

ცრურწმენები, სტერეოტიპები და
დისკრიმინაცია: გამოყენებითი სოციალური
ფსიქოლოგიის პერსპექტივები

რიდერი

შემდგენელი ანასტასია ქიტიაშვილი

სარჩევი:

1. Stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination at the seam between the centuries: evolution, culture, mind and brain - Susan T. Fiske .
2. Prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination: Theoretical and empirical overview - John F. Dovidio , Miles Hewstone , Peter Glick , Victoria M. Esses .
3. What causes prejudice and discrimination ? - Warren J. Blumenfeld
4. Bos, A. E. R., Pryor, J. B., Reeder, G. D., & Stutterheim, S. E. - Stigma: Advances in Theory and Research. Basic and Applied Social Psychology
5. Dasgupta, N. - Implicit ingroup favoritism, outgroup favoritism, and their behavioral manifestations. *Social Justice Research, 17(2)*

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY
FACULTY OF ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
Summer 2018
SOCI 401.52 - Advanced Topics in Sociology (Prejudice)

INSTRUCTOR: Alla Konnikov
OFFICE: Social Sciences 943
OFFICE HOURS: Tuesday and Thursday after class
E-MAIL: akonniko@ucalgary.ca
CLASS: Tuesday and Thursday 9:00 - 11:45 in SB146

COURSE DESCRIPTION

Discrimination is one of the most universal and persistent social problems. Individuals are discriminated against in many social settings, such as educational institutions, workplaces and/or while attaining a variety of services. Individuals are discriminated against based on a variety of social markers such as ethnicity, race, religion, immigration status, gender, age, etc. This course aims to unpack one of the main factors underlying discriminatory practices, namely, prejudice. By drawing on the perspectives from Social Psychology, Symbolic Interactionism and Intersectionality, we will examine (1) the mechanism of preconceived judgment (prejudice); (2) the way it is produced and reproduced in social interactions; and (3) the way it is manifested in inter-group relations and behaviors. We will examine the most influential empirical evidence in different fields of research exploring prejudice and inter-group relations, as well as methodological insights to conducting research on prejudice.

The course is organized around three major theoretical perspectives:

- (1) Social Psychology's main theoretical concepts, namely the prejudice, stereotype, social distance, threat, social contact and intergroup relations.
- (2) Symbolic Interactionism and
- (3) Intersectionality perspectives.

By the end of the course students should be able to:

- (1) sustain an in-depth and integrative understanding of the way Social Psychology, Symbolic Interactionism and Intersectionality frame the phenomena of prejudice.
- (2) identify and analyze the mechanisms that sustain the inter-group relations;
- (3) identify and analyze the way prejudice is produced and reproduced through social interactions
- (4) apply the concepts of prejudice and inter-group relations to analyzing the social world around them;

Class discussions are important. Your active and thoughtful participation is critical to shaping the quality of your own learning experiences as well as those of others in the seminar. Therefore you are expected to attend every class and to be an active participant in both guiding and engaging in the discussion. High sensitivity of the topic may lead to emotionally charged discussions and debates. Please make sure you express your opinion in a respectful way.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

All assignments will be based on lectures and assigned readings. Students are responsible for familiarising themselves with the assigned reading materials, which may or may not be discussed in class. Additionally, students are responsible for acquainting themselves with the information covered in class that is not reviewed in the readings.

The final grade for the course consists of the following components:

Assessment	Date	Method of Submission	Weight
Reflective memos	By <u>noon</u> , a day before the reading is discussed in class	Uploaded to D2L	20% (5 x 4% each)
In-class presentation / Critical article review	Week 6 & Week 7	Presented in class	10%
Take-home examination 1	Exam given: Jul 19 Exam returned: Jul 24	Hard copy submitted in class	35%
Take-home examination 2	Exam given: Aug 14 Exam returned: Aug 21	Uploaded to D2L	35%

1. Reflective Memos (15% + 5%)

During Weeks 2 to 6, students will write 5 reflective memos based on the assigned readings and upload them onto D2L by Sunday noon before the week the assigned readings are to be discussed in class. The memos will be 1-2 pages long and include:

- (1) a brief and synthesized summary of the key ideas and concepts presented in 2 selected articles of the week.
- (2) a critical and a thoughtful reflection on the articles;
- (3) one or two sociological questions that the readings have raised.

2. In-class article review presentation (10%)

The presentation will be 10-15 minutes long and will summarize the chosen article, provide a critical reflection on it and offer a few questions for class discussion. The sign-up sheet with the presentation dates will be circulated at the beginning of the course.

3. Take-home examinations 1 (35%) & 2 (35%)

The take-home examination will be written in an essay format based on the questions provided on the dates presented above. The instructions will be given in class on the day the exam is distributed.

LETTER GRADE ASSIGNMENT			
95 - 100 =	A+ (Outstanding)	67 - 71 =	C+
90 - 94 =	A (Excellent)	63 - 66 =	C
85 - 89 =	A- (Very Good)	59 - 62 =	C-
80 - 84 =	B + (Good)	54 - 58 =	D+
76 - 79 =	B (Satisfactory)	50 - 53 =	D
72 - 75 =	B-	00 - 49 =	F

COURSE READINGS

Week 1: Jul 3 & Jul 5

What is Prejudice? The conceptualization and operationalization of the term.

Allport, G.W. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Chapters 1 & 2. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley.

Duckitt, J. (2010). Historical overview. In J. F. Dovidio, M. Hewstone, P. S. Glick, V. M. Esses, & J. F. Dovidio (Eds.), *SAGE Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination* (pp. 29–44). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publ.; SAGE

Nelson, T.D. (2016). (Ed.). *Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination. 2nd edition*. Chapter 2. New York: Psychology Press.

Week 2: Jul 10 & Jul 12

Who we are and who they are? Inter-Group Relations and Group Conflict.

Sherif, M. (1958). Superordinate goals in the reduction of intergroup conflict. *American Journal of Sociology*.

<http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/stable/2774135>

Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. *Scientific American*, 96-102.

Tajfel, H and J. Turner.(1986). “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior”. In S. Worchel and W. Austin (eds.) *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers. 7-24.

Brewer, Marilynn. (1999). The Psychology of Prejudice: In-group Love or Out-group Hate? *Journal of Social Issues*, 55 (3): 429-444.

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/doi/10.1111/0022-4537.00126/full>

Week 3: Jul 17

The Perception of Threat

Stephan, W. G., Stephan, C. W., & Gudykunst, W. B. (1999). Anxiety in intercultural relations: A comparison of anxiety/uncertainty management theory and integrated threat theory. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 23, 613– 628.

<http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/science/article/pii/S0147176799000127>

Riek, B. M., Mania, E. W., & Gaertner, S. L. (2006). Intergroup threat and out-group attitudes: A meta-analytic review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 10, 336–353.

http://journals.sagepub.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/doi/pdf/10.1207/s15327957pspr1004_4

Week 3: Jul 19

Intergroup Contact Theory

Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 49, 65– 85.

<http://www.annualreviews.org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.65>

Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2008). How does intergroup contact reduce prejudice? Meta-analytic tests of three mediators. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 38, 922–934.

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/doi/10.1002/ejsp.504/epdf>

1st Take-home examination is distributed

Week 4: Jul 24 & Jul 26

Symbolic Interactionism: Understanding Interaction in a Social setting

Goffman, E. (1959) *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Introduction, Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Goffman, E. (1963). *Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity*. Chapter 1. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Rosenhan, D. L. (1973). On being sane in insane places. *Science*, 179, 250-258.

<http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/stable/1735662>

Optional reading:

Goffman, Erving. (1961). *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*, pp 3-74; New York: Doubleday.

Week 5: Jul 31 & Aug 2

Intersectionality

Collins, P. H. (1990). *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment*. Chapter 1. Routledge.

<http://ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=17141927&site=ehost-live>

Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color. *Stanford Law Review*, 43 (6), 1241-1299.

<http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/stable/1229039>

Week 6: Aug 9

Empirical evidence: Students' presentations

Fein, S., & Spencer, S.J. (1997). Prejudice as self-image maintenance: Affirming the self through derogating others. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 73, 31–44.

<http://ovidsp.ovid.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/ovidweb.cgi?T=JS&CSC=Y&NEWS=N&PAGE=fulltext&AN=00005205-199707000-00003&D=ovft&PDF=y>

Goodman, S & Rowe, L. (2014). ‘Maybe it is prejudice...but it is NOT racism: Negotiating racism in discussion forums about Gypsies’. *Discourse & Society*, 25, 32-46.

<http://journals.sagepub.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/doi/full/10.1177/0957926513508856>

Miller, C.T, Rothblum, E.D, Felicio, D, Brand, P. (1995). Compensating for stigma: obese and non-obese women’s reactions to being visible. *Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21, 1093–1106.

<http://journals.sagepub.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/doi/abs/10.1177/01461672952110010>

Palmore, Erdman B. (2004). “Research Note: Ageism in Canada and the United States.” *Journal of Cross Cultural Gerontology*, 19(1), 6-41.

<https://link-springer-com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/article/10.1023/B%3AJCCG.0000015098.62691.ab>

Eagly, A. H., & Karau, S. J. (2002). Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders. *Psychological Review*, 109, 573- 598.

<http://ovidsp.ovid.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/ovidweb.cgi?T=JS&CSC=Y&NEWS=N&PAGE=fulltext&AN=00006832-200207000-00007&D=ovft&PDF=y>

Shelton, J. N., Richeson, J. A., & Salvatore, J. (2005). Expecting to be the target of prejudice: Implications for interethnic interactions. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31, 1189 –1202.

<http://journals.sagepub.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/doi/pdf/10.1177/0146167205274894>

Stephan, W. G., Boniecki, K. A., Ybarra, O., Bettencourt, A., Ervin, K. S., Jackson, L. A., et al. (2002). The role of threats in the racial attitudes of Blacks and Whites. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28, 1242–1254.

<http://journals.sagepub.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/doi/pdf/10.1177/01461672022812009>

Holmes, M. D., & Smith, B. W. (2012). Intergroup dynamics of extra-legal police aggression: An integrated theory of race and place. *Aggression and Violent Behaviour*, 17(4), 344–353.

<http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/science/article/pii/S1359178912000286>

Gonzalez, K., Verkuyten, M., Weesie, J. &Poppe, E. (2008). Prejudice towards Muslims in The Netherlands: Testing integrated threat theory, *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 47, 667–685.

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/doi/10.1348/014466608X284443/full>

Hintjens, Helen (2001). When identity becomes a knife: Reflecting on the genocide in Rwanda. *Ethnicities*, 1(1) 25-55.

<http://journals.sagepub.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/doi/pdf/10.1177/146879680100100109>

Week 7: Aug 14

Changing the prejudice: Is it enough to become a "better" person? Students' presentations

Duckitt, J. (2005). Personality and Prejudice. In J. F. Dovidio, P. S. Glick, & L. A. Rudman (Eds.), *On the Nature of Prejudice. Fifty Years after Allport* (pp. 395–412). Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.

Czopp, A. M., Monteith, M. J., & Mark, A. Y. (2006). Standing up for a change: Reducing bias through interpersonal confrontation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90(5), 784–803.

<http://ovidsp.ovid.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/ovidweb.cgi?T=JS&CSC=Y&NEWS=N&PAGE=fulltext&AN=00005205-200605000-00005&D=ovft&PDF=y>

Paluck, E. L., & Green, D. P. (2009). Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A Review and Assessment of Research and Practice. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 60(1), 339–367.

<http://www.annualreviews.org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163607>

Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (1998). Internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 75, 811–832.

<http://ovidsp.ovid.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/ovidweb.cgi?T=JS&CSC=Y&NEWS=N&PAGE=fulltext&AN=00005205-199809000-00017&D=ovft&PDF=y>

Shapiro, J.R, Williams, A.M, Hambarchyan, M. (2012). Are all interventions created equal? A multi-threat approach to tailoring stereotype threat interventions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 104, 277-288.

<http://ovidsp.ovid.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/ovidweb.cgi?T=JS&CSC=Y&NEWS=N&PAGE=fulltext&AN=00005205-201302000-00007&D=ovft&PDF=y>

2nd Take-home examination is distributed

OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

1. The main Sociology Department office does not deal with any course-related matters. Please speak directly to your instructor.
2. Academic Misconduct: Please refer to the website listed below for information on University of Calgary policies on Plagiarism/Cheating/Other Academic Misconduct:
<http://www.ucalgary.ca/pubs/calendar/current/k-5.html>
3. Protection of Privacy: The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy (FOIPP) legislation does not allow students to retrieve any course material from public places. Anything that requires handing back will be returned directly during class or office hours. “If students are unable to pick up their assignments from the instructor, they provide the instructor with a stamped, self-addressed envelope to be used for the return of the assignment.”

4. Ethical Research: Students are advised that any research with human subjects – including any interviewing (even with friends and family), opinion polling, or unobtrusive observation – must have the approval of the Faculty Ethics Committee. In completing course requirements, students must not undertake any human subjects research without discussing their plans with the instructor, to determine if ethics approval is required.

5. Deferrals: If possible, please provide advance notice to the instructor if you are unable to write an exam or complete/turn-in assignments on time. All requests for deferral of a course component due to health reasons must be accompanied by written documentation as outlined in the University Calendar and should be obtained while the student has the health issue rather than after recovery. Deferrals will be allowed in the following circumstances: illness, domestic affliction or religious conviction. Travel arrangements and misreading of the syllabus are not valid reasons for requesting a deferral. Deferrals will not be granted if it is determined that just cause is not shown by the student. If you have missed a test for a legitimate reason, the instructor can require you to write a “make up” test as close in time to the original test as possible or can choose to transfer the percentage weight to another course component. If the instructor schedules a “make up” test for you, its date and location will be at the convenience of the Department of Sociology.

Deferred Final Exam Form: Please note that requests to defer a Registrar scheduled final exam are dealt with through the Registrar’s Office. Further information about deadlines, and where paperwork should be taken, is available on the form, which can be found at: <https://www.ucalgary.ca/registrar/student-forms>

Deferred Term Work Form: Deferral of term work past the end of a term also requires a form to be filled out. It’s available at

https://www.ucalgary.ca/registrar/files/registrar/deferred_termwork15_0.pdf

Once an extension date has been agreed between instructor and student, the form should be taken to the Faculty of Arts Program Information Centre (SS 110) for approval by an Associate Dean (Students).

6. Student Representation: The 2017-18 Students’ Union VP Academic is Tina Miller (suvpaca@ucalgary.ca). For more information, and to contact other elected officials with the Student’s Union, please visit this link: <https://www.su.ucalgary.ca/about/who-we-are/elected-officials/>

You may also wish to contact the Student Ombudsperson for help with a variety of University-related matters: <http://www.ucalgary.ca/ombuds/contact>

7. Academic Accommodation: The student accommodation policy can be found at: ucalgary.ca/access/accommodations/policy. Students needing an Accommodation because of a Disability or medical condition should communicate this need to Student Accessibility Services in accordance with the Procedure for Accommodations for Students with Disabilities ucalgary.ca/policies/files/policies/student-accommodation-policy. Students needing an Accommodation based on a Protected Ground other than Disability, should communicate this need, preferably in writing, to the course instructor.

8. Handing in papers, return of final papers, and release of final grades:

- All assignments for this course will be submitted to the instructor via D2L system or handed in as a hard copy during class. Papers will not be accepted in the main Sociology Department office.
- All feedback regarding assignments for this course will be provided by the instructor via email, D2L system or attached to the hard copy.
- Final grades are not posted by the Sociology Department. They are available only online.

9. Email communication: Feel free to contact me over email at any time. Please put your course number and section in your email's subject line, and include a proper salutation, your full name, student ID, and a proper closing in the body of your email. All emails violating customary email conventions will be ignored. All other emails will be answered within one business day. I do not answer emails over the weekend. Please take that into account when emailing me questions pertaining assignments or exams. If you have a course-related question, please check the course outline first. Questions that can be answered by consulting the course outline will not be answered. Also, please e-mail me for administrative purposes only, for example to set up an appointment. Please do not use e-mail as a replacement for an office visit, if there is something you want to discuss. Questions about the course content and readings, concerns about grades, or any other personal issues should be dealt with in person during my office hours.

Psychology 447.3**Stigma, Prejudice, & Discrimination****Fall 2015**

Instructor:	Andrew Szeto	Lecture Location:	SH 278
Phone:	403-880-2192	Lecture Days/Time:	MWF 12:00-12:50
Email:	aszeto@ucalgary.ca		
Office:	Admin 131C		
Office Hours:	Fridays 10:30 to 11:30am or by appointment only		

Course Description and Goals

This course explores the current research on stigmatized groups, the impact and consequences of stigma (such as prejudice, discrimination, and self-stigma), and ways to reduce stigma. Although the course will survey various stigmatized groups and the various contexts where stigma may occur, there will be a specific focus on the stigma related to mental illnesses. Some of the other groups impacted by stigma that will be surveyed in this course include people of disadvantaged or minority groups, immigrants, and people with certain medical conditions. There will also be exploration of the processes involved in stigmatization, prejudice, and discrimination, in addition to understanding and application of ways that we may reduce these. Students will also get to reflect on the attitudes they may hold towards other groups and how specific attitudes could lead to stigmatizing behaviours. Finally, students will take the concepts and knowledge learned in the course and apply it to a real world setting.

Prerequisites

Psyc 200 – Principles of Psychology I

Psyc 201 – Principles of Psychology II

Psyc 312 – Experimental Design and Quantitative Research Methods in Psychology

Required Text

The required readings for this course can be found on the course Blackboard page. Please check D2L for the updated schedule of assigned readings.

Evaluation

There are multiple evaluation components in this course. Please read each component carefully.

1) Exams (each is worth 20% of final grade)

- Exam 1—20% (Oct 2, 2015): Lectures and assigned readings from Sept 9 to Sept 30
- Exam 2—20% (Nov 6, 2015): Lectures and assigned readings from Oct 5 to Nov 4

Both exams will contain multiple choice, short answer, and long answer questions.

No iPods, iPads, computers, books or notes during tests

2) Take Home Exam (15% of final grade)

- Take Home Exam (Assigned: Dec 7, 2015; Due: Paper copies of the exam must be submitted to my office by 5pm Dec 14, 2015): Long answer and short essay response based on all materials covered in the course

Late exams will be accepted but will incur a 10% penalty per day (including weekends).

3) Research Paper (20% of final grade)

The research paper will be assigned on Sept 16, 2015. Students will choose from 1 of 5 topics to write an APA style paper. The paper has a maximum length of 3000 word (about 10 double-spaced pages, not including references). More information will be given on D2L and when the paper is assigned. This paper is due at the beginning of class on Oct 23, 2015. Only paper copies will be accepted. Late papers will be accepted but will incur a 10% penalty per day (including weekends).

4) Group Presentation (15% of final grade) and Presentation Feedback (5% of final grade)

Students will form groups of 3 to 5 (depending on the size of class) and give a 30 min presentation (plus 5-10 min of questions) to the class during the last third of the course. The group presentation is worth 15% of the final grade where all members will receive the same grade. This presentation will be assigned and groups formed on Oct 5, 2015. The topic of the presentation must be approved by the professor before Oct 21, 2015. More information will be given on D2L and when the presentation is assigned. All group members must be present for the presentation and will take part in the presentation. Missing group members will automatically receive 0% for their grade unless the professor (in consultation with the other members) deems the missing member should receive some portion of the grade based on the contribution to the development of the presentation.

The second component is presentation feedback worth 5% of the final grade. Each student will be required to complete 3 presentation feedback forms, one from the first 3 presentations (i.e., presentations 1 to 3), one from presentations 4-6, and one from presentations 7-9 (this may be slightly different depending on the number of groups and class size). More information will be given on D2L and during class. The presentation feedback forms will be due 48 hours after the presentation (e.g., if the presentation was on Friday's class, the feedback form is due the following Sunday by 5pm). Late feedback forms will be accepted but will incur a 10% penalty per day (including weekends).

5) Thought Questions (5%)

Students will post a thought question/idea/comment based on the week's assigned readings on D2L five times throughout the course. The goal is to think critically about the assigned reading and generate an interesting idea, issue, or criticism that will stimulate discussion. Students only need to post once for each of the five thought questions and the length should be about one paragraph long. Be sure to read everyone's thought questions before coming to class. More details will be given on D2L and in class.

Department of Psychology Grade Distribution Policy

The distribution of grades in Psychology courses (the percentage of A grades, B grades, etc.) will be similar to the distribution of grades in other courses in the Faculty of Arts. The Department monitors the grade distributions of 200-, 300-, and 400-level courses in the Faculty to ensure that the grade distributions in Psychology courses are comparable. Based on these reviews, students can expect that 1) up to 30% of grades in 200- and 300-level psychology courses will be “A” grades (A+, A, and A-), and 2) up to 40% of grades 400-level psychology courses will be “A” grades.

Department of Psychology Criteria for Letter Grades

Psychology professors use the following criteria when assigning letter grades:

A+ grade: *Exceptional Performance.* An A+ grade indicates near perfect performance on multiple choice and short answer exams. For research papers/essays/course projects/presentations, an A+ grade is awarded for exceptional work deserving of special recognition and is therefore not a common grade.

A, A- Range: *Excellent Performance.* Superior understanding of course material. Written work is very strong in terms of critical and original thinking, content, organization, and the expression of ideas, and demonstrates student’s thorough knowledge of subject matter.

B Range: *Good Performance.* Above average understanding of course material. Written work shows evidence of critical thinking and attention to organization and editing but could be improved in form and/or content.

C Range: *Satisfactory Performance.* Adequate understanding of course material. Knowledge of basic concepts and terminology is demonstrated. Written work is satisfactory and meets essential requirements but could be improved significantly in form and content. Note: All prerequisites for courses offered by the Faculty of Arts must be met with a minimum grade of C-.

D range: *Marginally meets standards.* Minimal understanding of subject matter. Written work is marginally acceptable and meets basic requirements but requires substantial improvements in form and content. Student has not mastered course material at a level sufficient for advancement into more senior courses in the same or related subjects.

F grade: *Course standards not met.* Inadequate understanding of subject matter. Written work does not meet basic requirements. Student has not demonstrated knowledge of course material at a level sufficient for course credit.

Grading Scale

A+	96-100%	B+	80-84%	C+	67-71%	D+	54-58%
A	90-95%	B	76-79%	C	63-66%	D	50-53%
A-	85-89%	B-	72-75%	C-	59-62%	F	0-49%

As stated in the University Calendar, it is at the instructor’s discretion to round off either upward or downward to determine a final grade when the average of term work and final examinations is between two letter grades.

To determine final letter grades, final percentage grades will be rounded up or down to the nearest whole percentage (e.g., 89.5% will be rounded up to 90% = A but 89.4% will be rounded down to 89% = A-).

Tentative Lecture Schedule

Date	Topic/Activity/Readings/Due Date
W Sep 9	Course Overview and Introduction
F Sep 11	Definitions and Introducing the Concepts
M Sep 14	Definitions and Introducing the Concepts
W Sep 16	Methods of Measuring Stigma/Prejudice/Discrimination <i>Research Paper Assigned</i>
F Sep 18	Social Categorization as a Precursor to Stigma/Prejudice/Discrimination Last day to drop full courses (Multi-term) and Fall Term half courses. No refunds for full courses (Multi-term) or Fall Term half courses after this date.
M Sep 21	Social Categorization as a Precursor to Stigma/Prejudice/Discrimination Last day to add or swap full courses (Multi-term) and Fall Term half courses. Last day for change of registration from audit to credit or credit to audit.
W Sep 23	Development of Stigma/Prejudice/Discrimination
F Sep 25	Other Processes Involved in Stigma/Prejudice/Discrimination Fee payment deadline for Fall Term full and half courses.
M Sep 28	Other Processes Involved in Stigma/Prejudice/Discrimination
W Sep 30	Individual Differences and Personality in Stigma/Prejudice/Discrimination
F Oct 2	Exam 1 (20%)
M Oct 5	Reducing Stigma/Prejudice/Discrimination <i>Group Presentation Assigned; Groups formed</i>
W Oct 7	The Contact Hypothesis
F Oct 9	The Contact Hypothesis
M Oct 12	Thanksgiving Day, University closed (except Taylor Family Digital Library, Law, Medical, Gallagher and Business Libraries). No lectures.
W Oct 14	Other Ways to Reduce Reducing Stigma/Prejudice/Discrimination
F Oct 16	The Media and Stigma/Prejudice/Discrimination
M Oct 19	The Stigma of Mental Disorders
W Oct 21	The Stigma of Mental Disorders <i>Group Presentation Topics Approved by</i>
F Oct 23	The Stigma of Mental Disorders <i>Research Paper Due at the beginning of class (20%)</i>
M Oct 26	Interventions and Evaluations
W Oct 28	Guest Speaker
F Oct 30	Interventions and Evaluations
M Nov 2	Interventions and Evaluations
W Nov 4	Specific Stigmatized Groups
F Nov 6	Exam 2 (20%)
M Nov 9	Group Presentation Preparation
Nov 11-15	Reading Days. No lectures.

