political psychology and many applied areas of social psychology could be considered as such) but to identify the traditions in which citizenship has been studied explicitly as a topic in its own right. Below we outline each in turn and trace their impact upon contemporary social psychological approaches to the themes of citizenship, participation and exclusion.

The Psychology of Organisational Citizenship Behaviour: Positive Citizenship

The most voluminous psychological literature on citizenship and participation has been in organisational and industrial psychology, where researchers addressed individual worker behaviour and specifically that form of voluntary, extra-role behaviour that can be considered to be 'good citizenship' within an organisation. In some respects this usage removes the concept of citizenship from its societal origins and strips it of its political philosophy roots, such that it is perhaps better understood as a metaphor ([Smith, 2002](#)) rather than the conventional study of citizenship as a social science topic. However, this would be to ignore the earlier emphases on the central role of employment in citizenship within psychology (see above) and in sociology, where the concept of the 'worker-citizen' is central to classical models of citizenship ([Turner, 2001](#)). It would also ignore the impact of organisational psychology on later understandings of citizenship elsewhere in the discipline. Finally, it would neglect the significance of the continuance of a collective, 'communitarian' understanding of citizenship ([Delanty, 2002](#)) – one based on ties to a sub-societal collective unit (albeit one shaped by primarily economic interests within an institutional setting).

The origins of the concept of citizenship behaviour in organisational psychology are often attributed to the work of Daniel [Katz \(1964\)](#). Katz had identified that the success of any organisation depended upon innovative and spontaneous behaviours from its employees that go beyond formal role prescriptions. While such behaviours may be ill-defined and remain unrewarded within the formal structures of organisations, they facilitate the smooth functioning of the workplace while providing the flexibility among its members to deal with unexpected threats and challenges. This concept of 'good citizen behaviours' in the workplace gained popularity in the 1980s as organisational structures moved away from rigid individualised job roles towards team-working and more fluid forms of collective endeavour. Such practices increased the necessity and impact of voluntary communication and cooper-

ation between workers. Within organizational psychology these developments gave rise to the concept of 'Organizational Citizenship Behaviour' (OCB) defined by [Organ \(1988\)](#) as "individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization" ([Organ, 1988](#), p. 4).

Originally OCB had two dimensions: 'altruism' (or helping behaviour) and 'compliance' (or adherence to institutional norms and values). These were later refined into several sub-dimensions that were thought to operate at both individual and organisational levels: altruism, civic virtue, conscientiousness, courtesy and sportsmanship. These reflected the character of the good 'worker-citizen' and were shown to be influenced by various elements of the workplace environment, in particular leadership, institutional fairness and the clarity of role descriptions. In turn, OCB was found to contribute to overall organisational performance through impacting upon the attainment of individual and organisational goals. Indeed, it has been estimated that up to 25% of the variance in organisations' financial indicators are predicted by OCB alone ([Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000](#)). Also, although OCB by definition involves additional exertion, it was (perhaps counter-intuitively) associated with increased job satisfaction and lower levels of stress and burnout at the level of the individual and improved aggregate wellbeing at the level of the organisation.

Of course this understanding of 'citizenship' bears only a superficial resemblance to that of earlier psychological analyses of citizenship. While it contains some of the emphases on active participation and pro-sociality inherent in Dewey's and Floyd Allport's ideas, 'citizenship' has been removed from its broader social and cultural context and lacks any of the critical or political force of these earlier conceptualisations. Even within the confines of organisational psychology, the concept is complicated by lack of conceptual clarity and an overlap with competing concepts (e.g., 'extra-role behaviour', 'contextual performance' and 'prosocial organisational behaviours': [Organ, 1997](#)). Moreover, it is recognisably a concept designed and measured from a management perspective and, as a consequence, struggles to deal with behaviours that could be described as both prosocial and extra-role but which are critical of and challenge the organisation (e.g., 'whistle-blowing' and 'principled organisational dissent'; [Van Dyne, Cummings, & Parks, 1995](#)). As such, the concept of OCB arguably serves to illustrate the relative poverty of reductionist psychological approaches to the study of citizenship which neglect asymmetries of power, intergroup struggle and contestation.