W Nov 11	Remembrance Day (Observed). University Closed (except Taylor Family Digital Library, Law, Medical, Gallagher and Business Libraries). No lectures.
F Nov 14	Reading Days. No lectures.
M Nov 16	Group Presentation 1
W Nov 18	Group Presentation 2
F Nov 20	Group Presentation 3
M Nov 23	Group Presentation 4
W Nov 25	Group Presentation 5
F Nov 27	Group Presentation 6
M Nov 30	Group Presentation 7
W Dec 2	Group Presentation 8
F Dec 4	Group Presentation 9
M Dec 7	Course Wrap-Up <i>Take Home Exam assigned; Take Home Exam due by the end of the day Dec 14th, 2015 (15%)</i>
T Dec 8	Fall Term Lectures End. Last day to withdraw with permission from Fall Term half courses.
Dec 11-22	Fall Term Exam Period.

Reappraisal of Grades

A student who feels that a piece of graded term work (e.g., term paper, essay, test) has been unfairly graded, may have the work re-graded as follows. The student shall discuss the work with the instructor within 15 days of being notified about the mark or of the item's return to the class; no reappraisal of term work is permitted after the 15 days. If not satisfied, the student shall immediately take the matter to the Head of the department offering the course, who will arrange for a reassessment of the work within the next 15 days. The reappraisal of term work may cause the grade to be raised, lowered, or to remain the same. If the student is not satisfied with the decision and wishes to appeal, the student shall address a letter of appeal to the Dean of the faculty offering the course within 15 days of the unfavourable decision. In the letter, the student must clearly and fully state the decision being appealed, the grounds for appeal, and the remedies being sought, along with any special circumstances that warrant an appeal of the reappraisal. The student should include as much written documentation as possible.

Plagiarism and Other Academic Misconduct

Intellectual honesty is the cornerstone of the development and acquisition of knowledge and requires that the contribution of others be acknowledged. Consequently, plagiarism or cheating on any assignment is regarded as an extremely serious academic offense. Plagiarism involves submitting or presenting work in a course as if it were the student's own work done expressly for that particular course when, in fact, it is not. Students should examine sections of the University Calendar that present a Statement of Intellectual honesty and definitions and penalties associated with Plagiarism/Cheating/Other Academic Misconduct.

Academic Accommodation

Students seeking an accommodation based on disability or medical concerns should contact Student Accessibility Services ; SAS will process the request and issue letters of accommodation to instructors. For additional information on support services and accommodations for students with disabilities, visit www.ucalgary.ca/access/.

Students who require an accommodation in relation to their coursework based on a protected ground other than disability should communicate this need in writing to their Instructor.

The full policy on Student Accommodations is available at http://www.ucalgary.ca/policies/files/policies/student-accommodation-policy_0.pdf.

Students who have not registered with the Disability Resource Centre are not eligible for formal academic accommodation. You are also required to discuss your needs with your instructor no later than 14 days after the start of this course.

Absence From A Test/Exam

Makeup tests/exams are **NOT** an option without an official University medical excuse (see the University Calendar). A completed Physician/Counselor Statement will be required to confirm absence from a test/exam for health reasons; the student will be required to pay any cost associated with this Statement. Students who miss a test/exam have up to 48 hours to contact the instructor and to schedule a makeup test/exam. Students who do not schedule a makeup test/exam with the instructor within this 48-hour period forfeit the right to a makeup test/exam. At the instructor's discretion, a makeup test/exam may differ significantly (in form and/or content) from a regularly scheduled test/exam. Except in extenuating circumstances (documented by an official University medical excuse), a makeup test/exam must be written within 2 weeks of the missed test/exam during exam make-up hours provided by the department <http://psychology.ucalgary.ca/undergraduate/exam-and-course-information#mues>. If a student cannot write their final exam on the date assigned by the Registrar's Office, they need to apply for a deferred exam http://www.ucalgary.ca/registrar/exams/deferred_final. Under no circumstances will this be accommodated by the department.

Travel During Exams

Consistent with University regulations, students are expected to be available to write scheduled exams at any time during the official December and April examination periods. Requests to write a make-up exam because of conflicting travel plans (e.g., flight bookings) will NOT be considered by the department. Students are advised to wait until the final examination schedule is posted before making any travel arrangements. If a student cannot write their final exam on the date assigned by the Registrar's Office, they need to apply for a deferred exam http://www.ucalgary.ca/registrar/exams/deferred_final. Under no circumstances will this be accommodated by the department.

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy (FOIP) Act

The FOIP legislation disallows the practice of having student's retrieve tests and assignments from a public place. Therefore, tests and assignments may be returned to students during class/lab, or during office hours, or via the Department Office (Admin 255), or will be made available only for viewing during exam review sessions scheduled by the Department. Tests and assignments will be shredded after one year. Instructors should take care to not link students' names with their grades, UCIDs, or other FOIP-sensitive information.

Course Credits for Research Participation

Course Credits for Research Participation (Max 2% of final grade)

Students in most psychology courses are eligible to participate in Departmentally approved research and earn credits toward their final grades. **A maximum of two credits (2%) per course, including this course, may be applied to the student's final grade. Students earn 0.5% (0.5 credits) for each full 30 minutes of participation.** The demand for timeslots may exceed the supply in a given term. Thus, students are not guaranteed that there will be enough studies available to them to meet their credit requirements. Students should seek studies early in the term and should frequently check for open timeslots. Students can create an account and participate in Departmentally approved research studies at <http://ucalgary.sona-systems.com>. The last day to participate in studies and to assign or reassign earned credits to courses is **Dec 8, 2015**

Evacuation Assembly Point

In case of an emergency evacuation during class, students must gather at the designated assembly point nearest to the classroom. The list of assembly points is found at <http://www.ucalgary.ca/emergencyplan/assemblypoints>. Please check this website and note the nearest assembly point for this course.

Student Organizations

Psychology students may wish to join the Psychology Undergraduate Students' Association (PSYCHS). They are located in Administration 170 and may be contacted at 403-220-5567.

Student Union VP Academic: Phone: 403-220-3911 [suvpaca@ucalgary.ca](mailto:suypaca@ucalgary.ca)

Student Union Faculty Rep.: Phone: 403-220-3913 socialscirep@su.ucalgary.ca

Student Ombudsman's Office

The Office of the Student Ombudsmen provides independent, impartial and confidential support for students who require assistance and advice in addressing issues and concerns related to their academic careers. The office can be reached at 403-220-6420 or ombuds@ucalgary.ca (<http://www.ucalgary.ca/provost/students/ombuds>)

Safewalk

The safewalk program provides volunteers to walk students safely to their destination anywhere on campus. This service is free and available 24 hrs/day, 365 days a year. Call 403-220-5333.

Important Dates

The last day to drop this course with no "W" notation and **still receive a tuition fee refund** is **September 18, 2015**. Last day for registration/change of registration is **September 21, 2015**. The last day to withdraw from this course is **December 8, 2015**.

Agenda 2000

**Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination
at the seam between the centuries:
evolution, culture, mind, and brain**

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Abstract

Social psychologists possess considerable enthusiasm and expertise in the study of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, having commenced in the 1920s and 1930s. Research and theory in the next three to four decades focused on motivation, followed by a reactively exclusive focus on cognition in the 1970s and early 1980s, in turn followed by a 1990s joint focus on cognition and motivation. Throughout, intra-individual conflict analyses have alternated with contextual analyses, though both clearly have merit. Based on a social evolutionary viewpoint, a few core social motives (belonging, understanding, controlling, enhancing, and trusting) account for much current research on interpersonal category-based responses. Trends for the future should entail more emphasis on behavior, more sensitivity to cultural specificities and universals, as well as budding efforts on neural mechanisms of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

In July 1999, the Oxford meeting of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology witnessed, out of 33 total symposia, 13 focused on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. In October 1999, the St Louis meeting of the American Society for Experimental Social Psychology witnessed, out of 18 symposia, 6 on the same topic. At the seam between the centuries, Western social psychologists enthusiastically stitch away, trying to mend intergroup tears in the fabric of society and to embroider intragroup patterns of identity. The same social wear and tear motivated our forebears in the early part of the century, so perhaps a turn-of-the-century assessment is in order. This paper focuses on the interpersonal level of one person responding to another, based on that person's perceived social category. How have social psychologists approached this patchwork quilt of categorical thoughts, feelings, and behavior? What have we done, what are we doing now, and what are we (maybe) going to do?

For the better part of a century, researchers in stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination have focused on the mind, in both a cognitive and motivational sense. At

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the end of the twentieth century, we concentrated on the mind's adaptation in groups, from an implicitly evolutionary perspective. The twenty-first century may continue to emphasize mind, augmented by (one hopes) a focus on behavior, cultural sensitivity, and altogether new links to the brain. Doubtless, individuals will continue to stereotype, prejudge, and discriminate against each other on the basis of perceived category membership, so social psychologists are unlikely to go out of the mending business any time soon.

WHAT HAVE WE DONE?

Academic bookshelves overflow with historical overviews of intergroup attitudes (e.g. Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Brown, 1995; Duckitt, 1992; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Jones, 1997; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; collections include Eberhardt & Fiske, 1998; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Hamilton, 1981; Macrae, Stangor, & Hewstone, 1996; Jost & Major, in press; Miller, 1982. For current purposes, this section adopts one historical framework noted earlier (Eberhardt & Fiske, 1996; Fiske, 1998): Generations of researchers have alternated individual versus contextual levels of analysis. A cynic might argue that each cohort wearies of the current approach—pushing either individual or contextual analysis as far as it can go before collapsing under the accumulated complexity of evidence pro and con—meanwhile forgetting the disadvantages of the even older approach. An advocate might argue that the value of revisiting old approaches with new perspectives allows the field to keep viable both levels of analysis, while capitalizing on people's fresh insights and enthusiasm. Besides, the cyclical patterns emerge only when viewed from a distance; up close, the new theories reveal truly new creations. And both individual and contextual analyses must be right, on some level.

Curiously, both the individual and contextual analyses take the same rough form over the decades, moving from motivational to cognitive to combining both types of analysis. In the individual analysis, as the next section will review, the authoritarian approach (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levenson, & Sanford, 1950) rested in nothing if not motivation; the subtle, unconscious prejudice approaches (e.g. Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay & Hough, 1976) focused more on cognition. The dissociation model (Devine, 1989) combined individual cognition with motivational differences between high and low-prejudice people, and the social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), as well as other system justification theories (Jost & Major, in press) also combine motivational and cognitive mechanisms.

Intra-Individual Levels of Analysis

As every student of prejudice knows, some of the most extensive early work originated from Europe-to-USA immigrant academics concerned about the nature of Western antisemitism and racial prejudice (Adorno *et al.*, 1950). Varieties of prejudice co-occur, suggesting the possibility of reliable individual differences in overall prejudice. In those psychodynamic times, the account rested in child-rearing practices that

punished, controlled, and repressed, leading to punitive, controlling, and oppressive adults with attitudes to match. The motives involved were Freudian impulses (sex, aggression, obedience). At a broad level, for example, one kind of outgroup (i.e. Negroes) carried the unacceptable impulses of the id, whereas another kind of outgroup (i.e. Jews) carried the unattainable standards of the superego (Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1950; this point will resurface in future research trends). Motivated to repress intrapsychic conflict, authoritarian personalities employ prejudice as the motivational safety valve (for reviews, see Brown, 1965; Christie, 1991). The overall approach died for several decades but would reincarnate (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988), as a later section indicates.

In response to theoretical, methodological, and empirical shortcomings, a new generation of individual-difference researchers in the 1970s jettisoned the excess motivational baggage, crafting an efficient cognitive vehicle for understanding prejudice. Modern bigots, researchers argued, differ from modern egalitarians in cognition, but not in motivation: both types are motivated not to seem prejudiced. (Researchers typically abandon the extremist minority who are content with appearing prejudiced.) Prejudiced and unprejudiced people alike apprehend prevailing norms of tolerance, abandon open expressions of bias, and abhor signs of prejudice in themselves. Because motivation does not distinguish among levels of modern prejudice, it rapidly becomes irrelevant in those analyses.

Nevertheless, modern prejudiced and unprejudiced people do differ subtly in cognition: in the extent to which they display quiet forms of prejudice, which may escape social and personal notice, but not the measuring instruments of social psychologists (or consequences for the targets). Three major theories of subtle prejudice arose:

- (1) Modern or symbolic racism (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976) focuses on policy beliefs that all happen to disadvantage minorities; the high-scoring individual thus has ideological excuses for bias. The difference between modern racists and modern nonracists lies in the political beliefs of the racists.
- (2) Again focused on beliefs, ambivalent racism (Katz & Hass, 1988) notes the tension between 'pro'-black attitudes (paternalistic pity for the disadvantaged) and 'anti'-black attitudes (hostility toward the oppositional deviant); both attitudes reside in the same ambivalent racist. In this view, the difference between ambivalent racists and nonracists lies in the racists' simultaneously high scores on both 'pro' and 'anti' beliefs about blacks in general.
- (3) A final example of cognitive diagnoses of modern individual prejudice, aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) focuses on the tension between not wanting to be racist and simultaneous, unconscious cognitions that reflect racism. The difference between aversive racists and nonracists lies in the extent of their willingness to confront their unconscious biases. Although not formally assessing individual differences, this theory does focus on comparing traditional overt racists and modern subtle racists, and it focuses on individual cognition more than on motivational issues.

Notice that the subtle cognitions all involve intra-individual conflict—whether anti-minority policy beliefs coupled with rejection of overt racism, or pro-black attitudes combined with anti-black attitudes, or conscious egalitarian beliefs co-existing with unconscious cognitive bias. Thus, like the intra-individual motivational conflict of the

authoritarian personality, subtle forms of racism result from intra-individual cognitive contradictions. The heavily cognitive, less heavily motivational analyses of the 1970s and 1980s contrast with the heavily motivational flavor of the 1940s and early 1950s, but conflict and contradiction inhere in both.

In the 1990s, a combined cognitive-motivational theory (Devine, 1989), centered in dissociation, began in the cognitive camp, positing intra-individual contradiction between cultural and personal beliefs, respectively automatic and controlled. In this view, virtually everyone has automatic access to cultural racism. Differences between low- and high-prejudice individuals lie in personal, controlled beliefs. The dissociation theory rapidly moved toward a motivation-cognition mix, examining prejudice with and without compunction, resulting in respective guilt versus anger at one's inevitable transgressions (e.g. Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993).

In the late 1990s, another individual-difference theory combined cognition and motivation, describing individuals high and low in social dominance orientation (e.g. Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The cognitive aspect differentiating those high and low in SDO lies in ideology, myths that legitimate social hierarchy. The motivation that differentiates high and low SDO centers on personal investment in group hierarchies, enacted, for example, through personally choosing hierarchy-attenuating or hierarchy-maintaining careers. In its linkage of individual motivation to beliefs about social hierarchy, the theory brings to mind (a) authoritarian personality theory (as cited earlier), which originally opened up individual difference approaches in the motivational psychology of bias, and (b) Rokeach's (e.g. 1951a, b, 1954, 1956) work on narrow-mindedness and dogmatism, which had followed a more cognitive bent. But SDO combines cognition and motivation in equal measure.

Building on the insights of several decades, individual-differences approaches to stereotyping, prejudice, and racism all apparently emerge from US researchers, an oddity that may stem from historical peculiarities (Fiske, 1998). Centuries of dramatically heterogeneous immigration into one nation may have brought ethnic issues to the surface sooner in the USA than elsewhere. Coupled with an explicit constitutional ideology of equality, the US cultural focus on individualism places responsibility for bias on individuals, and privileges individual autonomy over ethnic group identity. In Europe, the histories of intergroup encounter are centuries older, and occur between nations at least as frequently as within. Coupled with the importance of linguistic, cultural, religious, and geographical boundaries, a lesser cultural focus on individualism makes Europe the logical birthplace of social identity approaches to intergroup relations, a topic to be addressed by another in this series of Y2K essays for the *EJSP*. Be this as it may, Europeans as well as Americans fall prey to modern subtle racism (Jackson, Brown, & Kirby, 1998; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), dissociated cultural and personal beliefs (Lepore & Brown, 1997), and social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

At a more global level, we know little about individual differences in stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination in the Southern and Eastern hemispheres. In some Asian cultures, which have a history of being more ethnically homogeneous within nation and more collective in general, social psychologists rarely study individual variation in stereotyping and prejudice. Likewise, Latin American and African social psychologists still have much to say on this topic, with someday more international impact than thus far.

Contextual Levels of Analysis

If the individual level of analysis has spanned three-quarters of the century, contextual approaches concentrated in the last half-century. As with individual differences, so too in the contextual analyses: motivational approaches predated more emphatically cognitive approaches, before a motivational-cognitive balance re-emerged.

At the group level of contextual analyses, of course, social identity theory (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; for a recent review, see Brewer & Brown, 1998) blossomed within the European context into a primary approach to intergroup relations from the 1970s onward. The core idea of social identity theory, that people identify with and value their ingroup, thereby derogating the outgroup, carries both cognitive (categorization) and motivational (self-esteem) foundations. Its heir, self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987), eliminated the motivational aspects of SIT and selectively focused on the cognitive. Although the intergroup relations history and forecast both lie outside this article's assigned Y2K portfolio, the pattern apparently replicates the motivation-cognition-combined trend seen elsewhere. A provocateur might argue that theories of system justification (such as social dominance theory; see Jost & Major, *in press*, for a broader collection) will take up the combined motivational-cognitive thread of these group-level analyses, but this is not our focus here.

At a more interpersonal level of contextual analysis, immediate social contexts do shape individual responses to individual outgroup members. This exemplifies a social psychological analysis, that is, how actual, imagined, or implied other people influence an individual's stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. As this section will indicate, in the 1950s, Allport led the way to understanding the contextual nature of interpersonal bias, with one eye on motivational underpinnings, and the other famously on cognitive underpinnings. Then, from the late 1970s through the 1980s, the cognitive shortcuts viewpoint all but eliminated motivational perspectives from contextual analyses, partly in reaction to the previous dominance of psychoanalytic authoritarian personality approaches, but this was followed rapidly in the 1990s by hybrid cognitive-motivational contextual approaches incorporating perceiver goals.

The first wave of context-based, interpersonal, cognitive analysis (Allport, 1954) argued for the normality of individuals prejudging people in categories and specified the conditions for successful intergroup contact at the interpersonal level, both ideas that survive as maxims nearly 50 years later. Although not rejecting the insights of the authoritarian personality theory, isolating extreme bigotry in the benighted few, the novel categorization approach neatly captured a much-needed perspective on ordinary prejudice. These cognitive analyses fly in the face of naive analyses of prejudice, then and now. From the 1950s to the 1990s, students enter university courses on prejudice thinking that prejudice is the province of a few shriveled hearts and warped minds, not the average person. Cognitive theories recognize, in effect, the banality of bias. People normally prejudge, form ingroups, and reject outgroups. As Allport's preface forecasts, though the experiments may change, the framework endures. These cognitive underpinnings of prejudice do not depend on individual differences, for everyone must categorize, in order to function. 'Orderly living depends on it' (Allport, 1954). Categorization thus must vary, if it varies, according to context.

The second, equally enduring, insight, the conditions for successful intergroup contact, explained how people move from normal categorization and prejudice to tolerance. Conditions for contact originally cited equal status, common goals, cooperation, and authority sanction. At the interpersonal level of analysis, these contact conditions waited until the 1990s to have much impact. (At the group level of analysis, not reviewed here, they paralleled the work of Sherif and Sherif, 1953, and both informed the work of Amir, 1969, 1976; Cook, 1962, 1985; Pettigrew, 1971, 1998, and many others).

At interpersonal levels of analysis, the cognitive bases of stereotyping flourished 20 years after Allport's initial insights, coming into the 1970s through the 1980s. People normally divide people into ingroups and outgroups, so that stereotyping is a normal function (Tajfel, 1969, 1970, 1981). The story of the cognitive miser (Fiske & Taylor, 1984) explains how shortcuts to category-based information processes do not require motivation to account for prejudice. Categorization suffices. People accentuate differences between categories and minimize differences within categories (Capozza & Nanni, 1986; Tajfel, 1970; Taylor, 1981). People tag other people by race, gender, and age, so they confuse people within groups and differentiate them between groups (Arcuri, 1982; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). People view categorized groups as homogeneous (e.g. Wilder, 1986), and they privilege category-confirming information in memory (Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979), as well as category-confirming covariation in judgment (Hamilton, 1981). People's category-based behavior elicits confirming behavior from stereotyped targets (Darley & Fazio, 1980; Snyder & Swann, 1978; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1977). The complexity of social content overwhelms the limited human mind, which then employs a number of simplifying strategies. In this 1970s to early 1980s account, as in Allport's 1950s original, the role of content is implicit; if the universal processes do not differ by individuals, then perhaps they differ by context.

Some of the individual difference accounts mentioned earlier did introduce the importance of context. Two theories of subtle racism (ambivalent racism and aversive racism) do take context into account, when they examine the interaction of individual differences and context. For example, when an ambivalent racist encounters a positive exemplar, the result is Allport's 'love prejudice' (overdone positive bias); when the same ambivalent racist encounters a negative exemplar, the result is hate. Thus, extremity results from ambivalence, depending on context. Similarly, when an aversive racist encounters a context that would expose discrimination, tolerance results, but when an aversive racist encounters a context that excuses discrimination, prejudice results.

Even more so, other early 1990s models explicitly took on the new hybrid cognitive-motivational approaches by incorporating perceiver goals. Category-based and individuated responses depend on goals that emphasize respectively various kinds of decisiveness versus various notions of accuracy (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Gollwitzer, 1990; Hilton & Darley, 1991; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1992; Snyder, 1992). For example, our own work provides outcome dependency or accuracy motivations, resulting in more individuating impression formation processes and outcomes (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Neuberg, 1989; Pavelchak, 1989; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Ruscher, Fiske, Miki, & van Manen, 1991).

WHAT ARE WE DOING NOW?

The lesson of nearly a century's research on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination combines motivation and cognition at all three levels—intra-individual, inter-individual, and inter-group. But the proliferation of potential motives staggers an observer. The challenge of systematizing core social motives elicits as many taxonomies as there are reviewers, but our own efforts led us to the delusion that five (plus or minus five) social motives capture well enough the insights of social and personality psychologists over the last century (Stevens & Fiske, 1995). In considering these motives, we proposed that a social adaptation perspective explains what matters to people in social situations, including their interactions with outgroup members.

People need other people for survival. Over human history, being banished from the group has amounted to a death sentence. People's evolutionary environment, one might argue, is located in other people (not so much in the immediate savannah, forest, tundra, or jungle). As such, people need to function well in the face-to-face ingroup (Caporael, 1997). Loyalty to the sustaining ingroup would be a biological predisposition, and suspicion of the outgroup can result by default or by feared defeat. Viewed this way, the core social motive is *belonging*, getting along in one's own group. From this follow relatively cognitive motives, emphasizing shared social *understanding* and *controlling* socially effective interactions. Also from this follow relatively affective motives, which emphasize *enhancing* self and *trusting* ingroup others. (As a mnemonic, the motives spell BUCET, so with a little adjustment, one might call this a 'bucket' of core social motives.) In any event, this viewpoint helps to systematize motives currently under study as relevant to stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination (for detail, see Fiske, 1998).

Belonging

At core, people are motivated to maintain affiliations and bonds with others, as more than a dozen social-personality theorists have argued (e.g. Baumeister & Leary, 1995; see Stevens & Fiske, 1995, for more references). If the individual is motivated to get along with an ingroup, because social survival determines physical survival, then people most often work to enhance relationships with similar others. Such relationships are well served, the research on belonging suggests, by attending to individuals on whom one depends, echoing their beliefs, complying with group norms, and mimicking their behavior, all principles demonstrated in current stereotyping research, as follows.