Despite this, this tradition's study of OCB has, in fact, proven seminal across the wider discipline. As outlined below, the finding that the additional effort required by citizenship behaviours is associated with more satisfaction, less stress and better collective health has become a core tenet of the community psychology approach to citizenship participation. Moreover, the social identity approach has used the study of employees' OCB as key evidence for the pivotal relationship between organisational identification and group-level behaviour ([Ashforth & Mael, 1989](#); [Haslam, 2004, 2014](#)). From this perspective, OCB is not reducible to individual altruism or to a personal reaction to positive workplace structure, but is behaviour that only makes sense in terms of the shared interests and goals of the group itself. Insofar as the employee has internalised the broader organisation's identity, OCB is effectively an enactment of that identity.

The implications of this for group-based approaches to organisational citizenship behaviour are manifold ([Blader & Tyler, 2009](#); [Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004](#); [Haslam, 2004, 2014](#); [Van Knippenberg, 2000](#)). Firstly, if OCB is understood to be an enactment of the relevant organisational identity, it will be experienced as intrinsically rewarding as the individual is enacting an aspect of their own self-concept. Second, in line with a broader under-

standing of intragroup processes, OCB reflects increased trust, reciprocity and influence among members who share a common identity, and hence should have a positive impact on individual wellbeing. Thirdly, shared social identity forms the basis of cooperation, coordination and collective action, whereby the group can improve its position relative to others. Where this shared identity is extended to the organisation as a whole, this should be reflected in greater organisational productivity and success; where the relevant identity reflects a subgroup within the organisation, this should be reflected in the pursuit of fair and equal treatment within the organisational structure, or action to challenge and change the structure.

From this perspective then, a fuller understanding of the identity dynamics underpinning 'organisational citizenship behaviour' within the sphere of industrial relations regains some of the concept's previous political and critical dimensions. In addition, it locates these properties at the level of the collective and highlights the intrinsically rewarding nature of behaviour undertaken at the level of the group for both group and individuals. As part of a broader application of self-categorisation theory principles of organisational psychology (Haslam, 2014), OCB thus provided an exemplary case study of the relationship between individual and collective interest and action for social psychology more generally.

The Community Psychology of Citizen Participation: Active Citizenship

A rather different conceptualisation of the social nature of citizenship was simultaneously present within community psychology. Emerging in the United States in the 1960s from the field of clinical psychology and community mental health (Nelson & Prilleltensky, 2010), community psychologists studied the role of 'citizen participation' in developing and empowering local communities, especially those that are marginalised and disadvantaged (Florin & Wandersman, 1990). Community psychologists typically use the term 'citizenship' to denote the formal and informal rights, entitlements and obligations held by all community members while 'citizenship participation' can be formally defined as "a process in which individuals take part in the institutions, programs and environments which affect them" (Heller, Price, Reinharz, & Wandersman, 1984, p. 339). In practice, this has been taken to include grassroots involvement in local community organisations and social issue-focused groups and, according to its advocates, its benefits are demonstrable at the individual, organisational, community and national level. Accordingly, this approach shares with OCB a form of citizenship recognisable in classic theories as 'civic communalism' (i.e., it emphasises the obligation of members to participate in community life for the betterment of the group), though some forms of community psychology additionally emphasise the critical and transformative nature of citizen participation and collective community action (e.g., Nelson & Prilleltensky, 2010).

The research in this area has typically aimed to understand which citizens participate as well as the factors facilitating or impeding participation and the effects of participation upon the individuals and communities involved (Orford, 2008; Pancer, 2014). A range of demographic factors and individual characteristics such as age, ethnic group and self-reported level of civic responsibility all predict participation, though these factors vary systematically according to the specifics of the local area, voluntary organisation and social issue. These factors also predict level of participation (e.g., Arnstein, 1969; Kagan, Castile, & Stewart, 2005) from non-participation and disengagement to active engagement and 'citizen control' of local decision-making.

In addition, across most studies, the degree of investment in the community, strength of sense of community or 'community identity' has been consistently found to predict citizens' participation (Wandersman & Florin, 2000). A sense of community has been found to shape the perception of the environment, affect relationships with others and lead to a stronger sense of the capacity of the community to achieve its goals, all of which lead to increased

participation. Participation leads to an increased sense of personal efficacy, personal and organisational empowerment as well as an enhanced critical understanding of the local socio-political environment (Kieffer, 1984). In other words, citizen participation and community empowerment have been found to be mutually reinforcing (Rappaport, 1987; Zimmerman, 1990). Conversely though, negative or stigmatised identities have been found to constitute a significant barrier to community participation (e.g., McNamara, Stevenson, & Muldoon, 2013). As a consequence, the role of community activists is often a dual one: to challenge stereotypes and engage local community members.

Notably, as with organisational citizenship behaviour above, the study of citizenship participation has also focused on the organisational factors underpinning the sustainability of community action. Most voluntary organisations last less than one year, regardless of the persistence of the social need they address (Florin & Wandersman, 1990; Orford, 2008; Wandersman & Florin, 2000). Specifically, citizens' participation and consensus-building has been identified as crucial at the stages of initial mobilisation of community members, but also at the stage of role differentiation and leadership determination. The perseverance of participation is related to the level and seniority of the individual's involvement as well as the success of the organisation. In other words, citizens' continued participation is inextricable from the structural and psychological dimensions of the collective grassroots movement.

Furthermore, citizen participation is demonstrably contingent upon the community or voluntary organisations' interactions with the authorities. Participation will be inhibited by perceptions of tokenism or perceived discrimination by government organisations. As Tyler, Rasinski, and Griffin (1986) point out, citizens' decisions as to whether to engage with authorities and participate in decision-making processes are based on perceptions of how the government views them and whether they can expect to be treated fairly in relation to other groups. Groups which feel respected and which have faith in the procedural fairness of the government processes will be more willing to cooperate with authorities and participate in decision making than groups who do not. Again, the role of negative identities among marginalised and excluded communities is key, with the negative perceptions of authorities and service providers acting to deter community engagement and suppress participation (Campbell & Jovchelovitch, 2000; Renedo & Marston, 2011; Stevenson, McNamara, & Muldoon, 2014).

Again we can note several elements of the concept of citizenship which, though somewhat different from OCB, are worth considering as characteristic of psychological understandings of this topic. Firstly, the concept of citizenship here is inextricable from participation. Citizens gain their identity and rights from their community membership and the meaning of their actions is derived from their alignment with community goals. Participation is found to be intrinsically rewarding and is demonstrably linked to health and wellbeing (at the individual as well as the collective level). In other words, despite the demands of participation, the rewards experienced by the individual are considerable and measurable. Moreover, this research conceptualises citizenship participation as an inherently inclusive concept that emphasises the opportunity and obligation of all community members to take part. It also highlights the consequences of social and psychological barriers in preventing participation and the consequences of social exclusion within marginalised communities.

Citizen participation is also conceptualised as inherently collective and (as with collective approaches to the study of OCB) this again highlights the pivotal role of identity processes in this form of collective action (as well as in its suppression and deterrent). Indeed, this aspect of citizenship participation has informed later developments in the psychology of collective action that have incorporated the understanding of participation as intrinsically rewarding

and shown the close relationship between participation, empowerment and perseverance in collective action over time (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2005; Stürmer & Kampmeier, 2003; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012).

Finally, community psychology (as with organisational psychology) locates the practices and consequences of citizenship within the context of everyday life. On the one hand, this displays a lack of engagement with questions concerning the definition and enforcement of legal and political understandings of citizenship or with the rights and entitlements that citizenship status can confer. On the other, it provides a distinctly psychological focus on the understanding and action of the citizen within the lived reality of their social and physical contexts. This, in turn, forms the basis for more recent developments in conceptualising citizenship in relation to its spatial and residential settings (e.g., Di Masso, 2015, this section; McNamara, Muldoon, Stevenson, & Slattery, 2011).