Ingroups result from interdependence, which defines the basic structure of a group, that is, people needing each other for important outcomes. Interdependence motivates individuation: attention to unexpected counter-stereotypic attributes, as well as dispositional (individualized) personality portraits, and attribute-based evaluation, all of which diminish category-based responses relative to individual-based responses. If one depends on another person, one needs to understand the other person specifically, and not as a stereotypical approximation. Interdependence encourages accuracy motivation, which in turn encourages individuating processes of impression formation (e.g. for reviews, see Fiske, in press; Fiske & Depret, 1996). A person who starts as an

outgroup member, if interpersonally interdependent, may become a familiar ingroup member, as the Sherifs (1953) originally demonstrated.

Having understood (or having the sense of understanding) a person on whom one depends, one gets along by going along, that is, by reflecting the other person's beliefs (e.g. Chen, Schecter, & Chaiken, 1996; Dardenne & Leyens, 1995; Leyens, Dardenne, & Fiske, 1998; Ruscher, Hammer, & Hammer, 1996; Snyder & Haugen, 1994, 1995). Conveying shared beliefs is key to belonging. Sometimes the effort to belong means echoing another person's stereotypic beliefs, but sometimes the effort to belong means not expressing one's own stereotypes. More broadly, people motivated to belong will comply with perceived group norms regarding expressing or not expressing stereotypes (Blanchard, Lilly, & Vaughn, 1991; Fiske & Von Hendy, 1992; Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1994; Mackie, Hamilton, Susskind, & Rosselli, 1996; Pryor, Giedd, & Williams, 1995).

Most directly, people mimic the behavior even of stereotyped targets (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998; Dijksterhuis, Spears, Postmes, Stapel, Koomen, Knippenberg, & Scheepers, 1998). Mimicked behavior, unless negative and hostile, may facilitate belonging. That is, young people imitate the slow behavior of elderly people, and students mimic the intelligent behavior of professors, both of which would arguably facilitate those interactions. People enjoy interactions and feel understood when partners mimic their behavior (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).

Thus, as noted here, people's core social motive to belong directs their stereotyping and discrimination, via attending, echoing, complying, and mimicking.

Understanding

In order to get along in a group, one must share a common understanding of the environment and each other. Again, a dozen-plus social-personality psychologists have posited the core social motive of needing a coherent, shared understanding of one's social world (see Stevens & Fiske, 1995, for references). How people understand outgroup members has captured the imagination of stereotyping researchers over the last 20 years. And indeed, we have learned a lot. Most striking are the insights into automatic categorization processes, as well as other stereotypic information processing.

Automatic Categorization

People detect each other's probable gender, race, and age within milliseconds of meeting, and they especially quickly identify ingroup members (Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Zarate & Smith, 1990). *Categorization* on these dimensions speeds people's ability to sort each other out (McCann, Ostrom, Tyner, & Mitchell, 1985). People respond more positively to ingroup members and they do so more rapidly than to outgroup members (for a review, see Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993; Fiske, 1998); negative responses show small and less reliable speed differences. Thus, as in other research (Brewer, 1979; Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000), ingroup advantage precedes outgroup disadvantage.

Moreover, for a person once categorized as an outgroup member, a *stereotype-*

matching speed advantage sets in. People more quickly recognize stereotypic terms preceded by other stereotypic labels and terms, primed both preconsciously (Blair & Banaji, 1996; Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997) and consciously (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Zarate & Sandoval, 1995). More prejudiced people also more quickly recognize stereotypic terms preceded by category labels alone (Lepore & Brown, 1997; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997).

Some groups differ from the cultural default (i.e. the default being male, middle-class, and heterosexual, neither young nor old, and, in the West, white). Groups that depart from the norm are more often linguistically marked ('young person' or 'old person' versus just a 'person'). *Marked groups* are categorized more quickly than unmarked groups. That is, women have gender, and blacks have race more than men and whites respectively do (Eberhardt & Fiske, 1994; Zarate & Sandoval, 1995). Black men are categorized as black, not male, and white women are categorized as women, not white (Zarate, Bonilla, & Luevano, 1995; Zarate & Smith, 1990).

Automatic categorization has its advantages, saving perceivers mental resources, allowing them to operate under cognitive load (Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994a; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994b; Pendry, 1998) or degraded conditions (Macrae *et al.*, 1994b).

Stereotypic Information Search

Stereotype-matched behavior allows rapid encoding, so people do not examine its perceptual details (von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1995). People using strong stereotypes neglect ambiguous or neutral information (Macrae *et al.*, 1994a) and assimilate others to the stereotype (Krueger & Clement, 1994). People seem to prefer stereotype-matching information (Johnston & Macrae, 1994; Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1991) and may ask stereotype-matching questions (for a review, see Leyens *et al.*, 1994). Thus, when searching for additional information, people privilege stereotypic information.

Stereotyped Memory

Memory, too, shows a stereotype-matching advantage, but only in the most generalizable, real-world situations: under complex circumstances, with strong pre-existing stereotypes, and in natural conditions (e.g. Macrae *et al.*, 1993; Stangor & Duan, 1991; for meta-analyses, see Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Although this finding does not occur or even reverses under some laboratory conditions, and memory does not always relate to judgment, memory's major role appears to reinforce stereotypes. Moreover, group members are confused with each other in memory (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978; for reviews, see Fiske, 1998; Klauer & Wegener, 1998).

Outgroup Homogeneity

Having automatically or at least rapidly categorized, searched for stereotypic information, and remembered it, people famously tend to see the outgroup as more

homogeneous than the ingroup (for reviews, see Brewer & Brown, 1998; Mullen & Hu, 1989). Sometimes minorities see themselves as homogeneous (Simon & Brown, 1987), especially when the judgment dimension is important to their identity, and they may see powerful majorities as heterogeneous (Guinote & Fiske, unpublished manuscript).

Stereotypic Attributions

People seem to advantage the ingroup again, attributing ingroup positivity, success, and status to abstract ingroup dispositions rather than concrete, temporary circumstances. People describe positive ingroup and negative outgroup behavior more abstractly (Maass, Montalcini, & Biciotti, 1998; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989). Attributions explain outgroup members' stereotypic behavior by their enduring dispositions and their incongruent behavior by temporary circumstances or unstable effort (for a meta-analysis of gender effects, see Swim & Sanna, 1996; for a meta-analysis of inter-ethnic effects, see Hewstone, 1990, building on classic proposals respectively by Deaux & Emswiller, 1974, and by Pettigrew, 1979). Again, marked more than unmarked groups require explanation (Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991); for example, explaining the gender gap (e.g. showing that, on average, men vote for more warlike policies and women for more peaceful policies) describes women's behavior as deviant from the male norm, not vice versa.

Group Entitativity and Essentialism

Groups become real entities, instead of social constructions, the more people see them as homogeneous and stereotype-matching. The entitative group allegedly possesses a central essence—dispositional, perhaps biological—that explains its categorical nature. Entitativity and essentialism justify the status quo; supposedly, according to the bigot, it is in the nature of some groups to rise to the top and other groups to sink to the bottom (Glick & Fiske, in press; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, & Gaunt, in press; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997; for a collection, see Jost & Major, in press).

Overall, shared socially constructed understandings—starting with automatic categorization, along culturally condoned lines, proceeding to stereotypic information search, stereotyped memory, perceived outgroup homogeneity, stereotypic attributions, and resulting in entitative groups with essential natures—all these features can and do reinforce stereotypes. At the same time, they enable people to function adaptively within their own group, satisfying a motive to share understanding as a route to belong together.

Controlling

As just anticipated, entitativity and essentialism justify the status quo, exerting control at the system level. At the interpersonal level, people express a core social motive to

be effective, even to control, their social environment (e.g. White, 1959; see Stevens & Fiske, 1995, for more references). At a minimum, this motive expresses the push to experience some contingency between one's own actions and others' responses. People who experience effectiveness and competence last longer in groups than people who experience social interactions as arbitrary and out of control. Again, more than a dozen social-personality psychologists in the twentieth century posited such a core social motive.

Lack of control leads to information seeking in social settings (Pittman, 1998), and persistent lack of control is depressing and unhealthy (see Fiske & Taylor, 1984, ch. 5; Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998, for reviews). A drop in control was posited to set attribution processes in motion (Kelley, 1971). Slight loss of control, entailed in any relationship with others, compels information-seeking which, as just noted under understanding, facilitates group life. As noted earlier, people who lose some control because their outcomes depend on others attempt to restore at least prediction and possibly control by seeking unexpected information about those others, understanding in dispositional terms, and evaluating accordingly (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Goodwin *et al.*, in press; Neuberg, 1989; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Pavelchak, 1989; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Ruscher *et al.*, 1991). Cooperation thus encourages individuation, in the service of control. However, powerless people, when they feel they can have no possibility of control, may also stereotype the powerful in return (Depret & Fiske, 1999) or simply hope for the best without examining the details (Stevens & Fiske, in press). Mostly, though, a slight loss of social control discourages stereotyping.

Conversely, the control motive also can undermine cooperative group life. Too much push for individual control, excessive time pressure, and overdecisiveness all subordinate accuracy to stereotypic and simplistic impressions (e.g. Dijker & Koomen, 1996; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). More specific to stereotyping, when powerful people control other people's outcomes, by definition, they do not feel as contingent on them. Lacking a sense of dependency, they are vulnerable to stereotyping 'by default'; that is, they lack the motivation to pay individuated attention to dependent others, so they rely on automatic categories. In addition, some powerful people even stereotype 'by design'; that is, they attend selectively to stereotypic information and form impressions accordingly (Croizet & Fiske, 2000; Fiske, 1993; Goodwin *et al.*, 2000; Operario & Fiske, 1998). The powerful can satisfy the need for control easily, without necessarily individuating others.

All these results of asymmetrical control reinforce hierarchies, and as such the analysis fits social dominance theory's emphasis on people who subscribe to hierarchy-enhancing beliefs and follow hierarchy-enhancing careers (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), as well as system justification theories (see Jost & Major, in press, for a collection). Thus, too much control motive maintains power hierarchies, but a little control motive simply encourages the earlier understanding motive, enabling individuation.

Self-enhancing

After the two relatively cognitive core social motives (understanding and controlling), now come two more affective core social motives. The first one, self-enhancing, constitutes the motive to maintain and possibly improve self-esteem, and many the-

orists posit its importance in Western cultures (e.g. Epstein, 1991; see Stevens & Fiske, 1995, for references). Like the control motive, a little self-enhancement facilitates group life, but too much self-enhancement destroys it.

As an older example of adaptive, moderate self-enhancement, modern racism theories (reviewed earlier) hypothesize a self-esteem-based motive not to appear racist. Similarly, social identify was founded in the idea of group identify as promoting self-esteem (Tajfel *et al.*, 1971). Current examples would include the ways that stigmatized group identity can, counter-intuitively, bolster self-esteem (e.g. Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991; for a review, see Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998), either by dismissing negative feedback as prejudice or by dis-identifying with that domain. For any group member, moderate self-esteem motivates a healthy ingroup identity and involvement with other people in one's group.

Again, however, too much of a good thing can cause problems. Overly high self-esteem is brittle: rigid, fragile, and vulnerable. Protecting inflated self-esteem endangers those outside the self system. Inflated collective self-esteem and inflated personal self-esteem, when threatened, can lead to, respectively, discrimination (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990) and aggression (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). Being insecure or anxious worsens prejudice in intergroup interactions (e.g. Greenland & Brown, 1999; for overviews, see Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Altemeyer's right-wing authoritarianism (1981, 1988) reflects intense and insecure attachments to one's own ethnic group, demands rigid group cohesion, and completely subordinates the individual to the group. Extreme outgroup prejudice results, predicated on perceived value conflicts (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993, 1994). Viewing the group as an extension of the self may predict intergroup emotions (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Smith, 1993): For example, perceived wrongs to one's group beget anger. The humanity of the other group is denied. One's own group members allegedly experience an array of complex human emotions, whereas outgroup members experience only the primitive primary emotions of animals (Leyens *et al.*, in press).

Attachment to the ingroup and perceived danger from the outgroup fit well with a theory of self-enhancement driving adaptive (in)group behavior. In any event, important insights emerge from a return to the issues that opened social science work on prejudice. Self-enhancement and self-protection matter, in ways that we are still only beginning to explicate.

Trusting

The final core social motive proposed here, another relatively affective one, involves trusting (ingroup) others, parallel to one enhancing oneself. Although another dozen social-personality commentators view finding the world benevolent as a core social motive (e.g. Janoff-Bulman, 1992; see Stevens & Fiske, 1995, for references), this writer's experience suggests that not all readers are likely to agree with the importance of this motive.

However, consistent with this motive is one of the most basic findings in person perception, namely the expectation that other people will be relatively benign, all else being equal. The general person positivity bias stands well-documented (Matlin & Stang, 1978; Rothbart & Park, 1986; Sears, 1983), as does people's generalized positive expectancy for life outcomes (Parducci, 1968) and the preponderance of positive over

negative words in many languages (Zajonc, 1998). Against a backdrop of a generally benevolent social world, negative interpersonal events stand out. People are surprised and vigilant for negative exceptions to the positive norm (Fiske, 1980; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Pratto & John, 1991; Vonk, 1993). Negative exceptions to a basic trust for other people then are viewed as diagnostic (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). But people soon return to the more positive baseline (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Taylor, 1991). The relevance for stereotype, prejudice, and discrimination is this. Interdependence—the basis for group belonging—is possible only with trust, positive expectations for ingroup others' general benevolence. Because ingroup members deserve trust, people are cautious about assigning ingroup membership to a stranger, and any negative evidence rapidly excludes the person from closely guarded ingroup membership (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992).

Assuming, for argument, that people are motivated to trust at least ingroup others, one can posit the adaptive role of basic trust (until proven otherwise) in promoting (in)group life. All the instances of ingroup favoritism attest to the role of positivity toward the ingroup, that is, giving ingroup members benefit of the doubt, trusting them to be good, including toward oneself. For example, as noted, people respond positively to ingroup members more rapidly than to outgroup members (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998), suggesting that people are predisposed to expect good responses from the ingroup. If one attributes ingroup members' positive behavior to their dispositions (Hewstone, 1990), then one can expect more of the same from them in the future, that is, one can trust them.

Moreover, the motivation to maintain trust with interdependent ingroup others also describes how people learn to trust outgroup members when they must depend on them. Successful interpersonal contact (Fiske, *in press*) and successful intergroup contact (Pettigrew, 1998) both build trust through cooperation. Attitude change may generalize best when ethnic membership is salient, not minimized (Brown, Vivian, & Hewstone, 1999; Van Oudenhoven, Groenewoud, & Hewstone, 1996). But it may also work well when cooperators develop a one-group representation (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998; Gaertner, Dovidio, Rust, Nier, Banker, Ward, Mottola, & Houlette, 1999). In either case, cooperation, which entails trust, undercuts prejudice and stereotypes toward outgroup members.

WHAT WILL WE BE DOING?

Predicting the future is a fool's task, and like the weather forecast, maybe the safest prediction is 'more of the same'. But for intellectual entertainment, I offer three directions that move outward, from issues central in social psychology to those farther from the core. This section is necessarily brief, because the future is yet to come, but nonetheless urgent, as current events indicate.

Behavior: Remember Discrimination?

Social psychologists have learned a lot, at century's turn, about the complex interplay of motivation and cognition in reactions to outgroup members. By this logic, now we

should be happily combining motivation and cognition to produce behavior, which we are beginning to do, but not enough. Early examples include the work (Bargh, Dijksterhuis, and colleagues, cited earlier) on mimicking the behavior of primed outgroup members. Arguably, social identity theory/self-categorization theory does an adequate job of addressing discrimination, but the intergroup level of analysis does not necessarily reflect one-on-one discrimination. And we are not yet doing enough. Thoughts and feelings do not exclude, oppress, and kill people; behavior does.

Social psychologists have overslept. The stereotyping literature needs a wake-up call, now, on the order of the attitude-behavior wake-up call two or three decades ago, to get serious about predicting behavior (Fiske, 1998). The alarm is urgent. We cannot currently say enough, with enough authority, about what does and does not produce one-on-one discrimination. For example, dissociations among stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are frequent (Mackie & Smith, 1998).

Scattered accounts already suggest that prejudice will do a better job than stereotyping at predicting discriminatory behavior. Meta-analysis (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996) indicates that individual differences in stereotyping correlate only modestly (0.16) with discrimination, whereas individual differences in prejudice do a better job (0.32) of predicting discrimination. As a specific example, emotional responses outperform stereotypes in predicting behavioral social distance measures (Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991).

A pessimist would argue that our neglect of behavior is a disgrace. An optimist would predict that social psychologists over the next decades will understand better the relationships among stereotypes, prejudice, and actual discrimination. And besides, we already have certain leads from the stereotyping literature and from the attitudes literature. From the stereotyping literature, we know that people can be motivated by core social motives (belonging, understanding, controlling, self-enhancing, and trusting) to express or not to express stereotypes. Surely the same moderators motivate discrimination and tolerance. But we do not completely know yet. From the attitudes literature, we know that the attitude-behavior relation depends, among other factors, on the nature of (a) the attitude (read: stereotype/prejudice), that is, its strength, coherence, accessibility, centrality; (b) the person (e.g. sensitivity to norms versus self, chronic motivations, values), and (c) the context (e.g. salient norms, accountability, roles, relationships). Stereotyping researchers need to test our assumptions about generalizability from thoughts and feelings to behavior.

Culture

Doubtless, in the twenty-first century, moderator variables will strongly support the importance of cultural and local norms in predicting discriminatory behavior. Culture channels stereotyping and prejudice, by defining who constitutes 'us' and who 'them'. A critic might argue that each stereotype is unique, reflecting a unique cultural history, and because it does, psychologists have mostly ignored the contents of stereotypes. If the contents are arbitrary, why bother expending scientific resources on them?

Recently, we have suggested that the content of stereotypes may be systematic, and indeed may respond to universal principles of social structure. That is, a typology

of prejudice suggests (a) paternalistic prejudice toward the incompetent but nice, subordinate outgroup; (b) envious prejudice toward the competent but cold higher-status outgroup; (c) contemptuous prejudice toward the incompetent, exploitative, not warm low-status outgroup that cannot be trusted; and (d) admiration for the ingroup (Fiske, 1998; Glick & Fiske, in press). In our data so far, the first two kinds of outgroup stereotypes apparently predominate: those that are incompetent but maybe warm, and those that are competent but cold. Comparable clusters appear across the United States (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999; Fiske, Glick, Cuddy, & Xu, unpublished manuscript) and in Europe (Phalet & Poppe, 1997). Moreover, status predicts which groups will be seen as competent, implying a just world in which groups get what they deserve. And competition with the ingroup predicts which groups are seen as not warm. Principles such as these can explain cultural differences in stereotype content, depending on social structure in that culture.

Besides content, culture determines acceptable levels of expressed bias, from subtle to overt. Cultures differ in norms for describing perceived differences between social categories, as either inherent and traditional differences between categories, or as unacceptable and controllable. For example, one kind of sexism, ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996), appears in a similar form across a range of varied cultures (Glick *et al.*, unpublished manuscript). Nevertheless, degrees of its expression differ in cultures defined by UN gender indices as more progressive (Australia, the Netherlands) or more traditional (South Korea, Turkey).

Other possibly fertile avenues include pursuing the role of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination in relatively individualistic and collectivistic cultures. In collectivistic cultures, ingroup harmony is key, and ingroup loyalty, favoritism, and conformity motivate social behavior. People belong to fewer groups, and distance from outgroups is considerable. On the one hand, this kind of context would seem to exaggerate bias against the outgroup, but on the other hand, contact with the outgroup would be limited, thereby minimizing the expression of bias. In more individualistic cultures, where people belong to many groups, and have contact with a variety of outgroup members, their opportunities for expressing bias may be more frequent. These speculations aside, collaboration between cultural and stereotyping researchers would benefit both lines of work.

One challenge will be the balance between cultural differences and cultural stereotypes. Several antidotes are prescribed. First, active collaboration with social psychologists from the relevant cultures inhibits a one-sided perspective. Second, cultural differences overlap with affirmed cultural identities, again based on groups' own images of themselves. Third, of course, variability within cultures undercuts stereotypic overgeneralization. Fourth, overlap between cultures teaches us about minority trends within our own cultures of origin, trends that might otherwise go undetected. Finally, some general principles cut across cultural variation and show similar processes operating on different content. Cultural similarities are useful generalities, and cultural differences may be of intrinsic interest, as well as predictable by broad, measurable cultural variables. The trend to study culture in social psychology (A. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998) has yet to address stereotyping and prejudice in full force, but doubtless it will. We neglect culture at our peril, and cross-national (especially cross-hemispheric) collaboration will prove crucial to scientific progress in the twenty-first century.

Brain

After the US Decade of the Brain in the 1990s left social psychology relatively untouched, suddenly interest in social neuroscience is sprinkled across universities (in the USA, at least). A variety of initial datasets indicate that racial categorization occurs in unique neural locations closely linked to emotion. People apparently process black and white faces with different patterns of activation (Chiao, Colby, Eberhardt, & Gabrieli, poster presented at the Cognitive Neuroscience Society Meetings, April 2000). Cross-racial identification by both black and white respondents shows more activation in the amygdala, hippocampus, and insular cortex, each regions associated with the processing of emotional stimuli (Hart, Whalen, Shin, McInerney, & Rauch, 1999). Similarly, amygdala activation occurred in whites identifying black faces, and that activation correlated with potentiated startle response, as well as racial bias, as measured by the Implicit Attitude Test (Phelps, O'Connor, Cunningham, Funayama, Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 1999, unpublished manuscript). Amygdala activation was not correlated with a conscious measure of racial attitudes (Modern Racism Scale), and it was eliminated in judgments regarding familiar and positively regarded black individuals. The role of the emotionally attuned amygdala urges even more attention to prejudice as well as stereotyping measures in basic research.

On a more cognitive note, functionally independent and anatomically distinct slow-learning and fast-learning memory systems may respectively store general schemas (stereotypes) and specific individuating details (Smith & DeCoster, in press). Moreover, the memory systems that specify specific sources differ from those for stereotypes, and they correlate with performance tests for different areas of the brain (Mather, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1999). As people age, for example, their ability to recall specific details declines faster than their memory for general categories. These types of findings lend converging physiologically based evidence for categorizing and individuating processes (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999).

The budding interest in social neuroscience analyses, whatever their ultimate particulars, does not in itself constitute theory. Geography is not inherently theoretical. But theory-based accounts of psychologically meaningful brain regions allied to responses of social importance could provide encouraging evidence for existing theories (i.e. dual process theories, as just noted) and could facilitate theory development. For example, cross-racial identification apparently links with emotion centers of the brain, which fits together with early indications that prejudice may predict discrimination better than stereotypes do. The role of mid-range, not necessarily grand, theories will be crucial as at least some stereotyping and prejudice researchers seek the neural regions associated with biased responses.

CONCLUSION

Social psychologists laid out the pattern of research on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination 70 years ago, inspired by Lippmann (1922), and commencing with the initial work of Bogardus (1927) on social distance and of Katz and Braly (1933) on stereotype contents. Having reviewed what we have done (intra-individual and contextual analyses, first motivational, then cognitive, now joint), we came to the

present. A socially adaptive focus on core motives (belonging, understanding, controlling, enhancing, and trusting) captures much of the current activity, which integrates motivational and cognitive features of interpersonal bias. Future prospects suggest we have much yet to do, in studying behavior, culture, and brain. And the state of the world suggests that such expertise will continue to be sorely needed in the twenty-first century.

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Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination: Theoretical and Empirical Overview

John F. Dovidio, Miles Hewstone,
Peter Glick, and Victoria M. Esses

ABSTRACT

This chapter has two main objectives: to review influential ideas and findings in the literature and to outline the organization and content of the volume. The first part of the chapter lays a conceptual and empirical foundation for other chapters in the volume. Specifically, the chapter defines and distinguishes the key concepts of prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination, highlighting how bias can occur at individual, institutional, and cultural levels. We also review different theoretical perspectives on these phenomena, including individual differences, social cognition, functional relations between groups, and identity concerns. We offer a broad overview of the field, charting how this area has developed over previous decades and identify emerging trends and future directions. The second part of the chapter focuses specifically on the coverage of the area in the present volume. It explains the organization of the book and presents a brief synopsis of the chapters in the volume.