As with OCB research, the limitations to this conceptualisation of citizenship are also illuminating. Aside from a lack of integration with broader social science understandings of citizenship, the lack of reflection on the definition of citizenship status within communities means that this strand of community psychology has often ignored the essentially contested nature of the concepts of citizen and community. As Pancer (2014) admits, the general focus on inclusivity and democratic values in this tradition has sometimes been at the expense of the consideration of the very different experiences of individuals and groups of citizens within the social structure. However, more radical approaches have examined the perceptions and experiences of citizenship participation from the perspectives of different disadvantaged communities. This more differentiated approach has considered the specific challenges faced by groups on the basis of their economic and ethnic backgrounds, gender, sexuality, disability and age as well as relationship with their environment (Kagan & Burton, 2000). Accordingly, community psychology has begun to address the differentiated experiences, values and practices of citizenship in contemporary societies.

The Micro-Politics of Everyday Interaction: Constructionist Citizenship

A third approach within social psychology takes this issue of the definition and negotiation of citizenship status in everyday life as its primary focus. This more recent approach emerged from the social constructionist, discursive and dialogical movements within psychology in the late 1980s (Billig, 1987; Billig et al., 1988; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and is most clearly expressed by John Shotter (1993). Taking as a starting point the essentially contested nature of citizenship, Shotter argues for an examination of how rights and entitlements associated with personhood are manifest and negotiated in interpersonal interaction. From this perspective, citizenship is inextricably linked to lay understandings of what it is to be a person, as well as the rights understood to be attached to this ontological position within the social world. Accordingly, the micro-politics of social interaction – who gets to say what, when and who will be listened to – will reflect and manifest these rights.

The upshot of this focus on the micro-level detail of interaction is that citizenship, rather than being simply a matter of legal definition, organisational structure, community movement or individual personality, is understood to be a matter of dialogical engagement between interlocutors, through which the meaning of what it is to have rights emerges. While this is fluid and indeterminate, it does not occur afresh in each interaction but rather exists within broader ‘discourses’ or patterns of ideas on citizenship which constrain as well as empower us to create and contest our social reality. This engagement also occurs within a culturally-shared tacit understanding or ‘feeling’ for the norms governing such encounters and their outcomes. Within this space, people manage their identities as moral agents, positioning themselves within discourses, accounting for their actions, maintaining their rights to speak as competent social actors and performing their interactive business on the basis of holding these rights (Harré, 1983; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

This approach provides a radical departure from previous understandings of citizenship. In contrast with work conducted in the OCB tradition, it offers a thoroughgoing reappraisal of the critical and creative potential of citizenship. It also departs from the more macro-level analysis of community and organisational aspects of citizen participation in favour of a micro-interpersonal focus. Yet, still it shares some of the characteristics of these previous formulations. Primarily, it is a relational rather than an individualistic perspective in that it is concerned with the interactions between individuals. Second, it requires an element of shared understanding, as participants need to share the broad rules governing interaction in order to have successful engagement (even if this engagement is contestation and debate). [Shotter \(1993\)](#) characterises this as an ‘imagined community’, in which the entitlement to speak and be heard depends on the acceptance of others as ‘one of us’. Whereas some will automatically be accepted as insiders and have the right to speak, others will need to assert and prove their membership. While of course there are competing understandings and perspectives within any such community, the boundaries are drawn at the point at which someone is marginalised or silenced by virtue of being an outsider. Third, it locates the study of citizenship in the everyday lives and experiences of individuals (albeit in a more profound way than the previous approaches).

[Haste \(2004\)](#) explicitly draws upon these divergent elements to make a case for a thoroughgoing constructionist approach to the social psychology of citizenship which incorporates active participation and collective action as well as a consideration of the negotiation of citizenship status in interaction. Adopting [Shotter’s \(1993\)](#) model, she argues that the study of citizenship should include the analysis of identity dynamics (within talk but also collectively within groups), the negotiation of position-taking (in micro-interaction, but also in relation to shared representations of groups), the construction of narrative accounts of citizenship (at the level of the individual but also the broader cultural discourse), and the development of personal and collective efficacy through active participation. This synthetic approach is used to identify the variety of different understandings of citizenship and modes of participation that are available to people: From the participants’ perspective, civic engagement is perceived very differently from political action; public participation is experienced differently to private interactions, and the meaning of each will be shaped and informed by the cultural and social specificities of the groups and citizenship issues involved. Later work by [Gray and Griffin \(2014\)](#) and [Condor and Gibson \(2007\)](#) has highlighted the value of studying official and lay understandings of citizenship in different cultural contexts in explaining the relationship between citizenship and national identity as well as the role of different formulations of citizenship in facilitating or inhibiting active participation.

A further dimension of citizenship foregrounded by the constructionist approach is the exclusive nature of citizenship. While organisational and community psychology approaches deal indirectly with the potentially exclusive effects of the absence of participation or barriers to engagement, they do not reflect on how the definition of citizenship serves to exclude individuals and groups from participation. In contrast, the constructionist approach (though focusing on the consequences of informal, everyday definitions of citizenship) allows for a direct investigation of the various ways in which citizenship can be used to deny rights and entitlements to others. In [Shotter’s \(1993\)](#) initial description, this was a tacit, subtle process of telling insider from outsider and affording rights to speak accordingly. Other work in this domain has been more explicit: [Barnes et al. \(2004\)](#) demonstrate how constructions of citizenship are tied to locality and belonging and are systematically used by local residents to rhetorically deny social and economic rights to travellers’ groups; [Gibson and Hamilton \(2011\)](#) illustrate how constructions of citizenship based on effort and participation are used to rhetorically exclude the unemployed; and [Stevenson et al. \(2014\)](#) illustrate how understandings of residents as ‘bad citizens’ undermine successful service-use interactions in disadvantaged communities. In other words, while research on citizenship within psychology has largely ignored

issues of the denial of citizenship status, constructionist approaches provide a critical exploration of how understandings of citizenship can be used to exclude individuals and groups and to deny them rights on this basis.

Some Commonalities Across the Social Psychology of Citizenship: Citizenship as Understanding, Participating, Excluding

As noted already, this overview of three traditions of research on citizenship within social, organisational and community psychology is not intended to be an exhaustive coverage of work within the discipline relating to citizenship. For example, most areas of political psychology deal in one way or another with the application of psychological concepts and methods to the study of issues of citizenship, participation and exclusion. Also, many other areas of social psychology deal with topics cognate to the study of citizenship, especially those that examine pro-social behaviour, intergroup relations and collective action. However, the purpose of the present review is to outline past understandings of citizenship within psychology that have explicitly or implicitly influenced the contemporary social psychology of citizenship.

Considering the papers included in this special thematic section, we are able to discern common aims and values across contemporary social psychological approaches to studying citizenship. These, we argue, are recognisably derived from their collective heritage within organisational, community and social constructionist forms of psychology. In recognising these continuities and commonalities, we can begin to solidify the identity of the area.

Understanding Citizenship: Constructing, Practicing and Contesting Citizenship in Everyday Life

Firstly, all contributions to the thematic section evidently inherit a core concern to understand citizenship subjectively, from the perspective of the citizen (or non-citizen). As we have seen above, OCB is rooted in the understanding of the motivations and perception of the individual within the collective, while citizenship participation in community psychology concerns both the perceptions of citizens and the recursive effects of participation upon their identities. Privileging the perspectives of the citizens over those of theorists or the state is, arguably, the most obvious contribution of social psychology, and has been a longstanding concern within community psychology and discursive psychology. Insofar as citizenship is a property of the citizenry and citizenship is ingrained in everyday life, social psychology is particularly well placed to explore the perceptions and meanings that inform the lived experience of citizenship.