Throughout psychology's history, researchers have evinced strong interest in understanding prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Dovidio, 2001; Duckitt, 1992; Fiske, 1998), as well as the phenomenon of intergroup bias more generally (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Intergroup bias generally refers to the systematic tendency to evaluate one's own membership group (the ingroup) or its members more favorably than a non-membership group (the outgroup) or its members. These topics have a

long history in the disciplines of anthropology and sociology (e.g., Sumner, 1906). However, social psychologists, building on the solid foundations of Gordon Allport's (1954) masterly volume, *The Nature of Prejudice*, have developed a systematic and more nuanced analysis of bias and its associated phenomena. Interest in prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination is currently shared by allied disciplines such as sociology and political science, and emerging disciplines such as neuroscience. The practical implications of this

large body of research are widely recognized in the law (Baldus, Woodworth, & Pulaski, 1990; Vidmar, 2003), medicine (Institute of Medicine, 2003), business (e.g., Brief, Dietz, Cohen, et al., 2000), the media, and education (e.g., Ben-Ari & Rich, 1997; Hagendoorn & Nekuee, 1999).

In recent years, research on prejudice and stereotyping has rapidly expanded in both quantity and perspective. With respect to quantity, even when the term ‘discrimination’ is omitted because of its alternative meaning in perception and learning, a PsychInfo search for entries with prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping in the title reveals a geometric progression, roughly doubling or tripling from each decade to the next, from only 29 works in the 1930s to 1,829 from 2000 through 2008. Of course, scientific information has accelerated generally. Thus, we examined the percentage of articles in which prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping appeared in the abstract, relative to the total number of articles published, in four leading general-interest journals in social psychology: *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, and *European Journal of Social Psychology*. Figure 1.1 presents the overall trend from 1965 to the present. From 1965 through 1984, 1–2 percent of the articles in these journals examined prejudice or stereotypes. Beginning in 1985, interest jumped; in recent years,

almost 10 percent of the articles published in these mainstream journals study these phenomena. Moreover, as Figure 1.2 shows, the trend was similar across journals.

Approaches to understanding prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination have also significantly broadened. Early theorists focused on individual differences, and associated prejudice with psychopathology (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, et al., 1950). In the 1970s and 1980s, the cognitive revolution in psychology generated interest in how cognitive processes lead to stereotyping and prejudice (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1984); simultaneously European researchers focused on how group processes and social identities affect bias (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Both perspectives emphasized how normal psychological and social processes foster and maintain prejudice and stereotyping. The expansion has continued in recent years, with new perspectives on how specific emotions, nonconscious processes, and fundamental neural processes contribute to biases. In addition to ‘drilling down’ into the nonconscious mind and brain processes, the field has expanded upwards to consider how social structure creates and justifies biases, which permeate social institutions, such as the legal and health-care systems. In sum, the study of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination represents a well-established area incorporating traditional and emerging




Figure 1.1 Percent of articles in four leading social psychology journals that use the term prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping in the abstract (data aggregated across journals).




Figure 1.2 Percent of articles in four leading social psychology journals (*Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* – JPSP, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* – PSPB, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* – JESP, and *European Journal of Social Psychology* – EJSP) that use the term prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping in the abstract.

(often multi-disciplinary) perspectives that have consistently attracted significant empirical and theoretical attention.

This volume provides a comprehensive summary of the state of research on prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. Each chapter reviews the history of a specific topic, critically analyses what the field understands and does not yet know, and identifies promising avenues for further study. As a whole, the volume considers the causes and consequences of bias toward a range of social groups, theoretical perspectives, and applications, summarizing current knowledge within a single volume that can serve as a key resource for students and scholars.

This introductory chapter lays the foundations for the volume by defining and distinguishing key concepts, identifying basic underlying processes, outlining past research, and anticipating future directions, while explaining the general organization and content of the book.

KEY CONCEPTS

The current volume focuses on three forms of social bias toward a group and its members: (a) prejudice, an attitude reflecting an overall evaluation of a group; (b) stereotypes,

associations, and attributions of specific characteristics to a group; and (c) discrimination, biased behavior toward, and treatment of, a group or its members. Conceptualizations of each of these aspects of bias have evolved over time. For example, recent research distinguishing between implicit and explicit cognition has greatly affected how theorists define prejudice and stereotypes. Likewise, concepts of discrimination have gone from a tight focus on individuals engaging in biased treatment to how institutional policies and cultural processes perpetuate disparities between groups. We briefly review the development of each of these central concepts below.

Prejudice

Prejudice is typically conceptualized as an attitude that, like other attitudes, has a cognitive component (e.g., beliefs about a target group), an affective component (e.g., dislike), and a conative component (e.g., a behavioral predisposition to behave negatively toward the target group). In his seminal volume, *The Nature of Prejudice*, Allport (1954) defined prejudice as ‘an antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he

[sic] is a member of that group' (p. 9). Most researchers have continued to define prejudice as a negative attitude (i.e., an antipathy).

Psychologists have assumed that, like other attitudes, prejudice subjectively organizes people's environment and orients them to objects and people within it. Prejudice also serves other psychological functions, such as enhancing self-esteem (Fein & Spencer, 1997) and providing material advantages (Sherif & Sherif, 1969). However, whereas psychologists have focused on prejudice as an intrapsychic process (an attitude held by an individual), sociologists have emphasized its group-based functions. Sociological theories emphasize large-scale social and structural dynamics in intergroup relations, especially race relations (Blauner, 1972; Bonacich, 1972). Sociological theories consider the dynamics of group relations in economic- and class-based terms – often to the exclusion of individual influences (see Bobo, 1999).

Despite divergent views, both psychological and sociological approaches have converged to recognize the importance of how groups and collective identities affect intergroup relations (see Bobo, 1999; Bobo & Tuan, 2006). Blumer (1958a, 1958b, 1965a, 1965b), for instance, offered a sociologically based approach focusing on defense of group position, in which group competition is central to the development and maintenance of social biases. With respect to race relations, Blumer (1958a) wrote, 'Race prejudice is a defensive reaction to such challenging of the sense of group position ... As such, race prejudice is a protective device. It functions, however shortsightedly, to preserve the integrity and position of the dominant group' (p. 5). From a psychological orientation, in their classic Robbers Cave study, Sherif, Harvey, White, et al. (1961) similarly proposed that the functional relations between groups are critical in determining intergroup attitudes. Specifically, they argued that competition between groups produces prejudice and discrimination, whereas intergroup interdependence and cooperative interaction that leads to successful outcomes reduces intergroup bias (see also Bobo, 1988; Bobo &

Hutchings, 1996; Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966).

Recent definitions of prejudice bridge the individual-level emphasis of psychology and the group-level focus of sociology by concentrating on the dynamic nature of prejudice. Eagly and Diekmann (2005), for example, view prejudice as a mechanism that maintains status and role differences between groups. But, they also emphasize how individuals' reactions contribute to this process. People who deviate from their group's traditional role arouse negative reactions; others who exhibit behaviors that reinforce the *status quo* elicit positive responses. Consistent with this view, prejudice toward women has both 'hostile' and 'benevolent' components (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Hostile sexism punishes women who deviate from a traditional subordinate role ('Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them'), whereas benevolent sexism celebrates women's supportive, but still subordinate, position ('Women should be cherished and protected by men'). This perspective reveals that current prejudices do not always include only an easily identifiable negative view about the target group, but may also include more subtle, but patronizing and also pernicious 'positive' views.

Because prejudice represents an individual-level psychological bias, members of traditionally disadvantaged groups can also hold prejudices toward advantaged groups and their members. Although some research shows that minority-group members sometimes accept cultural ideologies that justify differences in group position based on the positive qualities of the advantaged group (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), there is considerable evidence that minority-group members also harbor prejudice toward majority group members. However, much of this prejudice is reactive, reflecting an anticipation of being discriminated *against* by majority group members (Johnson & Lecci, 2003; Monteith & Spicer, 2000).

These complexities, and others considered throughout the current volume, make it

difficult to formulate a single, overarching definition of prejudice. Nevertheless, we suggest the following definition, based on extensive social-psychological research of the sort reviewed in this volume: Prejudice is an individual-level attitude (whether subjectively positive or negative) toward groups and their members that creates or maintains hierarchical status relations between groups.

Stereotypes

By most historical accounts, Lippmann (1922) introduced the term 'stereotype' to refer to the typical picture that comes to mind when thinking about a particular social group. Whereas early research conceptualized stereotyping as a rather inflexible and faulty thought process, more recent research emphasizes the functional and dynamic aspects of stereotypes as simplifying a complex environment. Stereotypes are cognitive schemas used by social perceivers to process information about others (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Stereotypes not only reflect beliefs about the traits characterizing typical group members but also contain information about other qualities such as social roles, the degree to which members of the group share specific qualities (i.e., within-group homogeneity or variability), and influence emotional reactions to group members. Stereotypes imply a substantial amount of information about people beyond their immediately apparent surface qualities and generate expectations about group members' anticipated behavior in new situations (to this extent they can, ironically, be seen as 'enriching'; Oakes & Turner, 1990). Yet, of course, stereotypes also constrain. In general, stereotypes produce a readiness to perceive behaviors or characteristics that are consistent with the stereotype. At the earliest stages of perceptual processing, stereotype-consistent characteristics are attended to most quickly. For instance, because cultural stereotypes associate Black people with violent crime in the United States, White people are quicker to recognize objects associated with crime (e.g., a gun) when primed with a

Black person than a White person (e.g., Payne, 2001).

Recent work also explores how social structure affects the specific content of stereotypes. Stereotypes can not only promote discrimination by systematically influencing perceptions, interpretations, and judgments, but they also arise from and are reinforced by discrimination, justifying disparities between groups. In particular, people infer the characteristics of groups based on the social roles they occupy (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Eagly & Diekmann, 2005; Jost & Banaji, 1994). As a consequence, people view members of groups with lower socioeconomic status (even if caused by discrimination) as less competent and/or less motivated than high-status group members. Moreover, minority group members are also socialized to adopt 'system-justifying ideologies,' including stereotypic beliefs about their own group, that rationalize the group's social position (Jost, Banaji, Nosek, et al., 2004).

Although some components of group stereotypes relate to unique aspects of intergroup history (e.g., enslavement of Black people in the United States, middle-man roles performed by Jews who were excluded from other forms of employment since the Middle Ages in Europe), systematic principles shape the broader content of stereotypes. The Stereotype Content Model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, et al. 2002) proposes two fundamental dimensions of stereotypes: warmth (associated with 'cooperative' groups and denied to 'competitive' groups) and competence (associated with high-status groups and denied to low-status groups). Groups with stereotypes that are similarly high or low on each of the two dimensions of warmth and competence arouse similar emotions. Stereotypically warm and competent groups (e.g., the ingroup, close allies) elicit pride and admiration; stereotypically warm but incompetent groups (e.g., housewives, the elderly) produce pity and sympathy; stereotypically cold but competent groups (e.g., Asians, Jews) elicit envy and jealousy; and stereotypically cold and incompetent groups (e.g., welfare recipients, poor people) generate disgust, anger, and resentment. This powerful approach helps to

explain why two quite distinct ethno-religious groups (e.g., the Chinese in Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, and Jews in Europe) are stereotyped in very similar ways (see Bonacich, 1973; Hewstone & Ward, 1985).

Cultural stereotypes tend to persevere for both cognitive and social reasons. Cognitively, people often discount stereotype-discrepant behaviors, attributing them to situational factors, while making dispositional (and stereotype-reinforcing) attributions for stereotype-consistent behaviors (Hewstone, 1990; Pettigrew, 1979). Socially, people behave in ways that elicit stereotype-confirming reactions, creating self-fulfilling prophecies. Biased expectancies influence how perceivers behave, causing targets, often without full awareness, to conform to perceivers' expectations (e.g., von Baeyer, Sherk, & Zanna, 1981). In addition, language plays an important role in the transmission of stereotypes. When communicating, people focus on the traits viewed as the most informative. Because stereotypical traits are distinctive to a group, people are more likely to use them in social discourse than traits perceived as unrelated to group membership. Stereotypical traits are generally high on communicability (viewed as interesting and informative), contributing to persistent use (Schaller, Conway, & Tanchuk, 2002). A further insight of social-psychological research on stereotypes is that the traits that tend to form their core are characterized not only by high central tendency (e.g., the British are very *cold*), but also by low variability (e.g., most British occupy the 'cold' end of a warm-cold continuum; see Ford & Stangor, 1992; Judd & Park, 1993).

Whereas psychological research on stereotypes has traditionally focused on the perceiver, work in sociology, stimulated by Goffman's (1963) classic book, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, has emphasized the experience of targets of stereotypes. As psychology has increasingly turned to understanding the effects on targets, two influential directions have emerged: tokenism and stereotype threat. Kanter (1977a, 1977b) provided a pioneering

sociological analysis of the consequences of group proportions such as skewed sex ratios which, at the extremes, involve very small numbers of the minority group, even a sole individual. When people are tokens, one of relatively few members of their group in a social context, they feel particularly vulnerable to being stereotyped by others. This occurs especially when the individual is the only member of their group (solo status) in the situation. Tokens or solos experience high levels of self-consciousness and threat, which reduces their ability to think and act effectively (Lord & Saenz, 1985; Sekaquaptewa & Thompson, 2003).

More recent research has identified the phenomenon of stereotype threat that occurs when members of a stereotyped group become aware of negative stereotypes about them, even when (a) a person holding the stereotype is not present and (b) they personally do not endorse the stereotype. Thus, making group membership salient can impair performance by producing anxiety and cognitive preoccupation with a negative stereotype (Steele, 1997).

In sum, stereotypes represent a set of qualities perceived to reflect the essence of a group. Stereotypes systematically affect how people perceive, process information about, and respond to, group members. They are transmitted through socialization, the media, and language and discourse. For the present volume, we define stereotypes as associations and beliefs about the characteristics and attributes of a group and its members that shape how people think about and respond to the group.

Discrimination

In the context of intergroup relations, discrimination has a pejorative meaning. It implies more than simply distinguishing among social objects, but refers also to inappropriate and potentially unfair treatment of individuals due to group membership. Discrimination may involve actively negative behavior toward a member of a group or, more subtly, less positive responses than those

toward an ingroup member in comparable circumstances. According to Allport (1954), discrimination involves denying 'individuals or groups of people equality of treatment which they may wish' (p. 51). Jones (1972) defined discrimination as 'those actions designed to maintain own-group characteristics and favored position at the expense of the comparison group' (p. 4).

Discrimination is generally understood as biased behavior, which includes not only actions that directly harm or disadvantage another group, but those that unfairly favor one's own group (creating a relative disadvantage for other groups). Allport (1954) argued that ingroup favoritism plays a fundamental role in intergroup relations, taking psychological precedence over outgroup antipathy. He noted that 'in-groups are psychologically primary. We live in them, and sometimes, for them' (p. 42), and proposed that 'there is good reason to believe that this love-prejudice is far more basic to human life than is ... hate-prejudice. When a person is defending a categorical value of his own, he may do so at the expense of other people's interests or safety. Hate prejudice springs from a reciprocal love prejudice underneath' (p. 25).

In the 50 years since Allport's observation, a substantial body of research has confirmed that intergroup bias in evaluations (attitudes) and resource allocations (discrimination) often involves ingroup favoritism in the absence of overtly negative responses to outgroups (Brewer, 1979, 1999; Otten & Mummendey, 2000).

Even though much of the traditional research on bias has not made the distinction between ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation a central focus, the distinction is crucial, and each of them requires methodological concision and has distinct practical consequences. Methodologically, to separate the two components of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation we need to include an independent assessment of ingroup and outgroup evaluations, and a control condition. Practically, the bias uncovered in much social-psychological research predominantly takes the mild form of ingroup favoritism,

rather than outgroup derogation (see Brewer, 1999, 2001). This raises the question of when ingroup favoritism gives way to derogation, hostility, and antagonism against outgroups (e.g., Brewer, 2001, Mummendey & Otten, 2001).

A number of analyses argue that the constraints normally in place that limit intergroup bias to ingroup favoritism are lifted when outgroups are associated with stronger emotions (Brewer, 2001, Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, et al., 1998; Mackie & Smith, 1998; Mummendey & Otten, 2001). There is ample scope for these emotions in the arousal that often characterizes intergroup encounters, which can be translated into emotions such as fear, hatred, or disgust (Smith, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and emotions experienced in specific encounters with groups can be an important cause of people's overall reactions to groups (e.g., Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993). As part of a shift from exclusive concern with cognition in intergroup bias, Smith (1993) differentiated milder emotions (e.g., disgust) from stronger emotions (e.g., contempt, anger) most likely to be aroused in an intergroup context, and linked specific emotions, perceptions of the outgroup, and action tendencies (see Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Thus an outgroup that violates ingroup norms may elicit disgust and avoidance; an outgroup seen as benefiting unjustly (e.g., from government programs) may elicit resentment and actions aimed at reducing benefits; and an outgroup seen as threatening may elicit fear and hostile actions. Thus, weaker emotions imply only mild forms of discrimination, such as avoidance, but stronger emotions imply stronger forms, such as movement against the outgroup, and these latter emotions could be used to justify outgroup harm that extends beyond ingroup benefit (Brewer, 2001). This is not, however, to imply that pro-ingroup biases need not concern us. They can perpetuate unfair discrimination by advantaging dominant ingroups, often with less personal awareness and recognition by others, making them as pernicious as discrimination based on anti-outgroup

orientations (Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, et al., 1997).

For the present volume, we define discrimination by an individual as behavior that creates, maintains, or reinforces advantage for some groups and their members over other groups and their members.

Explicit and implicit bias

Whereas discrimination can occur toward a specific member of a group or the group as a whole, stereotypes and prejudice are intrapsychic phenomena. That is, they occur within an individual and may vary not only in their transparency to others but also in the level of awareness of the person who harbors stereotypes and prejudice. Traditionally, stereotypes and prejudice have been conceived as explicit responses – beliefs and attitudes people know they hold, subject to deliberate (often strategic) control in their expression (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, et al., 1995). In contrast to these explicit, conscious, and deliberative processes, implicit prejudices and stereotypes involve a lack of awareness and unintentional activation. The mere presence of the attitude object may activate the associated stereotype and attitude automatically and without the perceiver noticing.

Although implicit attitudes and stereotype measures are now commonly used (Fazio & Olson, 2003), researchers continue to debate their psychological meaning. Some contend that implicit measures of bias primarily represent overlearned and ‘habitual’ cultural associations rather than attitudes (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Others argue that implicit and explicit measures assess a single attitude measured at different points in the process of expression, with social desirability concerns more strongly shaping overt expressions (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, et al., 1995). And still others consider implicit and explicit measures to reflect different components of a system of dual attitudes, with implicit responses often representing ‘older’ attitudes and stereotypes that have been ‘overwritten’ by newer, explicit forms of bias or incompletely replaced by individuals who strive for egalitarian beliefs (Wilson, Lindsey, &

Schooler, 2000), or reflecting different aspects of attitudes, such as affective and cognitive components (Rudman, 2004). Nevertheless, there is consensus that implicit manifestations of attitudes and stereotypes exist and reliably predict some behaviors, often independently from explicit attitudes and stereotypes. We purposefully avoided reference to intentionality or personal endorsement in our working definitions of prejudice and stereotypes to accommodate implicit biases.

Institutional and cultural discrimination

Although psychologists have historically focused on the individual-level processes in intergroup relations, newer research informed by approaches from sociology, Black psychology, and cultural psychology illuminate how, independent of individual efforts or orientation, institutional and cultural forces maintain and promote intergroup bias and disparities. Institutional discrimination, which may originally stem from individuals’ prejudices and stereotypes, refers to the existence of institutional policies (e.g., poll taxes, immigration policies) that unfairly restrict the opportunities of particular groups of people. These laws and policies foster ideologies that justify current practices. Historically, for example, White Americans developed racial ideologies to justify laws that enabled two forms of economic exploitation: slavery of Black people and the seizure of lands from native peoples. Similarly, until relatively recently, immigration policies in many parts of the world favored White immigrants over immigrants of racial minorities.

Although individual prejudice and stereotypes may produce actions, such as political support for laws and policies that lead to institutional discrimination, institutional discrimination can operate independently from individual discrimination. Institutional discrimination does not require the active support of individuals, their intention to discriminate, or awareness that institutional practices have discriminatory effects. Indeed, people often do not recognize the existence of institutional discrimination because laws

(typically assumed to be right and moral) and long-standing or ritualized practices seem 'normal.' Furthermore, ideologies – whether explicitly prejudicial or obscuring prejudice (e.g., by suggesting that if discriminatory effects are unintended, there is no 'problem') – justify the 'way things are done.' The media and public discourse also often direct attention away from potential institutional biases.

Because institutional discrimination is not necessarily intentional or dependent on the overt efforts of individuals, it often must be inferred from disparate outcomes between groups traced back to differential policies, even those that might appear to be unrelated to group membership. These effects may appear economically (e.g., in loan policies after controlling for differences in qualifying conditions), educationally (e.g., in admission and financial aid policies), in employment (e.g., height requirement for employment as a police officer), in the media (e.g., exaggerating the association of minority groups with violence or poverty), in the criminal justice system (e.g., group differences in incarceration rates for similar crimes), and in mental and physical health (e.g., social stress or lesser care) (see Feagin, 2006; Institute of Medicine, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Whereas institutional discrimination is associated with formal laws and policies, cultural discrimination is deeply embedded in the fiber of a culture's history, standards, and normative ways of behaving. Cultural discrimination occurs when one group exerts the power to define values for a society. It involves not only privileging the culture, heritage, and values of the dominant group, but also imposing this culture on other less dominant groups. As a consequence, everyday activities implicitly communicate group-based bias, passing it to new generations. We thus define cultural discrimination as beliefs about the superiority of a dominant group's cultural heritage over those of other groups, and the expression of such beliefs in individual actions or institutional policies.

Under some circumstances, members of a minority group may adopt system-justifying ideologies propagated by the dominant cultural group that distract attention from

group-based disparities and inequities. Thus, members of a disadvantaged group may develop a 'false consciousness' in which they not only comply with but also endorse cultural values that systematically disadvantage them. For example, an exclusive emphasis on individually oriented meritocracy may obscure cultural and institutional discrimination and lead to an over-reliance on individual rather than collective action to address discrimination. Thus, the unique power of cultural discrimination resides in its power to shape how members of different groups interpret and react to group disparities, fostering compliance to the status quo without explicit intentions, awareness, or active support for these group-based disparities.

Each form of bias – prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination – can occur at the individual, institutional, and cultural levels. Furthermore, these biases are often perpetuated by habitual practices and even formal laws, and justified by ideologies (some of which may obscure the existence of discrimination). In the next section, we consider the social-psychological assumption that, despite all of the various forms bias may take, some basic and fundamental processes generally foster and reinforce stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination.

BASIC PROCESSES IN PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION

Summarizing the extensive research on social biases with a limited number of themes, Haslam and Dovidio (2010) identified basic factors that foster and maintain bias: (a) personality and individual differences, (b) group conflict, (c) social categorization, and (d) social identity. We review each below.

Personality and individual differences

Responding to the Nazi's rise to power in Germany and the subsequent horrors of the Holocaust, psychologists initially focused on

understanding ‘What type of person would harbor the kinds of prejudices and stereotypes that would lead to genocide?’ Given its prominence in psychological thought at the time, many of the answers relied on Freudian psychodynamic theory (see Allport, 1954). These approaches proposed that (a) the accumulation of psychic energy, due to frustration and guilt inevitably produced by society’s restrictions on instinctual drives for sex and aggression, power intergroup bias and hostility; and (b) an individual’s expression of prejudice has an important cathartic function in releasing pent-up energy and restoring the individual to a state of equilibrium.

Other approaches adopted elements of psychodynamic theory with critical variations. In their Frustration–Aggression Hypothesis, Dollard, Doob, Miller, et al. (1939) presented a drive-reduction model that included Freud’s proposition that drives sought discharge in behavior, but characterized aggression as a response to circumstances that interfered with goal-directed activity, not as an innate drive. Dollard et al. in their account of scapegoating, further hypothesized that aggression is often displaced onto an innocent target if the true source of frustration is powerful and potentially threatening (see Glick, 2005). Hovland and Sears (1940) argued that historically the relationship between economic downturns (a source of frustration) and the lynchings of Black people (1882–1930) in southern states in the United States provided support for this account of scapegoating (see also Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998).