Three papers in the present thematic section focus in particular on how definitions and dimensions of citizenship can be understood to embody and enact different concerns and interests within the polity. While decades of social theory have delineated the classic theories of republican, liberal and communitarian citizenship (see, e.g., [Delanty, 2002](#); [Smith, 2002](#)), these papers focus on how popular views diverge from these ideal types and on citizenship as experienced and constructed from the bottom-up.

In the first paper, 'Schooling, Citizen-Making, and Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in France', [Roebroek and Guimond \(2015, this section\)](#) examine the roles of schools in France as a central site in the transmission of official understandings of republican citizenship. They consider both the type of school and length of time in school, finding

that older pupils of mainstream (rather than vocational) schools adhere more closely to French republican principles. In addition, they demonstrate the conceptual difference between understandings of 'colour blind' republican values and the newly emerging secular values of religious suppression (new *laïcité*). While within the French context, colour blind egalitarianism is associated with decreased prejudice, the values of new *laïcité* are associated with increased prejudice. In other words, while schools may constitute a key location for the transmission of the officially sanctioned policies of egalitarianism, they may also serve as a site for popular philosophies of exclusion.

In the second paper, 'Constructions of 'the Polish' in Northern England: Findings From a Qualitative Interview Study', Gibson (2015, this section) also examines lay understandings of citizenship among school-aged children in a similar educational setting in northern England. Building upon previous investigations of popular understandings of citizenship in this context, he adopts a critical approach to further explore the relationship between citizenship and social exclusion, in this case the exclusion of recent Polish immigrants. His results chime with those of Roebroek and Guimond in identifying the interplay between different citizenship-related values and forms of prejudice. His qualitative methods facilitate an insight into the complexity and diversity of these associations, with Polish migrants disparaged on the basis of their perceived economic over-activity and underactivity, their lack of acculturation and their sense of overentitlement, their physical appearances and threat. While elsewhere theorists have investigated the emancipatory potential of extending the concept of citizenship from formal political and legal arenas to the micro-politics of mundane, everyday life (Isin, 2008; Isin & Nielsen, 2008; Lewis, 2004; Lister, 2003), it would appear that these arenas also provide rich resources for the systematic rejection and exclusion of outsiders.

Notably, Gibson's work also points to the needs to consider the relationship between understandings of citizenship and collectivities other than the nation. While contributors in the present special section and elsewhere in social psychology have previously argued for the centrality of the nation to conceptualisations of citizenship, Gibson points to the ways in which local community and territory can be mobilised to claim and assert rights as well as to deny these to others (see also Barnes et al., 2004). This spatial understanding of citizenship is developed more fully by Di Masso (2015, this section) in his consideration of the contestation of public space in Barcelona – 'Micro-politics of Public Space: On the Contested Limits of Citizenship as a Locational Practice'. Di Masso considers how the use of public space both reflects and enacts understandings of rights and entitlements and consequently how divergent understandings of space can lead to embodied enactment of political challenge through protest. Here the relationship between top-down official models of compliant citizenship and bottom-up constructions of the active engagement of local communities come into conflict. In effect, locality-based identity is mobilised to oppose and resist the erosion of rights of access and ownership of public space.

Citizenship as Participation: Ingroup Dynamics and Collective Engagement

While the set of papers described above focus on the definition and contestation of citizenship, the next set examines the processes of participation that rest upon these understandings. As we have seen above, the concept of participation has been at the heart of understandings of citizenship within psychology from the early decades of the 20th century. Participation has continued to feature prominently in organisational and community psychology approaches to this topic which, through their emphases on collective endeavour, have helped lay the path to more recent attempts to recover a group-level perspective in making sense of social participation and engagement. The papers in the present thematic section identify the particular role played by group processes in shaping how

individuals engage and participate in political activity and, in particular, how social influence, leadership and collective action impact upon the dynamics of citizenship-based perception and behaviour.

Hopkins, Reicher, and van Rijswijk's (2015, this section) paper 'Everyday Citizenship: Identity Claims and Their Reception' uses an analysis of group dynamics to problematize the assumption of 'horizontal' citizenship (identification with a community of equals) in Scottish society. The authors examine how the performance and enactment of citizenship does not occur in isolation but is accepted or rejected by others within the group according to common understandings of what it is to be a citizen. As in most countries, understandings of the rights and entitlements associated with citizenship in Scotland are assumed to be universally extended to all citizens, but in practice are infused with inequality. This is partly attributable to the alignment of citizenship with the national community, within which some groups are seen as more central than others. Depending upon a person's background, this may have consequences for their credibility as a citizen and their ability to influence other group members accordingly. Their findings, that membership claims on the basis of subjective identification alone were less likely to be accepted than those based on birth or ancestry, fit well with previous analyses of Scottishness (Kiely, Bechhofer, & McCrone, 2005; Kiely, Bechhofer, Stewart, & McCrone, 2001). However, the additional finding that the voices of these members were also less influential illustrates the consequences for such understandings of citizenship in marginalising 'less Scottish' actors within the polity.

In contrast, Botindari and Reicher (2015, this section) in their paper 'The Active Follower: What Young Voters Look for in Political Leaders and Parties' Examine the Vertical Dimension of Citizenship (Identification Within a Political Institution). They situate their work within broader tensions evident in theories of citizenship: between elements of authority and citizen autonomy; between public and private forms of citizenship; between passive and active forms of engagement. Applying the social identity approach to leadership to the study of voting behaviour, they set out to explore these tensions by capturing the reflections and deliberations of Italian first time voters. This novel approach provides an insight into the competing concerns and interests considered by these young citizens that goes far beyond the rational decision-making models of conventional political psychology. It thereby sheds light on the necessarily collective, dynamic, intragroup processes underpinning political representation and the need to consider the role of both followers and leaders as actively shaping the identity and collective future of the group.

The subsequent paper by Antonini, Hogg, Mannetti, Barbieri, and Wagoner (2015, this section), 'Motivating Citizens to Participate in Public Policymaking: Identification, Trust and Cost-Benefit Analyses', again considers the collective nature of citizens' participation in civic life. Once more examining the Italian context, but supplementing this with a parallel investigation in the United States, this cross-national investigation considers participation in public policymaking as a form of collective action. Drawing upon existing models of group behaviour, Antonini considers both the motivating factors of the extrinsic rewards of individual participation alongside the intrinsic rewards of adhering to and enacting one's collective norms and values. In addition, Antonini pinpoints trust in the government as a key element in predicting participation. Together, these elements successfully predict participation and illustrate the pivotal role played by identification with and trust in the broader societal structures that frame participation.

Citizenship, Exclusion and Inclusion

At all levels, the negotiation of citizenship demonstrably has exclusive as well as inclusive consequences. Although extensively researched within mainstream social psychology (e.g., Abrams, Hogg, & Marques, 2004), the impact of social exclusion has been largely overlooked in conventional psychological approaches to citizenship within

organisational settings and indeed within many community settings. This is of course at odds with the historic struggles for civil, political and social rights across the globe in the 20th century as well as the burgeoning literature on differentiated citizenship elsewhere in the social sciences that takes as its focus the uneven distributions of rights and exclusive nature of different definitions of citizenship. However, among more critical approaches within community psychology and within constructionist social psychology, the subtle and often invisible mechanisms through which citizenship is actively constructed and used to marginalise and exclude have come to the fore. As illustrated in the work of [Barnes et al. \(2004\)](#) and others, every rhetorical boundary drawn around the citizenry works to include some and exclude others.