Both of these accounts of scapegoating have been challenged recently. Using the Stereotype Content Model perspective, Glick (2005) argued that successful minorities, stereotyped as competent but cold competitors (not as weak and vulnerable) are most likely to be scapegoated. Only envied minorities are viewed as having both the ability (competence) and intent (coldness) to have deliberately caused widespread misfortunes (e.g., the Nazis blamed the ‘worldwide Jewish conspiracy’ for causing Germany’s collapse, citing the Jews’ relative success in banking, industry, the media, and government). This

model, then, focuses on collective attributions rather than Freudian psychodynamics.

The most influential work within the psychoanalytic tradition was Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, et al.’s (1950) research, represented in their classic volume, *The Authoritarian Personality*. These researchers conducted extensive qualitative and quantitative work on the psychological substrates of anti-Semitism and susceptibility to fascistic propaganda. Adorno et al. identified patterns of cognition differentiating prejudiced (authoritarian) individuals from others who were more tolerant or open-minded. Specifically, prejudiced individuals exhibited intolerance of ambiguity, rigidity, concreteness (poor abstract reasoning), and over-generalization. Such individuals were thus portrayed as seeing the social world in black-and-white terms – evincing strong and disdainful rejection of others perceived as inferior to themselves and their ingroup.

The origins of the authoritarian personality were also traced to individuals’ childhood experiences, specifically to hierarchical relations with punitive parents. In contrast, liberals (non-authoritarians) were believed to be the product of a more egalitarian upbringing that fostered more cognitive flexibility and rejection of stereotypic representations of others (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, et al., 2003). In response to subsequent methodological and conceptual challenges, ideas about authoritarianism evolved to emphasize the role of social norms and standards, rather than Freudian dynamics. The most current conceptualization, Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998), focuses on worldviews, and predicts negative attitudes toward a variety of groups, particularly those socially rejected by society (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Esses, Haddock, Zanna, et al., 1993).

Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) represents another recent approach to social biases, containing a focus on individual differences, which has similarly eschewed psychodynamic theory. This theory focuses on individual differences in whether people view intergroup relations as a competition in which it is appropriate for

some groups to dominate others. People who score high in Social Dominance Orientation endorsing items such as, 'Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups' and 'Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place,' show more prejudice and discrimination toward a range of outgroups.

Social Dominance Theory, while including an individual differences approach, focuses on an enduring theme in the study of social biases – the degree of competition between groups. This concern has been an abiding theme in understanding intergroup bias.

Group conflict

The early representation of prejudice as reflecting a dysfunctional personality was highly influential, not least because it fit with lay theories that viewed social biases as abnormal, a form of social pathology. However, a number of researchers argued instead that social biases are not restricted to a small group of people and represent a *group-level* phenomenon, and thus developed theories focusing on the functional relations between groups.

Theories based on functional relations often point to competition and consequent perceived threat as fundamental causes of intergroup prejudice and conflict. Realistic Group Conflict Theory (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966) posits that perceived group competition for resources leads to efforts to reduce the access of other groups to resources. Classic field work by Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues (Sherif, Harvey, White, et al., 1961) examined intergroup conflict at a boys' camp adjacent to Robbers Cave State Park in Oklahoma (United States). In this study, twenty-two 12-year-old boys attending summer camp were randomly assigned to two groups (who subsequently named themselves Eagles and Rattlers). When the groups engaged in a series of competitive activities (a tug-of-war and baseball, and touch football games), intergroup bias and conflict quickly developed. Group members regularly exchanged verbal insults (e.g., 'sissies,' 'stinkers,' and 'cheaters'), and each

group conducted raids on the other's cabin, resulting in property destruction and theft. The investigators then altered the functional relations between the groups by introducing a set of superordinate goals (goals that could not successfully be achieved without the full cooperation of both groups). Achieving these goals together led to more harmonious relations and large reductions in intergroup bias.

Sherif, Harvey, White, et al. (1961) proposed that functional relations between groups strongly influence intergroup attitudes. When groups are competitively interdependent, the success of one group is contingent on the failure of the other. Thus, each group's attempt to obtain favorable outcomes for itself is also realistically perceived to frustrate the goals of the other group. Such a win-lose, zero-sum competitive relation between groups initiates mutually negative feelings and stereotypes toward the members of the other group. In contrast, cooperatively interdependent relations between groups (i.e., needing each other to achieve common goals) reduce bias (e.g., Blanchard, Adelman, & Cook, 1975).

Functional relations do not have to involve explicit competition to generate biases. In the absence of any direct evidence, people typically presume that members of other groups will act competitively and hinder the attainment of one's goals (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; Insko, Schopler, Gaertner, et al., 2001). In addition, individual differences in intergroup perceptions (e.g., Social Dominance Orientation) can moderate responses regardless of the actual functional relations between groups (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, et al., 2001a). It was also recognized that social biases can serve less tangible or symbolic collective functions such as garnering prestige or social status, in addition to instrumental objectives such as obtaining economic advantage (Allport 1954; Blumer, 1958a). Indeed, it has been suggested that symbolic, psychological factors are typically more important sources of intergroup bias than is competition for tangible resources (Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, et al., 2005). Thus, additional themes in the study of social bias have focused on the

psychological consequences of seeing others and oneself in terms of group membership.

Social categorization

A further critical step toward recognition of prejudice as an aspect of normal rather than diseased minds was taken by Allport (1954). Allport's answer to the question, 'Why do human beings slip so easily into ethnic prejudice?' was that 'They do so because [its] two essential ingredients – erroneous generalization and hostility – are natural and common capacities of the human mind' (p. 17). Central to the first point, Allport recognized that prejudice relies on people's propensity to categorize, reacting to other people based on their group membership, rather than as individuals. He observed that the 'human mind must think with the aid of categories,' and 'Once formed categories are the basis for normal prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process. Orderly living depends upon it' (p. 20).

Tajfel (1969), in his highly influential paper on the 'Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice,' elaborated on the role social categorization plays in intergroup biases. Like Allport, Tajfel rejected the idea that prejudice and stereotyping must be irrational and pathological. Instead, he argued that these social biases reflect the importance of people's group memberships and their attempts to understand features of the social world (in particular, the actions of other groups) that impinge upon their groups. This analysis opened the door to a 'cognitive revolution' that informed the greater part of social psychological research into prejudice and stereotyping during the 1970s and 1980s. This approach paved the way for viewing prejudice as an aspect of general *social cognition*.

Since then, a large body of research has demonstrated that social categorization profoundly influences social perception, affect, cognition, and behavior. Perceptually, when perceivers categorize people or objects into groups, they gloss over differences between members of the same category (Tajfel, 1969), treating members of the same group as

'all alike,' while between-group differences become exaggerated (Abrams, 1985; Turner, 1985). Emotionally, people spontaneously experience more positive affect toward members of their ingroup than toward members of outgroups (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000), particularly toward ingroup members who are most prototypical of their group (Hogg & Hains, 1996). Cognitively, people retain more and more detailed information for ingroup than for outgroup members (Park & Rothbart, 1982), better remember ways in which ingroup members are similar to and outgroup members are dissimilar to the self (Wilder, 1981), and remember less positive information about outgroup members (Howard & Rothbart, 1980).

In terms of behavioral outcomes, people help ingroup members more than outgroup members (Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzic, et al., 1997), and work harder for groups identified as ingroups than outgroups (Worchel, Rothgerber, Day, et al., 1998). When ingroup-outgroup social categorizations, rather than personal identities, are salient, people behave in a greedier and less trustworthy way toward members of other groups than when they respond to others as individuals (Insko, Schopler, Gaertner, et al., 2001). Thus, although functional relations between groups can further influence the degree to which discrimination is manifested (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966), the process of social categorization itself provides the basis for social biases to develop and persist.

Social identity

While Tajfel's ideas spawned social cognitive approaches to stereotyping and prejudice, his own work developed in a somewhat different direction based on the results of his minimal group studies. In the early 1970s, Tajfel showed that artificial groups created in the lab, devoid of naturalistic meaning and a history of functional relations, nevertheless showed at least mild forms of prejudice and discrimination. This work inspired Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which characterizes social bias

as a context-specific response to the position of one's group within a particular system of intergroup relations.

Both Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the related Self-Categorization Theory (Turner, 1985; see also Onorato & Turner, 2001) emphasize the distinction between personal and social identities (see Spears, 2001). When personal identity (the self perceived as an individual) is salient, a person's individual needs, standards, beliefs, and motives primarily determine behavior. In contrast, when social identity (the self perceived as a member of a group) is salient, 'people come to perceive themselves as more interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities defined by their individual differences from others' (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, et al., 1987: 50). Under these conditions, collective needs, goals, and standards are primary.

This perspective also proposes that a person defines or categorizes the self along a continuum that ranges from seeing the self as a separate individual with personal motives, goals, and achievements to viewing the self as an embodiment of a social collective or group. At the individual level, one's personal welfare and goals are most salient and important. At the group level, the goals and achievements of the group are merged with one's own (see Brown & Turner, 1981), and the group's welfare is paramount. At one extreme, self interest is fully represented by the first-person pronoun 'I' and, at the other extreme, group interest is fully represented by the collective pronoun 'We.' Intergroup relations begin when people think about themselves, and others, as group members rather than as distinct individuals.

Illustrating the dynamics of this distinction, Verkuyten and Hagendoorn (1998) found that when individual identity was primed, individual differences in authoritarianism strongly predicted Dutch students' prejudice toward Turkish migrants. In contrast, when social identity (i.e., national identity) was made salient, ingroup stereotypes and standards primarily predicted prejudiced attitudes. Thus, whether personal or collective identity

is more salient critically shapes how a person perceives, interprets, evaluates, and responds to situations and to others.

In summary, whereas the section on Key Concepts emphasized distinctions between various forms of social biases, this section considered common elements that produce prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination. Prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination are complex, multi-determined processes. Therefore, basic factors related to individual differences, group conflict, social categorization, and social identity should not be viewed as competing but rather as complementary explanations, which can combine and operate in different ways under different conditions.

In discussing key concepts and underlying processes, we have illustrated how approaches to understanding prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination have evolved such that different facets of social bias and different influences have been emphasized at different times. The history of research on bias is explored in more detail in Duckitt's chapter in this volume (Chapter 2). In the next section, however, we offer our own historical perspective, looking forward as much as back.

THE PAST AND THE FUTURE

Building on Duckitt's (1992) insightful historical analysis, Dovidio (2001) identified three general 'waves' of scholarship, reflecting different assumptions and paradigms, in the social psychological study of social biases. The first wave, from the 1920s through the 1950s, portrayed social biases as psychopathology, with prejudice conceived as a kind of social cancer. Research during this wave focused first on measuring and describing the problem and monitoring any changes (e.g., Gilbert, 1951; Katz & Braly, 1933), and then on understanding the source of the problem (e.g., in family relations, feelings of personal inadequacies, and psychodynamic processes; Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, E., Levinson, et al., 1950). If the problem was confined to certain 'diseased' individuals (much as a cancer begins with diseased

cells), prejudice might be localized and removed or treated, containing the problem and preserving the health of society as a whole. Thus, researchers concentrated on identifying, through personality and attitude tests such as the authoritarian personality scale, prejudiced individuals so that remedial efforts could be focused on this subset of the population. This approach also directed attention toward a traditional, conservative, and not highly educated segment of the population – a group comfortably (for the researchers themselves) unlike the academics studying prejudice.

The second wave of theorizing and research began with an opposite assumption: prejudice is rooted in normal rather than abnormal processes. Thus, the focus turned to how normal processes, such as socialization into prevailing norms, supports and transmits prejudice. This approach revealed that changing general social norms, not simply targeting interventions toward a subset of ‘abnormal’ individuals, is necessary for combating prejudice. The typical focus of social psychology in North America on the individual in a social context was complemented by two other approaches in the 1970s. On the one hand, at a more macro level, Tajfel’s work (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) persuasively demonstrated the important role of social identity, as well as individual identity, in producing prejudice. Evidence that assigning people to temporary groups based on arbitrary criteria was sufficient to produce ingroup-favoring prejudices (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1970), and, when other factors (e.g., competition) were added, outgroup hostility reinforced the emerging conception of prejudice as a normal mechanism.

On the other hand, at a more micro level, the development of new theories and instrumentation for investigating social cognition further emphasized the normality and, some argued, the inevitability of prejudice. Prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination were conceived as outcomes of normal cognitive processes associated with simplifying and storing the overwhelming quantity and complexity of information people encounter

daily (see Hamilton, 1981). To the extent that social categorization was hypothesized to be a critical element in this process (Hamilton & Trolie, 1986), this cognitive, intra-individual perspective complemented Tajfel’s motivational, group-level approach in reinforcing the normality of prejudice.

Together, these orientations helped to divert the focus away from the question, ‘Who is prejudiced?’ – the answer seemed to be ‘everyone.’ If prejudice reflects normal cognitive processes and group life, not just personal needs and motivations, bias should be the norm. Researchers therefore turned to examining bias among the ‘well-intentioned’ and to the apparent inconsistencies between self-reported attitudes, which suggested that the vast majority of Westerners were non-prejudiced, and the continued evidence of disparities and discrimination (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). The key question therefore became, ‘Is anyone truly *not* prejudiced?’ Theories of racial ambivalence (Katz, 1981; Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986) and of subtle and unintentional types of biases, such as symbolic racism (Sears, 1988; Sears, Henry, & Kosterman, 2000), modern racism (McConahay, 1986), and aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kovel, 1970) emerged during this period. These theories all proposed that changing social norms in the United States (after the Civil Rights era) had driven racism ‘underground,’ either because of people’s genuine desire to be egalitarian or a simple realization that overt racism would elicit social disapproval. While the theories disagree on whether racism has merely become covert or individuals are truly conflicted about their attitudes, all agree that a lifetime of exposure to negative stereotypes fuels the persistence of prejudiced attitudes that are not readily apparent.

The third wave of research on prejudice, beginning in the mid-1990s and characterizing much current research, emphasizes the multidimensional aspect of prejudice and takes advantage of new technologies to study processes that earlier theorists hypothesized but had no way to measure. For example, aversive racism, modern racism, and symbolic

racism – distinctly different theories about contemporary racial prejudice – all assumed widespread unconscious negative feelings and beliefs by White people toward Black people. However, it was not until the 1990s that new conceptual perspectives (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) and technologies (e.g., response latency procedures; Dovidio & Fazio, 1992; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) emerged, allowing researchers to measure implicit (i.e., automatic and unconscious) attitudes and beliefs. These new technologies permit the assessment of individual differences in implicit, as well as explicit, racial attitudes and may thus help distinguish traditional racists, aversive or modern racists, and the truly non-prejudiced White people. These methods also open doors for developing ways to combat subtle forms of prejudice. The adaptation of fMRI procedures to study brain processes involved in social phenomena promises further links to cognitive neuropsychological processes and a more comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and multidimensional understanding of prejudice (Phelps, O' Connor, Cunningham, et al., 2000).

Besides addressing the multidimensional intrapersonal processes associated with prejudice and racism, the current wave of research more explicitly considers the interpersonal and intergroup context. That is, whereas previous research focused largely on perceivers' attitudes and how these attitudes biased their evaluations, decisions, and behavior, third-wave work considers how targets respond and adapt, and how prejudice unfolds in interactions between perceivers and targets. Targets are no longer viewed as passive victims of bias, an assumption implicit in Allport's (1954) question, 'What would happen to your personality if you heard it said over and over again that you are lazy and had inferior blood?' (p. 42) and explicit in his answer: 'Group oppression may destroy the integrity of the ego entirely, and reverse its normal pride, and create a groveling self-image' (p. 152). Current work demonstrates that minorities to some extent internalize social biases and implicit stereotypes (Johnson, Trawalter, & Dovidio, 2000), which can become activated

(even in the absence of interaction with Whites), with detrimental consequences (e.g., on academic tests) (Steele, 1997). However, the consequences of stigmatization are now understood to be more dynamic and complex than Allport and his contemporaries assumed (see Crocker & Major, 1989; Miller & Myers, 1998).

What, then, lies ahead? Each chapter in this volume specifically addresses this question. Here, we consider the broad picture and suggest eight general trends, ranging from the intra-individual (in fact, the intra-cranial) to the societal. The first trend is a more elaborated conception of the neuroscience of bias, which can help distinguish the underpinnings of different types of bias. Whereas social psychology operationalizes ingroup-outgroup relations in a variety of different ways (e.g., sex, race, age, weight), neuroscience points to fundamental differences in various forms of categorization. Racial categorization relates to structures that have evolved for sensitivity to novelty or threat (amygdala) and neural systems that track coalitions and alliances (Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003), but sex and age are encoded in other regions of the brain (frontocentral regions). Thus, although racism and sexism may share some similar behavioral dynamics and social consequences, social neuroscience data suggest fundamental differences in perception and encoding. Such different neural underpinnings may have critical implications for cognitive, affective, and behavioral reactions (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007).

A second emerging trend is closer attention to understanding how interpersonal interactions relate to larger-scale social biases. As Shelton and Richeson (2006; see also Shelton, Dovidio, Hebl, et al., 2009) have argued, interpersonal interactions between members of different groups represent critical encounters. Such encounters not only reflect contemporary group relations but also produce impressions and outcomes that can reinforce or diminish further bias. Interpersonal interactions between members of different groups are highly susceptible

to communication problems and misunderstandings. They are fraught with anxiety over how one is being perceived, making them highly cognitively demanding both for majority group members, who often strive to behave in an unbiased manner (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Shelton & Richeson, 2005), and for minority group members, who are vigilant for cues of bias (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, et al., 2005). These demands can arouse intergroup anxiety and its behavioral manifestations (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Because many signals of anxiety are also cues for dislike, expectations of rejection by members of another group (Shelton & Richeson, 2005) can lead to misattributions to unfriendliness that exacerbate interpersonal and, ultimately, intergroup tensions (Pearson, West, Dovidio, et al., 2008). Thus, understanding how and why intergroup misunderstandings develop during interpersonal interactions can complement structural and intergroup approaches aimed at alleviating intergroup conflict and achieving stable harmonious intergroup relations.

A third recent trend that is likely to broaden future research is the internationalization of psychology and the resultant focus on groups other than Whites and Blacks in the United States. As a result of these broadening horizons, research is increasingly examining such relations as those between immigrants and members of host nations (e.g., Esses, Dovidio, & Dion, 2001b), between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (e.g., Paolini, Hewstone, Cairns, et al., 2004), between groups identified on the basis of religious affiliation (e.g., Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005), between homosexuals and heterosexuals (Gabriel, Banse, & Hug, 2007), and between ethnic groups other than Whites and Blacks (e.g., Zick, Pettigrew, & Wagner, 2008). In addition to examining the applicability of theories developed to explain relations between Whites and Blacks (e.g., Bell & Esses, 1997), these expansions provide new understandings of the basis of prejudice, and point to new foci for intervention (e.g., Nickerson & Louis, 2008). The continent of Europe, for example, is

replete with examples of interactions between members of different ethnic and religious groups coming together in differing circumstances with different norms, and against the backdrop of different legal and political systems.

A fourth focus likely to generate considerable future research is a variation on an older theme. Since Allport's pioneering work, social psychology has focused on how to reduce bias in the most effective, generalizable, and enduring way. For over 50 years, intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; Williams, 1947; see also Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2003; Pettigrew, 1998) has represented one of psychology's most effective strategies for reducing bias and improving intergroup relations. This framework proposes the conditions under which intergroup contact can ameliorate intergroup prejudice and conflict. Much of the research on this topic has been devoted to establishing that intergroup contact does indeed reduce bias and to evaluating the relative importance of the conditions specified in Contact Theory (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). In recent years, however, work has moved beyond specifying the conditions that reduce bias to understanding the underlying processes (e.g., changes in social categorization) by which they work (see Pettigrew, 1998). A number of empirically-supported category-based alternatives have been proposed that involve de-emphasizing group membership and establishing personalized relations (Brewer & Miller, 1984; Miller, 2002; Wilder, 1986), recategorizing groups within a common group identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), or maintaining distinct group identities but within the context of positive interdependence between groups (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Future research will likely examine more closely the implications of various mediating processes for better understanding the conditions under which contact is more effective (e.g., for mild intergroup tensions versus open hostility) and how various types of contact and their resulting cognitive representations may operate sequentially, in a complementary fashion, to reduce bias.

More generally, future research is likely to investigate the effectiveness of other strategies for reducing bias. For example, because of world events, recent attention has turned to considering whether multiculturalism is effective for promoting intergroup harmony within a nation (e.g., Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008). Similarly, social cognitive associative training has been harnessed for reducing the application of stereotypes (e.g., Kawakami, Dovidio, & van Kamp, 2007). These strategies take advantage of knowledge of the sources of prejudice to develop strategies for counteracting such effects. Thus, as knowledge and understanding of the neurological and other bases of prejudice accrues, so too should new strategies be developed and evaluated that target such processes.

Two key aspects of this future work on bias reduction constitute independent themes in their own right; they can be illustrated with reference to intergroup contact, but are by no means exclusive to it. A fifth recent trend is shift from a static to a dynamic approach. At one level this is seen in the relational approach taken to intergroup interactions by Richeson, Shelton and their colleagues (see Shelton & Richeson, 2006). How one person perceives and interprets an interaction partner has a direct impact on how that partner interprets and responds. Thus how behavior unfolds over time becomes a critical focus. At another level, static, cross-sectional analyses of intergroup relations are no longer seen as sufficient to understand what are, essentially, dynamic phenomena. To give one example, more than 70 percent of the research on intergroup contact reported in a meta-analysis by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) involved respondents retrospectively reporting prior or current levels of contact. This reliance on cross-sectional, correlational studies needs to be gradually replaced with more complex longitudinal studies (e.g., Binder, Zagefka, Brown, et al., 2009; Levin, van Laar, & Sidanius, 2003).

A sixth, also methodological, focus, barely in its infancy, is for social psychology to complement its long-held expertise in laboratory

research with adventurous excursions outside the lab, where members of different groups live, work, cooperate and sometimes fight with each other. In one example, Pettigrew (2008) recently called for a greater focus on the multi-level nature of intergroup contact where, for example, members of different groups may inhabit different neighborhoods, but come together in common classrooms, in different schools. Pettigrew and Tropp's (2006) meta-analysis of intergroup contact included no multi-level studies, yet these are crucial for practical applications (see Pettigrew, 2006).

Integrating the traditional social psychological emphasis on intra-individual and interpersonal processes with macro institutional and societal factors that have been the province of sociology and political science represents a seventh fertile area for future research. Recent social phenomena, such as unprecedented rates of international immigration and the purported clash of eastern and western cultures, highlight the importance of multi-disciplinary approaches to social problems. The complexity of these issues speaks to the need to adopt truly multidisciplinary approaches that incorporate the different perspectives and methods of fields such as economics, political science, sociology, psychology, and anthropology (Esses, Semanya, Stelzl, et al., 2006). Initiatives in this area will likely require greater investment in field research, studying actual groups in extended conflict, than has been the case in recent years in psychology.

A final future direction we would like to see unfold is a greater input from social psychological research on prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination to relevant policy. The findings reviewed in the chapters in this volume have important and multiple implications for government policy, ranging from increasing the educational aspirations of minority youth, to providing equal access to health care irrespective of ethnic group, to promoting effective interventions to improve social harmony. A case in point is the burning question of whether residential diversity is associated with reduced levels of trust, as

claimed by political scientist Robert Putnam (2007), and what to do about it. Ensuing debate, drawn from multiple disciplines, has failed to reach agreement on the reliability of the findings (see, for example, Briggs, 2008; Dawkins, 2008; Lancee & Dronkers, 2008). One reason why Putnam's main pessimistic finding should be considered premature is that it largely neglects to measure actual face-to-face contacts between members of different groups, as opposed to merely living in the same neighbourhood. This is a conflation of *opportunity for contact* and *actual contact*. Social psychologists have long appreciated that living in a street or neighbourhood peopled by members of different ethnic groups does not constitute contact until and unless there is actual face-to-face interaction between them (see Hewstone, Tausch, Voci, et al., 2008; see also Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle, et al., 2009; Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008). Yet perhaps it was easy to overlook social psychology's contribution because so little of it dealt with the complexities of diversity and intergroup interaction outside the laboratory, or at least the campus, and in the community, and because social psychologists have sometimes been rather reluctant to press home the policy impact of their research. We hope that our discipline will be more effective in the future, and that a volume such as this one will help, as will the recent founding of social psychological journal outlets with an explicit focus on policy (e.g., *Social Issues and Policy Review*).

The purpose of the current volume is to provide a comprehensive summary of theory and research on prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination that establishes a solid foundation for identifying and pursuing new work on intergroup bias. The scope of the volume is broad, and it adopts a multi-level perspective. Still, we acknowledge the coverage is far from exhaustive. Nevertheless, the chapters in this volume illustrate the landscape of social psychological work on intergroup bias, drawing on the expertise of international scholars who have made significant contributions to this area.

ORGANIZATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE VOLUME

The current volume is organized into six discrete sections. The first section, which contains the present chapter, represents an overview of the topic. The present chapter introduced basic concepts that will be referred to across the chapters, summarized the major conceptual approaches in this area, and identified promising directions for further study. The next chapter, Historical Overview by John Duckitt, describes historical developments, conceptual and empirical, in the study of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. Duckitt emphasizes the interplay between society and science. He proposes that these paradigmatic transitions did not simply represent a systematic evolution of knowledge, but rather reflected responses to specific social and historical circumstances. Then Correll, Judd, Park, and Wittenbrink in their chapter, Measuring Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination, review the methodological challenges and tools associated with research in this area. Beyond describing different techniques for studying bias, the authors argue that measurement itself has fundamentally affected theories of the nature and origins of prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination. These three chapters combined thus not only review basic issues for studying prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination, but also they illustrate the importance of social context for theory and research in this area.

The second main section of this volume is Basic Processes and Causes of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination. This is the largest section of the volume and includes 12 chapters that explore the origins of different forms of bias. The section begins with a chapter on processes at the most micro level, neural processes, and ends with macro processes, the influence of mass media.

In the first chapter of the second section, Social Cognitive Neural Processes, Quadflieg, Mason, and Macrae describe the latest findings from studies on intergroup bias in social cognitive neuroscience, considered

in light of current theoretical models of person perception, social cognition, and social categorization. Next, Schaller, Conway, and Peavy, in their chapter *Evolutionary Processes*, identify two kinds of evolutionary processes contributing to bias, one genetic and the other social that relate to how knowledge is selectively transmitted between individuals. Killen, Richardson, and Kelly then discuss, in *Developmental Perspectives*, how intergroup attitudes emerge, change, and are manifested throughout development.

The next three chapters in the section examine cognitive, affective, and motivational processes in prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. In their chapter, *Cognitive Processes*, Fiske and Russell review social cognitive perspectives on prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination, focusing on underlying thought processes that create and maintain bias. Smith and Mackie follow with a chapter on *Affective Processes*. The authors explore ways that incidental affect, affect arising from an interaction, and affect experienced when they think of themselves as a member of a social group influences cognitive processes and behavioral reactions. Yzerbyt attempts to integrate research on cognitive and affective processes in bias in his chapter; he analyses bias from the perspective of fundamental integrity concerns to know and to control, to be connected with others, and to have value.

The volume then moves from intrapersonal processes to a focus on the individual. The chapter, *Individual Differences*, by Son Hing and Zanna, identifies ideological and dispositional influences that shape the degree to which different people harbor intergroup biases. Abrams and Hogg consider the roles of identity, personal and collective, in their chapter, *Social Identity and Self-Categorization*. From the perspective of social identity theory, the authors explain how prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination arise and are maintained. The next two chapters, *Group Realities* by Leyens and Demoulin and *Intergroup Competition* by Esses, Jackson, and Bennet-AbuAyyash, demonstrate how groups influence the way individuals perceive

each other and develop social relations that both create and justify intergroup bias. The chapter, *Social Structure*, by Diekmann, Eagly, and Johnston examines prejudice as resulting from social cognitive elements, such as attitudes and stereotypes, and social structural elements, such as roles and contexts, and they offer an integrative perspective, the role congruity model of prejudice. In the final chapter of the section, *Mass Media*, Mutz and Goldman consider how the ways different groups are portrayed in the media can influence intergroup attitudes and beliefs. They outline the contributions and limitations of past work on this topic, and point to the most promising theoretical frameworks for studying media influence on outgroup attitudes. Thus, this section spans different levels of analysis for understanding prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination.

The third section of the volume is *Expression of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination*. This section explores how bias is expressed sometimes subtly but other times blatantly in attitudes, interpersonal interactions, and intergroup relations. The chapter, *Attitudes and Intergroup Relations* by Maio, Haddock, Manstead, and Spears, which begins this section, reviews research on the content, structure, and function of attitudes in general and their relationship to intergroup biases. Richeson and Shelton focus on the role of prejudice in interpersonal interaction. They consider how the reciprocal ways stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals influence each other in interactions shape intergroup perceptions and outcomes. Dancygier and Green focus on one extreme outcome, *Hate Crime*. They explore motivational influences and contextual factors (including political, historical-cultural, sociological, and economic circumstances) that elicit hate crimes. The next four chapters in the section discuss four different forms of intergroup bias. The first three explore well-known '-isms'; Glick and Rudman focus on sexism; Dovidio, Gaertner, and Kawakami discuss racism; Hebl, Law, and King consider heterosexism. In the following chapter Wagner, Christ, and Heitmeyer examine anti-immigration bias.

Although far from exhaustive, these four chapters provide ‘case studies’ illustrating both common elements and unique aspects of discrimination toward different groups.

The fourth section of the volume is Social Impact of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination. Quinn, Kallen, and Spencer, in their chapter, Stereotype Threat, review the general evidence on stereotype threat, discuss potential underlying processes, and consider the role of varying group identities in stereotype threat outcomes. The chapter, Internalized Devaluation and Situational Threat by Crocker and Garcia examines research and theory on the idea that prejudice and discrimination lower the self-esteem of people with stigmatized identities and these authors identify moderating factors. They view the stigmatized as caught between protecting self-esteem at the cost of learning, relationships, and/or motivation versus sustaining learning, motivation, and relationships at the cost of self-esteem. Major and Townsend’s chapter, Coping with Bias, attempts to strike a balance between acknowledging the negative impact of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination on the lives of the stigmatized and recognizing the multiple strengths and resilience that stigmatized individuals and groups also display.

The next five chapters in the section consider the impact of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination institutionally, organizationally, and socially. Henry describes the dynamics of Institutional Bias generally. Smith, Brief, and Collela study the operation of intergroup bias in organizations, whereas Schmukler, Rasquiza, Dimmit, and Crosby examine bias in public policy. The impact of intergroup bias on a key area of society, health care, and outcomes, is reviewed by Penner, Albrecht, Orom, Coleman, and Underwood.

The fifth section of the volume is Combating Bias. It contains seven chapters that present a range of perspectives, conceptual and practical, for controlling and eliminating prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. Monteith, Arthur, and Flynn, in their chapter on Self-Regulation, discuss motivational factors influencing regulatory inclinations

and explain how suppression of prejudicial biases often backfires. In the chapter, Multiple Identities, Crisp provides a review and integration of research into how the recognition and use of multiple identities in person perception can encourage reductions in intergroup biases. Gaertner, Dovidio, and Houlette explore how social categorization, which often produces intergroup bias, can be redirected through recategorization to reduce bias. Tausch and Hewstone present an overview of the vast literature on intergroup contact, highlighting recent developments in the field, and identifying moderating factors and mediating mechanisms.

Ellemers and van Laar consider individual mobility, while Wright discusses collective action. Specifically, Ellemers and van Laar argue that individual mobility beliefs and behaviors tend to reinforce rather than challenge group-based inequality. Wright, in his chapter, Collective Action and Social Change, describes four psychological processes that underpin collective action: collective identity, perceived boundary permeability, feelings of legitimacy/injustice, and collective control (instability/agency). He concludes the chapter by contrasting the psychology of collective action with that of prejudice reduction.

The final ‘Commentary’ section of this volume features a capstone chapter, written by the senior scholar in this field who brings over five decades of experience to this task. This chapter, Looking to the Future, by Thomas Pettigrew identifies conceptual threads that run through the chapters of this volume and discusses a series of pressing concerns for future work, including the need for more integrative, multi-level, and contextually sensitive analysis.

Taken together, the chapters in this volume provide a broad overview of classic and current research and theory on prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. Each of the chapters is integrative and reflective. Moreover, and most importantly, they are collectively generative. The chapters offer critical analysis and insights that reveal gaps in what we know about intergroup bias and they highlight promising directions

for future work. They map the extensive knowledge base on this important issue and provide a blueprint for researchers to pursue individually and collectively, not only to better understand the phenomena of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination but also to develop new techniques for eliminating intergroup bias.

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What Causes Prejudice and Discrimination?

By Dr. Warren J. Blumenfeld¹

You've got to be taught
To hate and fear,
You've got to be taught
From year to year,
It's got to be drummed
In your dear little ear
You've got to be carefully taught.

You've got to be taught to be afraid
Of people whose eyes are oddly made,
And people whose skin is a different shade,
You've got to be carefully taught.

You've got to be taught before it's too late,
Before you are six or seven or eight,
To hate all the people your relatives hate,
You've got to be carefully taught!

“You’ve Got To Be Carefully Taught,” from *South Pacific*, Richard Rogers &
Oscar Hammerstein, 1949

This song from the Broadway musical *South Pacific* is preceded by the line that prejudice is “not born in you! It happens after you’re born.” Though the lyric in this song referred to racism and ethnic biases, it can and does refer to other forms of social prejudices and discrimination as well. Young children through their *socialization* learn the values and attitudes of people and later the larger society around them. Within this process, children also learn prejudices and how to discriminate through observing others around them, and through reinforcement, and modeling.

Children begin developing attitudes about various groups in society as early as ages three or four. Initially such attitudes are quite flexible. However, as children grow older such attitudes become more difficult to change (Byrnes, 1995, p. 3).

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Socialization



Beverly Daniel Tatum (1999) states that identity is shaped by several factors, including individual characteristics, family dynamics, historical factors, and social and political contexts. Everywhere a child is born—for example, Atlanta, New Guinea, Moscow, and Tokyo—all children undergo the process of socialization, which can be defined as the life-long process through which people acquire personality and learn the values, attitudes, norms, and societal expectations of their culture. Though the content varies from one culture to the next, the process of socialization is very similar. Through this process, people come to understand their culture, begin to develop a sense of who they are, and come to know what is expected of them in terms of their social role. While an acorn will inevitably become an oak tree, humans require socialization to realize their humanity. Charles Horton Cooley (1918) talks about the “looking glass self,” whereby other people are the mirrors through which we see ourselves.

A social role is any pattern of behavior that an individual in a specific situation is encouraged to perform. The term comes from the language of the theater, being derived from the French *role*, referring to the “roll” of paper containing an actor’s part. A role is not the same as the person who is performing it at the moment—just as the role of Macbeth has been played by countless actors over the centuries. Macbeth has certain characteristics, which, regardless of the particular actor who plays the part, enable the audience to recognize him as “Macbeth.” Yet, as a stage role leaves some room for interpretation, so too most social roles involve general guidelines, but not precise behaviors.

Individuals play many different social roles. One can, for example, play the role of daughter, mother, student, friend, patient, and professional. Each of these roles has a set of expectations associated with it. The role of student, for example, involves coming to class on time, treating teachers respectfully, participating in class discussions, doing homework on time, and so forth. Our understanding of these expectations enables us to recognize “inappropriate” behavior.

Though we have the capacity to reflect on these roles, most of us do not even notice them. The roles represent our socialization. Actors receive their roles by the person in charge of casting, instructed by the director, and handed the part to memorize. In learning a social role, however, we have a variety of teachers and models.

When infants are born, they have very limited in their understanding of the ways of the world. For the young child, the most important agents of socialization are parents or guardians who consciously and unconsciously model certain behaviors while teaching all sorts of roles: “No dear, not like that, like this.” As roles become more and more sophisticated, people may begin to learn them from others who are already performing them. For example, a first-year middle school student may “learn” how to be a middle school student from observing members of the senior class in the school.

When a young child enters school, teachers are not merely the transmitters of knowledge, but they also serve to continue and supplement the process of socialization. It is in these early years of school when the child learns many of the “rules” of behavior and becomes a social being to an even greater extent. Later, peer relationships play a more significant position in the socialization process.


Social agents whose importance should not be underestimated are the media. From the television tube, the radio or iPod speakers, the movie screen, the pages of newspapers, books, and magazines, the internet, and billboards come the messages that help formulate or reinforce our attitudes and value systems. The media expose people to the latest concepts of style, beauty, morality, and social behavior. Other social institutes that reinforce the socialization process include the schools, religion, law, businesses, science, the government, and others (Harro, 2000).

People often learn their roles by playing complementary roles, which are then interdependent. Juliet, for example, learns to play her part by taking cues from Romeo, and vice versa. Social roles are similar; there cannot be parents without children, teachers without students, leaders without followers.

Our socialization begins before we are born, with no choice on our part. No one brings in a survey in the womb inquiring into which gender, class, religion, sexual orientation, cultural group, ability status, or age we might want to be born. These identities are ascribed to us at birth through no effort or decision or choice of our own; there is, therefore, no reason to blame each other or hold each other responsible for the identities we have. This first step in the socialization process is outside our control. In addition to having no choice, we also have no initial consciousness about who we are. We don’t question our identities at this point. We just are who we are (Harro, 2013, p. 47).

Cycle of Socialization

Bobbie Harro (2013a) details the process by which individuals learn the overarching values regarding issues of domination and subordination of their societies in what she calls her “Cycle of Socialization.” (In Part III, we introduce Bobbie Harro’s “Cycle of Liberation” (2013b).



Bobbie Harro’s model comprises six stages:

1. The Beginning
2. First Socialization
3. Institutional and Cultural Socialization
4. Enforcements
5. Results
6. Actions

A seventh component of Harro’s model, “The Core,” includes the individual’s emotions, which serve to keep the cycle in place.

Harro’s first stage, “The Beginning,” discusses that in the womb even before the person is born, society ascribes a collection of identities that will eventually shape their dominant or subordinate statuses within existing systems of privilege and oppression. Since humans are born with no consciousness or self-awareness, they do not have an initial basis upon which to challenge or dispute the identities ascribed to them.

During First Socialization, Harro’s second stage that happens as soon as we are born, humans are taught by their caretakers (i.e., immediate family, guardians) what roles they are expected to play, the rules they are expected to follow, and the norms to which they are expected to adhere. This happens on two levels, the intrapersonal level, which refers to how humans think about themselves, and the interpersonal level, which refers to how humans relate to others. At this stage, members of subordinate groups are initially taught what it means to be members of those groups, which reflects the hegemony of the larger dominant culture. Although this may result in them learning and accepting their subordinate social roles, this is not always the case, especially when the individual’s initial caretakers have critically reflected on and consciously challenged the dominant

ideology. (For example, Hindu families maintaining and teaching about the values and cultural heritage of their religious traditions.)

During Stage three, Institutional and Cultural Socialization, the bases of socialization broaden to include the institutions and cultural contexts by which people are surrounded. Harro states:

The media (television, the Internet, advertising, newspaper and radio), our language patterns, the lyrics to songs, our cultural practices and holidays, and the very assumptions on which our society is built all contribute to the reinforcement of the biased messages and stereotypes we receive (p. 48).

At this stage, Harro asserts that the opportunities for transmission or contradiction of oppressive messages arises more frequently from increasingly numerous places, and that these oppressive messages are “woven into every structural thread of the fabric of our culture” (p. 48). Members of subordinate groups are, therefore, surrounded and immersed within an atmosphere that consistently reflects and reinforces their subordinate status.

Harro’s fourth stage in the Cycle of Socialization, Enforcements, comprise all the rewards and/or punishments that confirm members of subordinate groups to follow prearranged roles in oppressive systems. Members of subordinate groups who observe their roles and follow the status quo are thus rewarded for abiding. For example, people who accept and behave according to their given gender scripts are accorded more benefits and privileges by society and considered as “normal.” On the other hand, members of subordinate groups who somehow contest their prescribed gender roles or refuse to obey the status quo are summarily punished, sometimes subjected to violence, and even murdered.

Harro’s fifth stage, Results, explains the outcomes of the socialization process. Harro states:

By participating in our roles as targets, we reinforce stereotypes, collude in our own demise and perpetuate the system of oppression. This learned helplessness is often called internalized oppression because we have learned to become our own oppressors from within (p. 49).

At this stage of the socialization process, society teaches and enforces members of subordinate groups to more completely internalize their oppression within overarching systems of oppression. Harro labels specific behaviors and emotions including anger, low self-esteem, guilt, hopelessness, and self-destructive behaviors.

According to Suzanne Lipsky (1977) referring to internalized racism, which can also apply to other forms of internalized oppression:


The result has been that these distress patterns, created by oppression and racism from the outside, have been played out in the only two places it has seemed "safe" to do so. First, upon members of our own group—particularly upon those over whom we have some degree of power or control.... Second, upon ourselves through

all manner of self-invalidation, self-doubt, isolation, fear, feelings of powerlessness, and despair (p. 5).

In the final stage of Harro's Cycle of Socialization, Actions, people make decisions, sometimes unconsciously, regarding which way to go with the results of their socialization process. Harro views the options as twofold: Either choose a direction for change or accept and eventually maintain and perpetuate the cycle. Harro states:

We fail to realize that we have become participants just by doing nothing. This cycle has a life of its own. It doesn't need our active support because it has its own centrifugal force. It goes on and unless we choose to interrupt it, it will continue to go on (p. 50).

Urie Bronfenbrenner's Bioecological Model of Human Development



Developmental psychologist, Urie Bronfenbrenner (1981), provides a Bioecological Model of Human Development, a systems model of human behavior composed of three major aspects:

- 1) The **Mind** or Human Personality involving Cognition (thinking, knowing, and understanding), Affect (attitudes, predisposition, emotions, and feelings), and Conation (volition, will, intentions to act, reason for doing). The mind receives information and it manifests actions through...
- 2) The **Body**: biological or genetic influences bodily functioning of overt behavior or output. There is feedback between overt responses—behavior—and the resulting stimuli from the environment.
- 3) The **Spirit**: In addition to the biological component, the spiritual component influences the development and functioning of the components of the mind.

Bronfenbrenner theorizes that several interacting social contexts affect personal-social development, the Bio- (people bring their biological selves) Ecological (to social contexts, “ecosystems”) in which they interact and influence others. These ecosystems comprise:

- The **Microsystem**: the level that has the most immediate and earliest influence on the individual including family, friends, teachers, the local neighborhood, and community.

- The **Mesosystem**: the intermediate level of influences including the set of interactions and relationships among all the elements of the microsystem: family members interact with each other or with teachers: the ways the teacher influences the parents or guardians, and the ways the parents or guardians influence the teacher. In addition, other social interactions are involved: media organizations, entertainment, transportation, and more.
- The **Exosystem**: All the social settings that affect the individual, even though the individual is not a direct member of the system. Examples include teachers' relationship with administrators and the school board, parents' or guardians' employment, community resources regarding health, employment, recreation, religions and houses of worship.
- The **Macrosystem**: the larger society, its values, laws, norms, traditions, history. The most removed influences on the individual include such things as international or global conditions like the paradigm shift from agricultural to industrial and information-age economies.

Social Learning Theory

Social Learning Theory, sometimes referred to as “Social Cognitive Theory,” proposes that individuals learn by observing and associating with others (modeling), and through the process of reinforcement, whereby one’s beliefs and actions are in some way supported by others.

Think back in your life to any role models you may have.

1. Who were they?
2. How did they serve as role models?
3. What skills, knowledge, behaviors, views, perspectives/outlooks, feelings, etc. did you gain from them?
4. How have they impacted the course of your life?

Albert Bandura and “Social Modeling Theory”



The developmental and educational psychologist, Albert Bandura (1965), proposed that children learn primarily through observation, and that one’s culture transmits social mores and what he

called “complex competencies” through *social modeling*. As he noted, the root meaning of the word “teach” is “to show.”

Other, including Diane Maluso, propose that parents teach prejudice through their beliefs and actions, and through the process of reinforcement:

Parents play an important role in prejudice acquisition. The relationship between parents' and children's attitudes toward members of outgroups is consistent. Not only do parents teach prejudice directly through reinforcement but children often learn their parents' prejudiced attitudes by simply observing their parents talking about and interacting with people from other groups. (Maluso, 2007).

Bandura, on the other hand, asserted that the process of modeling alone—free from social reinforcements—can, in fact, be enough for children to incorporate and act on their own beliefs and behaviors.

Bandura, along with educational psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1978), posited that positive modeling by knowledgeable or advanced peers/classmates, can develop even higher efficiency and cognitive developmental competencies than teachers modeling the same activities.



Vygotsky asserted that schools are major socializing agencies whereby students learn further their *expected* social roles, including expressions of gender and sexual identity. For Vygotsky:

Every function in the child’s cultural development appears twice: first on the social level, and later on the individual level; first, between people (interpsychological) and then inside the child (interpsychological). This applies equally to voluntary attention to logical memory, and to the formation of concepts. All the higher functions originate as actual relationships between individuals (1978, p. 57).

Vygotsky asserted that the child’s understanding of society is shaped through the process of social learning, and at the same time, the individual retains the ability to think independently while growing in experience throughout life.

Society at large, adults, and peers present an array of modeling, a continuum from very productive and affirming to very biased, aggressive, and destructive. Modeling to Bandura included much more than simple observation of concrete actions followed by imitation (“response mimicry”), but also included what he called “abstract modeling” of such abstract concepts as following rules, taking on certain values and beliefs, and making moral and ethical judgments.

On the negative side of the modeling continuum, for example, Bandura concluded that young children acted out aggression modeled by adults in their homes. This finding contradicted the premise that parental/guardian punishment would inhibit children’s aggressive behaviors.

To test his hypothesis that social modeling had a primary impact on children’s learning and on their behaviors and beliefs, Bandura *et al* (1961) developed his “Bobo Doll” experiments. The purpose of the experiment was to determine whether adult modeling resulted in either aggressive or non-aggressive behaviors by the young children in the study. Research participants included 36 boys and 36 girls, with a control group of 24 children. The participants ranged in age from 3 to 6 years, with an average age of 4 years and 4 months, all from the Stanford University Nursery School. The researchers investigated and were knowledgeable about each participant’s prior behavioral history, and this was factored into the final data analysis.



Each child was taken individually into a playroom filled with a variety of “non-aggressive toys” including a tinker toy set, and “aggressive toys” including a wooden mallet and a Bobo Doll: a large inflatable clown, weighted on the bottom so it could stand unaided, approximately the size of a pre-adolescent child of 5 feet. The experimenter told each child participant that the toys were only for the adult model to play with, and that the child was to watch the adult. The children in the control group, however, were each told individually that they could play with the toys. No adult model was to enter their playroom.

For half of the participants, the adult model initially played with the tinker toys for one minute, then for nine minutes, attacked the Bobo doll with a sequence of verbal insults and physical violence including kicking, punching, and hitting about the head with the wooden mallet. For the other half of the participants, the adult model played with the tinker toys and ignored the Bobo doll for the entire 10-minute duration of this phase of the experiment.

Following their observations, each child was taken individually by the experimenter into another playroom with an assortment of toys, which included an airplane, a fire engine, a doll set with

clothes and carriage, and other. For the purpose of instilling a certain degree of anger and frustration, the experimenter told each child that they could play with the toys in this room for a very short time, and that these toys were reserved for other children.

The children were then taken individually to a third playroom and left alone for 20 minutes to play with aggressive and non-aggressive toys. The aggressive toys included the Bobo doll, a wooden mallet, two dart guns, a tetherball with a face painted on it, and others. Among the non-aggressive toys were paper and crayons, a tea set, two dolls, a ball, cars and trucks, and plastic farm animals. Experimenters observed each child behind a one-way mirror and evaluated their behaviors on a series of specific measures of aggressive behavior.



Bandura found that the children who observed the aggressive adult model were much more likely to exhibit both imitatively physical and verbal aggressive behaviors when left alone in the third playroom, as opposed to children who were exposed to the non-aggressive model or no model. In addition, Bandura's initial assumption that children were more highly influenced by same-sex models was validated. Both the males and the females exhibited higher degrees of aggressive verbal and physical behaviors following modeling by a same-sex experimenter than by an experimenter of the other sex. Finally, overall, males tended to behave more aggressively than females in the study.

Bandura and his associates succeeded in supporting their theory of social learning. Children, they found, can indeed learn specific behaviors, such as forms of verbal and physical aggression, by observing and imitating others. This was found to be true even in the absence of behavioral reinforcements. Bandura concluded that children are highly influenced by observing adult behavior, leading them to believe that such behavior is acceptable, and, in this instance, freeing their own aggressive inhibitions. They are then more likely to behave aggressively in future situations.