The papers by [Blackwood, Hopkins, and Reicher \(2015, this section\)](#), ‘Flying While Muslim’: Citizenship and Misrecognition in the Airport’, as well as [Rodríguez López, Andreouli, and Howarth \(2015, this section\)](#), ‘From Ex-Combatants to Citizens: Connecting Everyday Citizenship and Social Reintegration in Colombia’, examine the complex interplay of identity processes at the boundaries of citizenship, where practices based on definitions of citizenship can create either solidarity or conflict. The paper by Blackwood, Hopkins and Reicher brings together several themes already explicated in the special thematic section: the intersection of citizenship and national identity, the role of public space in shaping the experience of citizenship and the acceptance or rejection of identity claims by other citizens. Their study of Scottish Muslims’ experiences of airport security highlights the challenges faced by ‘suspect’ minorities in asserting their rights and entitlements as citizens in public space. The consequences of anticipated (and experienced) scrutiny and suspicion include suppressing interactions, inhibiting behaviours and restricting the expression and enactment of civic rights and entitlements. In other words, the tactics intended to tackle radicalisation and extremism among this group may work to further marginalise and exclude group members within a public arena which, ironically, should be a site of identity expression, recognition and validation for these citizens.

In the final empirical paper, Rodríguez López, Andreouli, and Howarth consider the converse process, whereby group members who have been formerly excluded can become accepted back into society through citizenship. After violent conflict, the disarmament and reintegration process of military actors is often complicated by institutional as well as community barriers of stigmatisation and rejection. Rodríguez López and colleagues examine this process among ex-combatants in Colombia, explaining that the process of re-integration necessitates an active re-appropriation, reinterpretation and repositioning of identity in relation to broader society. In concrete terms, this necessitates state support and recognition for the process as well as an active engagement by ex-combatants in systematically redefining their relationship within the networks and institutions of their local community.

Across both these last papers, the intergroup dynamics of the enactment, recognition and acceptance of identity are illustrated as key elements of the social psychology of citizenship. Along with the papers in the previous section, this illustrates for us the irreducibly social and collective nature of citizenship and the need to further develop a social psychology of lived experience and practice of citizenship in everyday life. This, we believe, is perhaps a core defining element of the social psychology of citizenship and we explore this and the other emergent aspects of citizenship from this special thematic section in the concluding paper in this section ([Stevenson, Hopkins, Luyt, & Dixon, 2015, this section](#)).

Conclusion: The Citizenship of Social Psychology

From the accumulated research on citizenship in social psychology outlined above, we know that articulating a voice within a broader community requires some form of ontological claim: a sense of who we are; our entitlement to speak; and why we should be heard. This is very much the case for the fledgling social psychology of citizenship attempting to make a contribution within the broader arena of citizenship studies. For this to occur we require a clearer sense of where we come from so as to craft a message that is coherent and recognisable without being reductive or misleading.

In this article we have attempted to undertake some of this work. We first provided some background to the current approaches to citizenship, participation and exclusion within social psychology by reviewing previous and current approaches to these topics. This is not intended as a comprehensive review but to give a stronger sense of some of the origins of the study of citizenship within the discipline and to provide some insight into how these have shaped the way we currently understand and study the concept. We acknowledge that this specific focus provides something of a 'chiaroscuro' – selectively illuminating some aspects of the psychology of citizenship while obscuring others – but we argue that this serves to identify specific conceptual antecedents which help make sense of the current diversity of approaches to citizenship within psychology.

Second, rather than valorising this diversity of current approaches or attempting to present a single or integrative theory, we have attempted to illustrate commonalities across a range of social psychological approaches that may be of use in defining this area. Broadly speaking, we view the study of the constructive, active and collective (but often exclusive) understandings of citizenship in people's everyday lives to characterise much social psychological work in this area. Of course there are many disparate methodological and epistemological approaches within this, but we believe that these can be used in concert to contribute to a fuller understanding of citizenship that is distinctively social psychological in nature.

In our final contribution to this thematic section (Stevenson et al., 2015, this section), we develop these arguments further to suggest where and how this contribution could be made. We consider some potential points of insertion in the broader sphere of citizenship studies and outline some key lines of inquiry that have potential to substantially develop the social psychology of citizenship: the everyday politics of recognition; the lived experience of intergroup contact; the study of the contested nature of the city. These are rooted in the ongoing work of the authors as well as the other contributors to this volume and we believe these topics could make for a constructive engagement with our colleagues in citizenship studies. This of course is simply a conversational 'opener' to a dialogue in which we hope to fully and critically participate.

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