Social Rank Theory

Social rank theory, as used by Hawker and Boulton (2001), proposes that aggressive individuals actually hold a higher rank, power, or status within a social group. Therefore, aggressive behavior, and bullying in particular, may be reinforced, and it provides those who engage in aggressive behaviors a sense of belonging. Hawker and Boulton contend that peer victimization serves a number of functions. First, it establishes and maintains a social hierarchy within a given group (an

“ingroup”), and second, it maintains distinctions between members of the ingroup, from members of other groups (“outgroups”).

In addition, Teräshjo and Salmivalli (2003), contend that those who bully fulfill the social “function” of establishing and reinforcing social norms. They found that students often justify bullying behaviors by blaming the targets of their attacks, and emphasizing that they somehow deserve the peer aggression or that they in some way deviate from the established peer social norms. This is a form of “ruthless socialization.”

Both individual and situational factors related to ethical decision-making must be considered when attempting to explain oppressive beliefs and actions. Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) found that an individual’s values, attitudes, and behaviors are greatly impacted by co-workers and peers. Even when individuals judge a particular behavior or actions to be morally wrong, the organizational environment—that is, the perceived attitudes and behaviors of peers or co-workers—can severely “neutralize” their previously held moral judgments. They then often take on the actions consistent with the perceived organizational climate (see e.g., Vitell and Grove, 1987), especially individuals who are particularly susceptible to social influences, what Synder (1979) refers to as those high in “self-monitoring” who rely to a great extent on cues from social interactions to shape appropriate attitudes and behaviors. In this sense, then, behavior is not always an indication of beliefs or values, for an individual may take on actions in accordance with perceived accepted organizational or peer actions, even when those actions run counter to the individual’s ethical judgment.

Psychodynamic Theories

Some theorists argue that the denial of basic (and often intangible) psychological needs for security, identity, recognition, and participation underlie prejudiced beliefs (e.g. Azar, 1986; Burton, 1986; Cohen and Azar, 1981). Helmreich and Marcus (1998b) asserted that one must look at the underlying psychological bases of social interactions. They proposed that the conflict is not *over* anything (p. 29). At the core of the conflict “are feelings of insecurity and mistrust, competing claims to greater suffering, and issues of envy, resentment, and otherness” (p. 28).

Frustration-Aggression-Displacement Theories

Since the 1930s, the majority of the theories to explain prejudice and conflict through psychological factors operating in a social context are placed under the general category of “Frustration-Aggression-Displacement Theory” (or FADT). These theories made assumptions about *social* structures and *social* processes based on a number of hypotheses:

- Individuals are concerned with gratifying their own needs, but are, to one extent or another, inhibited by social or communal restraints.
- Ingroup norms and discipline require self-denial, postponement of gratification, and/or repression of certain impulses and needs, which can be frustrating to the individual.
- Such frustration can generate retaliatory impulses directed toward the perceived source of the restraint, which is often from *ingroup* members (Berkowitz, 1962).
- Opposition itself can give one inner satisfaction and a sense of direction and relief (Simmel, 1955).

- In terms of the ingroup, the expression of hostility and aggression on the direct source of restraint can inhibit or reduce cooperation and cohesion.
- Thus, the hostility and aggressiveness directed toward the stimulus object can also be expressed against *other* objects. This principle is known as “stimulus generalization.”
- The transfer of hostility and aggressiveness from the original instigating stimulus object onto another object is called “*displacement*” and the “*displacement mechanism*.”
- Ingroups tend to institutionalize the displacement of hostility and aggression onto outgroups. This displacement is often rationalized and justified as appropriate by the ingroup. LeVine and Campbell (1972) called this process the *socially institutionalized displacement target mechanism*, which they defined as “a verbal tradition leading ingroup members to perceive outgroups as the cause of their frustrations” (p. 123).

Additional propositions that increase ingroup displacement include:

- The more frustrating the environment, the more likely will be the displacement onto outgroups.
- The more ingroup cohesion and discipline, the more likely the hostility will be directed toward outgroups.
- The more domineering and autocratic the ingroup authorities, and the more obedience that is required of ingroup member, the more hostility will be directed toward outgroups (Barry, et al, 1959; Adorno, et al, 1950).

Ethnocentrism to Sigmund Freud (1930) carried with it the social “function” of displacement of aggression from the ingroup to the outgroup. In addition, Wurtzel (1986) maintains that people maintain prejudicial attitudes to gain certain rewards and to avoid punishment, what he refers to this as the “Utilitarian Function” of prejudice. People generally want to be liked and, therefore, will take on the prejudices of others, including family member and peers. In doing so, they are consolidating their personal and social relationships, and in turn enhancing their own self concept. Also, when a leader exploits a prejudice widely held by her or his constituency, group members may experience a heightened sense of purpose and a stronger feeling of community while at the same time solidifying the leader’s position.

Wurtzel (1986) also contends that people treasure their own particular sets of values and modes of living, and there may be some insecurity surrounding anything that is different from those standards. For any difference may be construed as a threat to those frameworks, a threat that would undermine the security their social norms provide. Consequently, any group perceived as challenging one’s values one may consider as inferior and threatening. Prejudice against people who maintain values different from one’s own tends to strengthen the values of those who hold the prejudice. Wurtzel calls this the “Value-Expressive Function” of prejudice. Seeing even imaginary threats to one’s shared values may not only increase animosity toward those who are perceived as threats, but also make the values appear to be worth defending.

Scapegoating

The concept of scapegoating is the prime factor connecting these processes. Most of these theories were inspired by Sigmund Freud’s work on the individual and extrapolated to the social level. MacCrone (1937), reflecting Freudian theory, distilled the theory of scapegoating:

The greater the discipline of group life, its repressions, privations, and exactions either in the form of moral, religious, or economic sanction, the greater we can expect its aggressiveness to become at the expense of some other group or groups (p. 251).

The origin of the scapegoat dates back to the Book of Leviticus in the Hebrew Bible (16:20-22). On the Day of Atonement, a live goat was selected by lottery. The high priest placed both hands on the goat's head and confessed over it the sins of the people. In this way, the sins were symbolically transferred to the animal, which was then cast out into the wilderness. This process thus purged the people, for a time, of their feelings of guilt (Blumenfeld and Raymond, 1988, 1993, p. 223).

Wurzel (1986) discusses a "Self-Esteem" or "Protective" function of prejudice and conflict. He contends that people often hate what appears threatening or uncertain, for it reminds them of the fragility of the human ego. All of us fail at times, and it is often frightening to take personal responsibility for those failures. Prejudice in these instances protects one's self-esteem against conflicts and weaknesses arising from one's limitations (whether internal or external). Thus, scapegoating certain groups shields people psychologically from their own inadequacies and fears, for example, blaming "those gays" for destroying the institution of heterosexual marriage for the problems one may be having in their own marriage.

MacCrone (1937) added that the mere existence of an outgroup protects the ingroup from internal disruption. Furthermore, the ingroup actually *needs* outgroups to serve the function of directing aggression outward. Jean Paul Sartre (1965) stated that in the absence of Jews, the anti-Semite would have to invent them. Similarly, in the absence of LGBT people, those with high levels of homophobia would have to invent them.

Coser (1956) proposed his "group maintaining function" of conflict in which the expression of conflict (both within one's own group and between groups) serves as a "safety-valve" by releasing pent-up stress. This expression can eventually "clear the air." The scapegoating of other groups can aid in the maintaining of group cohesion.

***What conditions are necessary for specific people or groups
to be singled out as scapegoats in contemporary society?***

Saenger (1953) found that for specific people or groups to be targeted for scapegoating, certain conditions are necessary. He found first, that prejudice and negative stereotyping must already exist against the particular group(s) before the scapegoating commences. Also, the group(s) in question must appear to be too weak to fight back successfully when attacked. In addition, the society must sanction the scapegoating through its own institutional structures.

Young (1932) discovered that such groups must be visible and easily distinguished from the ingroup, while LeVine and Campbell (1972) found that outgroups perceived as most frustrating will be more hated by the ingroup, and that the nearer the outgroups in terms of having the *opportunity* to frustrate, the more hated they attract. In addition, the stronger the outgroup, in terms of having more *capacity* to frustrate, the more they will be more hated, and the outgroup on which

aggression and hostility has most recently and severely been carried out will be more hated. They also maintain that those outgroups that are intermediate in similarity to the ingroup sources of frustration will be the most likely target of aggression.

Bettelheim and Janowitz (1950) added that individuals and ingroups select certain outgroups as appropriate targets of projection corresponding to different parts of the personality. Projection thus becomes another justification for aggression against outgroups. Such aggression serves to cleanse the ingroup or individual of undesirable traits. Projection onto an outgroup member or group tends to free the ingroup of forbidden thoughts or desires while at the same time enjoying vicarious gratification in that desire. Sigmund Freud termed this process *reaction formation*. This mechanism provides a defense against an impulse in oneself (or one's group) by taking a firm stand against its expression in others. Enemies help one to purge such antithetical parts of oneself by offering what Vamik Volkan (1988) calls "suitable targets for externalization" (p. 182).

Frustration-Aggression-Displacement Theory poses enormous problems for the reduction of prejudice and discrimination. It more than suggests that the mere removal of external threat and a dramatic reduction in competition for scarce resources is *insufficient* for the elimination of the *perception* of threat, and, subsequently, for the eventual elimination of hostilities. In addition, the psychological needs for security, identity, recognition, and participation must also be addressed for any conflict resolution strategies to be effective.

Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RGCT)

Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RGCT) includes all the theories that posit the cause of intergroup strife and conflict as actual, or real, competition over limited resources between groups with incompatible interests. This leads to mutually antagonistic group behavior: heightened ingroup solidarity, cohesion, and sense of identity; and biased intergroup perceptions toward outgroups. Conflict develops within historical, political, economic, and social contexts, often marked by power disparities and incompatible interests (or the perception of such) between opposing groups (and nations).

Sherif and his colleagues (Sherif, 1964; Sherif et al 1961; Sherif and Sherif, 1953) are principal proponents of the notion that conflict (emphasized by hostility, negative stereotyping, and aggression) arise over competition for scarce resources. Sherif looked at the "objective relationship" between groups: the relationship emphasized by competition *and* by cooperation between the groups.

Morton Deutsch, (1949) laid the foundations for one of the classic studies on the effects of competition and cooperation in intergroup relations. Based on Deutsch's theories, Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues (1961) conducted their "Robbers Cave" study at a boys' summer camp over a two-week period. Some days after the 24 11- and 12-year-olds arrived, researchers quasi-randomly divided them into two groups, the Rattlers and the Eagles in one study (the Bulldogs and the Red Devils in another version of the study), and placed them in competitive activities: football, tug-of-war, and cabin inspections. Hostility soon developed between the two groups culminating in name-calling, stereotyping, glorification of the ingroups' achievements and denigration of the outgroups' achievements, vandalism of one another's cabins, and a massive food fight at a camp picnic.

Later in the camp session, researchers devised cooperative activities to determine whether this would improve relations between the groups. Several “emergencies” were staged, such as having a camp vehicle break down and finding a split in the camp’s water line, which required cooperation between members of the Rattlers and Eagles. Researchers discovered that the introduction of a goal that members of both groups worked toward cooperatively significantly reduced tensions and conflict between the groups—hostility between groups declined substantially, the boys made friends with members of the other group, and they even began to work alongside one another spontaneously.

Relative Deprivation Theory

The theory of “relative deprivation,” which falls under Realistic Group Conflict Theory, relates to perceptions by the ingroup of being disadvantaged relative to some relevant outgroup. It proposes that *perceptions* of deprivation can lead to conflict, even when the perceptions are not entirely accurate. Often, the outgroups used for social comparison hold higher status, power, and resources (wealth) than the ingroup. Crosby (1982) stated that when upward comparisons are made, the chances that the ingroup will feel deprived are increased. Gurr (1970) believed that a group is more likely to experience relative deprivation when it has rising expectations than when its expectations are declining. Jones (1972), for example, pointed out that the period prior to the civil rights protests and riots during the 1960s was marked by a relative improvement in the economic and social conditions of African Americans. The economic environment, however, was improving at a significantly greater rate for White Americans causing African Americans to encounter relative deprivation. Moreover, working-class and poor whites experienced relative deprivation during the Civil Rights Movement era, feeling they were deprived of the benefits and advantages civil rights programs accorded to African Americans during this period.

The theory of relative deprivation has enormous implications for subgroup hostilities and conflicts within a given stratified society, especially when that society is not at war with another society—a war that can often diffuse or redirect intragroup hostilities outward.

Social Identity Theory

Tajfel and Turner and their colleagues at the University of Bristol developed Social Identity Theory in the 1970s and 1980s (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Henry Tajfel was a survivor of Nazi occupied France and of German prison camps during World War II. He was particularly interested in studying the psychological processes in large groups, and the conditions and consequences of intergroup conflict. In particular, Tajfel along with Turner were interested in studying people’s sense of themselves (their identities) and their motivations, responses, judgments, and overall perceptions when they became members of groups. They found that an individual’s general psychological processes were profoundly and qualitatively altered and transformed in group settings.

Foundational to their theory was the assertion that an individual’s self-definition is changed in groups. In addition, one’s personal identity (one’s concept of self with unique characteristics, qualities, and personality) expands to an enlarged social identity. Though the individual carries personal identities into group situations, within the group there are also possibilities for a new identity, one that carries with it the perception of oneself not only as a member of the group, but

also as someone with the characteristics of the group. In this transformation from personal identity to social identity, an individual's sense of self (and by connection, self-esteem) becomes intricately entwined with the successful functioning of the group. To paraphrase Tajfel and Turner, to have good feelings about oneself, one has to have good feelings about the group. Along these lines, and considering the process of comparison describe by Festinger (1954), people outside the group (e.g., outgroup members and outgroups generally) are increasingly seen as inappropriate role models and sources of information and support.

Social Identity Theory is a social psychological theory of group membership, group processes, and intergroup relations. It posits that conflict will be activated whenever social categories and group divisions are present. It emphasizes the social context as a cause of the conflict, due in part to the multiple processes of social categorization, social comparison, and social identification.

- **Social Categorization:** Bruner (1956) stated that “the main function of categorization is to reduce the complex object world to a more simple and manageable structure” (in Taylor, 1981, p. 83). People tend to accentuate the similarities among people within their own category as well as accentuate the differences of people of different categorical groupings. This categorization process in the formation of social groupings is the same process associated with the construction and maintenance of stereotypes.
- **Social Comparison:** Social Comparison states that identity is organized and maintained through intergroup comparison. It is the process by which individuals will pursue a positive self-identity by comparing one's sense of self with the relevant outgroup, and in the process clarifying and crystallizing one's self identify. Therefore, for individuals to feel positive about membership in a social group, they must first feel positive about that social group. Group theorists, such as Festinger (1954), argued that “individuals are attracted to groups in which the members have opinions similar to their own so that they can evaluate their own opinions with precision.” In this process, group formation is enhanced. Also comparison with other groups can lead to the ranking of groups as better/worse, higher/lower, majority/minority, domination/subordination, and others.

A seemingly contradictory, but nonetheless, closely-allied corollary to social comparison is reference-group theory (e.g., Merton, 1949; Hyman, 1942; Sherif and Sherif, 1953; Shibutani, 1955; Newcomb, 1961), which asserts that aspects of outgroups are sometimes praised and held up by the ingroups as something desirable to emulate.

- **Social Identification:** Tajfel defined “social identification” as the knowledge that one belongs to a group, along with the emotional, psychological, and value significance attached to that membership. Hurtado, Gurin, and Peng (1994) termed this “psychological work,” which is “both cognitive and emotional work” undertaken by individuals “to achieve a positive sense of distinctiveness” after the processes of social categorization and social comparison (p. 131). An individual's sense of social identity stems from three specific realms (Pliner, 1996): from self-definition, from definition by others members within the social group, and from definition by those outside the social group (p. 41). Hurtado, Gurin, and Peng maintained that those social groupings that are valued, granted

a high degree of privilege, and not highly obvious to others (for example, being White or heterosexual) and may not become salient identities to the individuals. On the other hand: The groups and categories that are most problematic for a sense of positive distinctiveness—ones that are disparaged, memberships that have to be negotiated frequently because they are visible to others, ones that have become politicized by social movements, etc.—are the most likely to become social identities for individuals (Hurtado, et al, 1994, p. 132).

If an individual is a member of a low-status group relative to other groups, theorists have identified a number of coping strategies for individuals to maintain their self-esteem. One strategy is labeled “disidentification” by Lewin (1948). In this instance, LGBT people, for example, sometimes attempt to “pass” as heterosexual and gender-role conforming in a predominantly heterosexist society. Tajfel and Turner (1979) suggested other possible approaches. One is to restrict comparisons to either similar or subordinate groups so the results of these comparisons are more favorable to the ingroup than they would be if comparisons had been made to higher-status outgroups.

So then, what constitutes group membership in terms of issues related to identity? Tajfel (1982) defined “social identity” as the “individual’s knowledge that he/she belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him/her of the group membership” (p. 2).

For Sumner (1906), the categorization of individuals into distinct ethnic groupings originated in the first human’s struggles (and competition) to meet their basic needs. Social identity theories insist, however, that the simple fact of belonging to one group over another, and the mere subdivision or categorization of persons into ingroups and outgroups is enough to trigger discriminatory attitudes favoring the ingroup (Allen & Wilder, 1975; Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). This is even the case when issues of competition for scarce resources and incompatible group goals are absent. A major premise in Social Identity Theory, as proposed by Tajfel, is that social identities themselves create and maintain attitudinal and behavioral discriminations favoring the ingroup (Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). The stronger are the individuals’ identification with their ingroup, the greater is the tendency to perceive outgroup members as undifferentiated members of another social category, and to perceive oneself and other ingroup members as different or dissimilar from the outgroup.

Several researchers argued that the mere recognition of two groups into dichotomous social categories is sufficient for hostility. That is, group membership itself has profound effects on psychological functioning, irrespective of personality types and other individual differences. It is thought that the individual is transformed in group situations. People will show favoritism toward the ingroup and hostility and discrimination toward the outgroup even:

when group membership is random and anonymous, in the absence of intergroup interaction, where there is no history of explicit intergroup competition, enmity, conflict, or status concerns, where no self-interest is involved (Tajfel and Turner, 1986).

Tajfel (1978) differentiated between the “objective” and “subjective” factors that give rise to intergroup conflict. His definition of “objective” factors is closely related to realistic-group-conflict theory in terms of competition for scarce resources, and also to issues of exploitation and marginalization by dominant groups. He added, however, that “subjective” conditions—including life experiences related to an individual’s social group membership—can, in some circumstances, impact the conflict and, therefore, must be factored into the equation.

Social Identity Theory also maintains that different facets of identity hold varying degrees of salience depending on situational factors, especially since most people in most societies hold multiple social identities and are members of a number of groups. Bochner (1982), in surveying the intergroup literature, concluded that social group identity becomes particularly salient in the context of intergroup conflict; an individual becomes increasingly aware of social group membership in conflictual intergroup situations, especially when group differences are the basis for such conflict. Bruner (1956) suggested that group categories most often considered salient in a given situation are those that are most “accessible” to the person at the time, those that are the closest “fit” to the stimuli the individual encounters.


For conflict resolution strategies to be successful, Azar and Burton (1986) emphasized that psychological needs served by social identities must be considered because these “basic psychological needs cannot be negotiated, exchanged, or bargained away” (quoted in Stephan and Stephan, 1996, p. 150).

Liberation

Bobbie Harro’s “Cycle of Liberation”

On her “Cycle of Socialization,” Bobbie Harro (2013a) charts the process by which we internalize our socialization. She envisions liberation, though, as “critical transformation” with her “Cycle of Liberation” (2013b)

Cycle of Liberation



Source: Developed by Bobbie Harro

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The cycle, or model, comprises several points, any of which individuals can enter depending on their degree of awareness. Harro emphasizes that travelers as they process along the pathways “will repeat or recycle many times,” since “[t]here is no specific beginning or end point, just as one is never ‘done’ working to end oppression” (p. 619). She emphasizes that the Cycle is held together by a “core” set of factors: “qualities or states of being,” some which are exhibited on the individual and collective levels all along the path toward liberation.

The points along the Cycle comprise the following:

1. Waking Up
2. Getting Ready
3. Reaching Out
4. Building Community
5. Coalescing
6. Creating Change
7. Maintaining

1. Waking Up

Often this entry point onto the Cycle begins when we feel somehow differently than we had previously, evidenced by an *intrapersonal* shift at the center of how we felt or believed about ourselves. This might have been sparked by a critical incident of incidents or may have come about through a slow evolutionary process whereby we experience a sense “of cognitive dissonance,

where something that used to make sense to us (or that we never questioned), ceases to make sense” any longer (p. 619).

2. Getting Ready

Though we may progress from a general sense of un-ease onto the Cycle at differing rates depending on who we may be, this point “involves consciously dismantling and building aspects of ourselves and our worldviews based on our new perspectives” (p. 620). Crucial factors involved in our initial part of our liberation includes “introspection, education, and consciousness raising.” We reflect on our thoughts and behaviors, the language we use that may indicate possible inconsistencies with our newly developing perceptions. We read, talk with people, and in other ways educate ourselves as we begin to make connections between our changing worldview and how we live our lives.

3. Reaching Out

Eventually, as we do our work toward liberation, we begin “to seek experiences outside ourselves to check our reality and to expose ourselves to a wider range of difference than we had before” (p. 621). We engage in dialogue and sometimes in debate with others, and we may disagree with others where we previously remained silent. As we begin to challenge the status quo, we may find resistance from some who would rather us stay quiet. On the other hand, we also may experience from others encouragement to continue speaking out.

4. Building Community

This *interpersonal* phase of the Cycle involves two steps: “dialoguing with *people who are like us* for support (people who have the same social identities as we do, with regard to this issue of oppression), and dialoguing with *people who are different from us* for gaining understanding and building coalitions” (italics in original, p. 622). We engage in ongoing dialogues, learn from others’ experiences, and come to a better and more integral understanding of ourselves.

5. Coalescing

Now that we have reduced some of our defenses to change, have joined with others, and strengthen our commitment, we are now at a point to challenge systems of oppression. In coalition, we may organize, shape actions, lobby key stakeholders, engage in fund raising activities, and educate others. We may express our views more overtly, take public stands, and rally others to join the coalitions. We now understand ourselves differently and refuse to collude any longer in systems of oppression. “We are refusing to accept privileges, and we are acting as role models and allies for others” (p. 623).

6. Creating Change

According to Harro (2013b), “The parameters of this phase of the cycle of liberation include using our critical analysis of the assumptions, structures, rules, and roles of the existing system of oppression, and our coalition power, to begin transforming the system” (p. 623). This involves

imagining new ways of living and being, a new culture reflecting changing assumptions and social structures concerning the rules we enact and roles we perform that align closely with our philosophy of a socially just, diverse, and equitable society and world.

7. Maintaining

We must remain ever vigilant each day to maintain, enhance, strengthen, and modify when needed our changed self-awareness and social consciousness. Along with this daily maintenance, we need also to celebrate our successful efforts at changing the system, no matter how small, no matter how large. “This process says to the larger world, ‘Look, this can work. You can change things by dialoguing and working together’” (p. 624).

Barbara Love’s “Liberatory Consciousness”



As highlighted in Bobbie Harro’s (2013a) “Cycle of Socialization,” people are born into their societies, which teach them the established rules the values, beliefs, behaviors, and roles the individual must play in the maintenance of hierarchal systems of power and privilege. And due to this socialization, according to Barbara Love (2013):

All humans now living have internalized the attitudes, understandings, and patterns of thoughts that allow them to function in and collaborate with these systems of oppression, whether they benefit from them or are placed at a disadvantage by them (p. 601).

While we had no input in constructing the systems of oppression, by coming to a deeper understanding of ourselves and of these systems, we can function integrally as “liberation workers” by developing with mindful intentionality, in Love’s terms, a “liberatory consciousness” (p. 601) free from the self-guilt one may experience and the blaming of others for its continuance. Barbara Love discusses her four elements of liberatory consciousness.

1. Awareness

As the term denotes, “awareness” involves developing the critical facility to perceive fully the depth and substance of our cultural and political environments, to attend to the details, the overt and covert meanings in language, in our and other people’s behaviors and thoughts. As Love states, “It means making the decision to live our lives from a waking position” (p. 602).

2. Analysis

With the awareness, the information we gather from our “waking position,” we have the means to reflect, examine, and posit what is happening as we make meaning from our perceptions. This analysis will provide us with practical options for actions we may need to take whenever what we perceive stands counter to our values of social justice.

3. Action

Following our awareness and analysis of our perceptions, we can now determine if any action is required, either by us as an individual, collectively by coalescing in unity with others, or by supporting and encouraging others to engage in action.

The action component of a liberatory consciousness includes deciding what needs to be done, and then seeing to it that action is taken (Love, 2013, p. 603).

4. Accountable / Ally-Ship

While acknowledging and accepting the axiom that it is not the responsibility of minoritized peoples to teach people of dominant groups about systems of oppression and to dismantle social oppression all on their own, Love believes that when members of subordinated and dominant groups join as allies “across and between ‘role’ groups,” a synergism derived from these unions can result in the furtherance of a **liberatory consciousness** for all involved.

People raised on one end of patterns of gender, race, and class subordination or domination can provide a different perspective for people raised on the other (Love, 2013, p. 604).

Serving as liberation workers can certainly be uplifting and empowering, whether acting individually and within coalition. It also can be challenging and often frustrating. Along with us giving credit for our successes, we need also to take responsibility, to be accountable, for the times we make mistakes. And yes, we *will* make mistakes. This work is certainly not easy, for if it were, we would have cured long ago the plagues of oppression that have infected our planet. Love provides some helpful advice.

Rather than self-condemnation or blame from others, it will be important to have the opportunity and the openness to hear an analysis from others that allows us to reevaluate problematic behaviors or positions (p. 604).

Each time we accept accountability, when we understand that sometimes our best intentions impact others in harmful ways, our liberatory consciousness expands.

Suzanne Pharr's "Liberation Politics"



Suzanne Pharr (1996) understands liberation as an ongoing political project with continually renewed dialogue and a struggle against all the types of oppression, all the barriers preventing large sectors of the population from attaining access to economic resources and social justice. Pharr includes several factors as essential in liberation politics:

- Helping individuals to fulfill their greatest potential by providing truthful information along with the tools and skills for using it, supporting their autonomy and self-government, and connecting them to life in community with others;
- Fostering both individual freedom and mutual responsibility for others;
- Recognizing that freedom demands people always be able to make their own choices about their lives;
- Creating a politic of shared power [**power with**] rather than **power-over**;
- Learning the non-violent skills of compromise and mediation in the sometimes-difficult collective lives of family and community – in organizations, the workplace, and governing bodies;
- Developing integrity in relationships through understanding that the same communal values – generosity and fairness, responsibility and freedom, forgiveness and atonement – must be maintained not just in personal relationships but in the workplace, social groups, and governing bodies;
- Treating everyone as a valued whole person, not as someone to be used or controlled;
- Maintaining civility in our relationships and being accountable for our behavior;
- Seeing cultural differences as life-enhancing, as expanding possibilities;
- Placing a broad definition of human rights at the center of our values: ensuring that every person has food, shelter, clothing, safety, education, health care, and a livable income.

Pharr believes that this liberatory politics will come about as a society, “When we grasp the value and interconnectedness of our liberation issues, then we will at last be able to make true coalition and begin building a common agenda that eliminates oppression and brings forth a vision of diversity that shares both power and resources” (pp. 600-601).

Educating Others: Moving beyond only educating self to questions and dialogue with others too. Rather than only stopping oppressive comments or behaviors, also engaging people in discussion to share why you object to a comment or action.

Supporting, Encouraging:

Supporting others who speak out against oppression or who are working to be more inclusive of target group members by backing up others who speak out, forming an allies group, joining a coalition group.

Initiating, Preventing:

Working to change individual and institutional actions and policies that discriminate against target group members, planning educational programs or other events, working for passage of legislation that protects target group members from discrimination, being explicit about making sure target group members are full participants in organizations or groups.

Some Additional Social Justice Action Strategies

I am often asked to suggest social justice action strategies. While I always open with the caveat that it is impossible and certainly not my intention to give a comprehensive narrative how to bring about social justice in any given situation because what might work effectively in one school or workplace or region of a country may not function in another, I do, nonetheless, offer some foundational guidelines for consideration.

Even in effective coalitions, it may be rough in the work people perform because this work often goes against a tide of obstruction. For this and many other reasons, we must understand that our work needs to be long-term by taking on a small amount at any given time. We cannot reverse the pendulum of oppression and privilege overnight. I have learned from experience that “**burnout**” can often be caused by having unrealistic expectations. Thousands of years of bias and discrimination will not end in one day, one week, one year, one decade, or one lifetime.

It is better not to work alone for social change. Work first with others who may be potential allies. Talk with them about their beliefs, stereotypes, impressions. Talk with them without blame, shame, or guilt. Allow people to speak about their concerns, issues, and impressions. It is not about trying to avoid making mistakes. It is about learning from mistakes and about being honest, truthful, and able to build a movement for progressive social change.

If you are working to promote social justice within a community, in your workplace, a school, or in another organization or institution, you might want to begin by assessing the “institutional climate” (the “inner workings,” social relations, belief systems, norms, values) of that institution or community. You can manage this informally, or hold public hearings, conduct interviews, or distribute research surveys. Also, investigate the official and unofficial policies that either inhibit or promote social understanding and dominant group privilege: that restrict and advance social inclusion and equity. Find out what if any workplace and community training sessions are conducted in your location focusing on social inclusion and dominant group privilege? Bring in professional trainers and investigate resources that you can use to initiate these training sessions.

Institutions and communities are encouraged to develop support groups for social justice advocates to form networks and learning experiences, and to learn successful strategies from one another.

School and community libraries are encouraged to develop and maintain up-to-date and age-appropriate collections of books, videos, CDs, DVDs, journals, magazines, posters, internet websites, and other information on the experiences and histories of diverse people and communities.

Organizations within your community are encouraged to establish and sponsor community-wide forums to discuss issues related to social justice and inclusion.

Schools are encouraged to include accurate, honest, up-to-date, and age-appropriate information on topics of diversity and social justice at *every* grade level, across the curriculum, and in other school programs and assemblies. Also, announce issues and events related social justice in your school, workplace, and in local community newspapers and other forms of media.

Schools and other community institutions are encouraged to select and hire people who advocate for issues of social justice, inclusion, and diversity to serve as supportive role models for all people. For minoritized people to join existing groups and institution, be certain that policies and major decision-making procedures are inclusive and democratic. Do not expect minoritized peoples to automatically join existing groups and organizations.

On the personal level, continue to educate yourself about the histories, needs, and experiences of diverse peoples and systems of oppression. When in the company of someone different from yourself, stop talking for a few minutes and listen, truly listen to them. Without having the expectation that it is their responsibility to teach you, listen to, and truly hear their voices when they do relate their experiences to you.

Attempt not to become defensive, argumentative, and do not downplay or minimize their stories. These are their experiences, their perceptions, and the meanings they make, and, therefore, it is not open for debate. Do not argue or attempt to change their positions about their experiences. Also, do not minimize their experience, their feelings, their beliefs, and their stories of bias and oppression. And do not talk for other people: “But my Latina friend said....” Rather, speak only for yourself and your experiences. Never ask people about their hair, their skin color, their noses, their style of clothing unless and until they open the discussion in these areas of discussion.

Attend cultural and community events focusing on diverse experiences. Interrupt and stop oppressive “jokes” and bigoted speech when you hear them. To sensitize yourself to the concept of dominant group privileges in all forms, attempt to place yourself in the shoes of a member of a subordinated group as you travel through your day. What do you notice and often take for granted that might be interpreted differently by someone in that subordinated group?

Monitor politicians, the media, and organizations to ensure accurate coverage of issues of social power and privilege. Call or write the media complimenting them when they have presented accurate and informative coverage and notify them of your concerns when you perceive inaccuracies or biased coverage. Also, write articles and letters to your local and national

newspapers and websites for publication on issues and events related to social justice and inclusion. Work and vote for candidates (including school board members) taking social justice positions. Talk with young people age-appropriately about social justice topics.

Working for social justice offers innumerable rewards for all who engage in the process for the right reasons. It increases our pride of self and an increased sense of personal integrity that comes when we know we are making the world a better place.

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
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Stigma: Advances in Theory and Research

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Stigma: Advances in Theory and Research

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It has been 50 years since the publication of Goffman's influential work *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. This special issue celebrates Goffman's contribution with 14 articles reflecting the current state of the art in stigma research. In this article, we provide a theoretical overview of the stigma concept and offer a useful taxonomy of four types of stigma (public stigma, self-stigma, stigma by association, and structural stigma). We utilize this taxonomy to organize an overview of the articles included in this special issue. Finally, we outline new developments and challenges in stigma research for the coming decades.

The year 2013 marks the 50th anniversary of Erving Goffman's landmark publication entitled *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. Goffman's pioneering treatise on stigma is influential in sociology—where it originated—but also in other fields, including medicine, the health sciences, criminology, and psychology. In fact, a PsycINFO search of all articles published from 1963 through 2012 using the keyword “stigma” produced 9,939 hits. Of interest, the number of stigma publications has grown exponentially over the last decade. Almost three in every four stigma publications found in our PsycINFO search had been published in the past 10 years. Attention to stigma has clearly grown. In this article, we provide a theoretical overview of the concept of stigma as well as an organizational framework within which research on stigma may be better understood. We then introduce the articles included in this special issue and outline new developments and challenges in stigma research for the coming decades.

The term *stigma* dates back to the Greeks, who cut or burned marks into the skin of criminals, slaves, and traitors in order to identify them as tainted or immoral people who should be avoided (Goffman, 1963). As we know it today, stigma is not merely a physical mark but rather an attribute that results in widespread social disapproval—a discrediting social difference that yields a “spoiled social identity,” to use Goffman's terms. Most definitions of stigma comprise two fundamental components, namely, the recognition of difference and devaluation (Dovidio, Major, & Crocker, 2000). They also emphasize that stigma occurs in social interactions. As such, stigma is not considered to reside in the person but rather in the social context (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Hebl & Dovidio, 2005). What is stigmatizing in one social context may not be stigmatizing in another situation (Crocker et al., 1998). Stigmatization can be overt. It can manifest as aversion to interaction, avoidance, social rejection, discounting, discrediting, dehumanization, and depersonalization of others into stereotypic caricatures (Dovidio et al., 2000; Herek, 1999). Stigma can also be subtle. For example, stigma can arise as nonverbal expressions of discomfort (e.g., a lack of eye contact) that result in tense social interactions between stigmatized and nonstigmatized individuals (Hebl, Tickle, & Heatheron, 2000).

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From a social psychological perspective, stigmatization may have a number of functions (Phelan, Link, & Dovidio, 2008). One is the function of exploitation and domination (keeping people down). People with more power may stigmatize people with less power in order to maintain inequalities between groups. Another function is social norm enforcement (keeping people in). The threat of stigmatization is thought to encourage deviants to conform to ingroup norms. A final function is disease avoidance (keeping people away). From an evolutionary perspective, social exclusion of deviants protected against infectious diseases and thus contributed to survival (Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Phelan et al., 2008).

Although Goffman discussed examples of stigma due to race and ethnicity (tribal stigma) alongside examples of stigma due to disabilities and moral infractions (abominations of the body and character blemishes), since that time, within psychology and particularly within social psychology, two overlapping research literatures have emerged, namely, the study of prejudice and the study of stigma. According to Phelan et al. (2008), research on prejudice characteristically has focused on different topics than research on stigma. Prejudice research is more often concerned with processes driven by intergroup domination and exploitation (e.g., ethnicity), whereas stigma research has focused more on processes driven by norm enforcement (e.g., deviant identity or behavior) and disease avoidance (illness or disabilities; Phelan et al., 2008). Despite differences in focus, it is important to ask whether there is a fundamental difference between the concept of stigma and the construct of prejudice. Some theorists (e.g., Corrigan, 2004) have suggested that negative reactions to stigmatized persons such as people with mental illnesses essentially represent a form of prejudice. An examination of the research literature suggests that although there is considerable overlap, stigma can be differentiated from prejudice because stigma necessarily involves reactions to perceived *negative deviance*. Prejudice does not necessarily connote a reaction to deviance. For example, prejudice can occur between two social groups that are similarly common in society where neither “sticks out” or appears deviant.

Stigmatization occurs on societal, interpersonal, and individual levels. Recently, Pryor and Reeder (2011) articulated a conceptual model that seeks to bring greater clarity to the current but diverse literature on stigma. Building on previous theories (Corrigan, 2004; Herek, 2007), this model depicts four dynamically interrelated manifestations of stigma (see Figure 1). *Public stigma* is at the core of Pryor and Reeder’s model and represents people’s social and psychological reactions to someone they perceive to have a stigmatized condition. Public

stigma comprises the cognitive, affective, and behavioral reactions of those who stigmatize (perceivers). The second type of stigma in Pryor and Reeder’s model is self-stigma. *Self-stigma* reflects the social and psychological impact of possessing a stigma. It includes both the apprehension of being exposed to stigmatization and the potential internalization of the negative beliefs and feelings associated with the stigmatized condition. The third type of stigma is stigma by association. *Stigma by association* is analogous to Goffman’s (1963) courtesy stigma and entails social and psychological reactions to people associated with a stigmatized person (e.g., family and friends) as well as people’s reactions to being associated with a stigmatized person. Finally, *structural stigma* is defined as the “legitimation and perpetuation of a stigmatized status by society’s institutions and ideological systems” (Pryor & Reeder, 2011). The four manifestations of stigma are interrelated. However, public stigma—the consensual understanding that a social attribute is devalued—is considered to be at the core of the other three manifestations.

PUBLIC STIGMA

The origin of stigmatization lies in the cognitive representations that people (perceivers) hold regarding those who possess the stigmatized condition (targets). These cognitive representations or features of a stigmatized condition can trigger negative emotional and behavioral reactions (Dijker & Koomen, 2003; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). One such representation is the *onset controllability* for the stigmatized condition. High levels of attributed personal responsibility for the onset of the deviant condition evoke anger and stigmatizing behavior, as would be the case with a smoker who gets lung cancer, whereas low levels of personal responsibility yield feelings of sympathy and greater tendencies to




FIGURE 1 Four types of stigma (based on Pryor & Reeder, 2011).

provide help, which would be more likely with a woman who receives a diagnosis of breast cancer (Weiner et al., 1988). Another representation is the *perceived severity* of the condition. High levels of perceived severity evoke both anxiety and sympathy on the part of perceivers (Crandall & Moriarty, 1995; Feldman & Crandall, 2007; Van Alphen, Dijker, Bos, Van den Borne & Curfs, 2012), and the occurrence of both emotions simultaneously can yield emotional ambivalence and awkward interactions (Dijker & Koomen, 2003; Hebl et al., 2000; Katz, 1981). This is often seen with conditions perceived to be fatal or severely disabling (e.g., being in a wheelchair). Another similar feature is the *perceived dangerousness* of the condition. Perceived dangerousness elicits fear and avoidance in perceivers (Bos, Kok, & Dijker, 2001; Feldman & Crandall, 2007). For example, people with mental illness have often been perceived to be unpredictable and dangerous and subsequently stigmatized. Last, *perceptions of norm violation* are positively related to anger and social exclusion and negatively related to sympathy (Dijker & Koomen, 2003). Perceptions of norm violation have played a fundamental role in the stigmatization of people with HIV as traditionally HIV has been associated with promiscuity, prostitution, homosexuality, and intravenous drug use, all of which have, at some time, been or are still considered deviant.

The dual-process model of reactions to perceived stigma (Pryor, Reeder, & Landau, 1999; Pryor, Reeder, Yeadon, & Hesson-McInnis, 2004) posits that people commonly have both implicit and explicit negative reactions to stigmatized conditions. Implicit reactions entail a reflexive system yielding automatic and immediate responses. Explicit reactions are derived from a rule-based system involving controlled and thoughtful responses. Research has shown that perceivers often manifest an immediate and automatic aversion to stigmatized individuals followed by controlled and thoughtful reactions which can either temper immediate negative reactions or further polarize them (Pryor et al., 2004).

SELF-STIGMA

Numerous studies have shown that stigma has detrimental consequences for the psychological well-being of stigmatized individuals (Meyer, 2003; Stutterheim et al., 2009). Self-stigma can result from an awareness of public stigma, as people with stigmatized conditions are keenly aware of the social devaluation connected with their condition. Like public stigma, self-stigma has cognitive, affective, and behavioral components (Mak & Cheung, 2008) and operates at both the explicit

and at the implicit level (Rusch, Corrigan, Todd, & Bodenhausen, 2011).

Public stigma impacts the self in three ways: (a) through *enacted stigma*, which is the negative treatment of a person possessing a stigmatized condition; (b) through *felt stigma*, which is the experience or anticipation of stigmatization on the part of the person with a stigmatized condition; and (c) through *internalized stigma*, which is the reduction of self-worth and accompanying psychological distress experienced by people with a stigmatized condition (Herek, 2007, 2009).

A fundamental dimension of stigmas concerns the degree to which they can be concealed. People who choose to “pass” as “normal” by hiding their stigma nevertheless remain “discreditable” as long as the potential that the stigma can be revealed remains (Goffman, 1963). Concerns regarding who to tell and the fear of being discovered are significant sources of psychological distress among those who conceal their stigmatized condition (Pachankis, 2007). Examples include people who could potentially be stigmatized as a result of their concealed sexual orientation or socioeconomic status. Although people who voluntarily disclose their stigmatized status (i.e., are open or out of the closet) or those who have a visible stigma (e.g., a deviant ethnicity, an obvious physical disability, etc.) do not experience the anxiety of “disclosure concerns,” they still must endure the potential of continually being ‘discredited’ in the eyes of others (Stutterheim et al., 2011).

Stigmatized individuals can attempt to mitigate the negative psychological and social impact of stigmatization (e.g. depression, anxiety, isolation, reduced social network, limited social support) by employing a variety of coping strategies. Some coping strategies are geared to altering the relationship between the stigmatized individuals and their environment (problem-focused coping), whereas other strategies seek to regulate negative emotions (emotion-focused coping). Problem-focused coping strategies can target the self, the situation, or others, and include strategies such as selective disclosure, compensating for the stigma during social interactions by, for example, being particularly outgoing, avoiding situations where stigmatization is likely (i.e., disengagement), affiliating oneself with others who share one’s stigmatized condition, seeking social support, and activism. Emotion-focused strategies include downward social comparison, external attributions for the stigmatizing behavior of others to, for example, ignorance, denial or prejudice minimization, distraction, positive reappraisal of experiences of stigmatization, and detaching oneself from one’s stigmatized identity (i.e., disidentification; Crocker et al., 1998; Major & O’Brien, 2005; Miller & Kaiser, 2001).

STIGMA BY ASSOCIATION

Stigmatization not only affects those who possess a stigmatized condition, it also impacts others. Research has shown people associated with stigmatized individuals (e.g., family, friends, caregivers) are routinely devalued purely as a result of their connection with someone with a stigmatized condition (Hebl & Mannix, 2003; Neuberg, Smith, Hoffman, & Russell, 1994). This kind of devaluation seems to take place not only when there is a meaningful connection between a nonstigmatized and a stigmatized person (e.g., family relationships) but also when the connection is purely arbitrary (e.g., as a result of pure proximity; Pryor, Reeder, & Monroe, 2012). Like public stigma and self-stigma, stigma by association comprises cognitive, affective, and behavioral aspects (Mak & Cheung, 2008). Also like public stigma and self-stigma, stigma by association entails dual processes. Explicit attitudes moderate the spread of stigma across companions with a meaningful relationship (e.g. a family member), whereas implicit attitudes moderate the spread of stigma when the connection is purely arbitrary as well as when the connection is more meaningful (Pryor et al., 2012).

Perceptions of stigma by association have been found to be related to lower self-esteem and psychological distress in those connected with stigmatized individuals (Struening et al., 2001; Mak & Kwok, 2010), which, in most empirical research, is family. People often try to hide their relationship to a stigmatized family member (Phelan, Bromet, & Link, 1998) or encourage that member to hide his or her condition. Such concealment “advice” is detrimental to the psychological well-being of the stigmatized family member (Stutterheim et al., 2009). Stigma by association also can have an impact on people other than family who have developed social connections to stigmatized persons such as AIDS volunteers (Snyder, Omoto, & Crain, 1999).

STRUCTURAL STIGMA

Structural stigma refers to the ways in which societal ideologies and institutions perpetuate or exacerbate a stigmatized status (Corrigan & Lam, 2007). Recent literature on stigma acknowledges that stigma reproduces existing social inequalities and is perpetuated by hegemony and the exercise of social, economic, and political power (Campbell & Deacon, 2006; Link & Phelan, 2001; Parker & Aggleton, 2003; Scambler & Paoli, 2008). Societal structures promoting stigmatization vary cross-culturally and historically. As a result, the examination of structural stigma requires the examination of the social context in which that stigma occurs and the local knowledge systems that contribute to structural stigma (Foucault, 1977).

FIFTY YEARS AFTER GOFFMAN: CURRENT STATE OF THE ART IN STIGMA RESEARCH

To commemorate the 50th anniversary of Goffman’s stigma publication, we invited some of the leading researchers in the field of stigma research to critically examine the concept of stigma and to present their most cutting-edge research and theoretical ideas on public stigma, self-stigma, stigma by association, and/or structural stigma.

Public stigma is often triggered by a label, and stigmatizing labels emerge in an historic and cultural context. The power of a label is related to the consensus with which it is understood. In this special issue, DePierre, Puhl, and Luedicke (2013/this issue) explore the impact of a relatively new label that has emerged in describing people with weight-related problems, namely, “food addict.” In their article, they show how this new label may be less vulnerable to public stigma than other addictions but may, at the same time, increase the stigma associated with obesity. Dijker (2013/this issue) also discusses public stigma in his article on stigmatization, repair, and tolerance. He argues that in addition to the negative reactions characteristically triggered by perceived deviance, people sometimes seek to “repair” or “fix” stigmatized people so that they can return to the ingroup. Such ameliorative responses to stigma appear to be most likely when the stigmatized person already holds some status as a recognized member of the ingroup (e.g., kin). Kin are also likely to experience tolerance in response to their deviance.

In addition to public stigma, a number of articles focus on *self-stigma* as the experience or anticipation of stigma, the impact of enacted stigma, or the internalization of stigmatizing responses. Ilic and colleagues (2013/this issue) focus on the experience of stigma and describe the development of the Multifaceted Stigma Experiences Scale. They show that the experience of both subtle and blatant forms of stigma impedes recovery in people with a mental illness stigma. Herek, Saha, and Burack (2013/this issue) examine the impact of felt stigma and self-stigma on psychological well-being in people with HIV and, in doing so, highlight the importance of recognizing the potentially negative consequences of self-stigma and felt stigma when providing mental health care to people with HIV. In their article, Pinel and Bosson (2013/this issue) posit that felt stigma presupposes a sense of stigma consciousness, which is a state of self-consciousness in which people with a stigmatized condition sense subtle or overt negative treatment by others. They argue that people high in stigma consciousness perceive more discrimination than those low in stigma consciousness. Van Laar, Derks, and Ellemers (2013/this issue) look at the flipside of self-stigma and explore identity affirmation as a positive force. They show how motivation for work and

education in young Muslim women in the Netherlands is affected when domains important to their identity, such as their religion and culture, are acknowledged and valued by the majority group, thus suggesting that distinctive identities can be harnessed as positive sources for integration. Chaudoir, Earnshaw, and Andel (2013/this issue) look at the personal impact of concealable versus visible stigmas in their article. They outline a framework showing how stigma can “get under the skin” and generate psychological and physical health disparities, and explore when and to what degree concealability moderates these effects. They conclude that knowledge of both shared and unique stigma mechanisms can inform the development of strategies designed to reduce psychological and physical health disparities among stigmatized individuals.

In addition to investigations of self-stigma, contemporary research also explores stigma by association and structural stigma. In this special issue, Dwyer, Snyder, and Omoto (2013/this issue) explore how people associated with stigmatized individuals can be buffered against the effects of *stigma by association*. In their article, they show that people with high self-esteem are less vulnerable to the psychological impact of stigma by association. Also, three articles in this issue focus on *structural stigma*. One article by Shin, Dovidio, and Napier (2013/this issue) shows how aspects of cultures can exacerbate (or ameliorate) the tendency for individuals to stigmatize others. Shin et al. investigated the role of culture in stigmatizing reactions and found that group-oriented cultures are more likely than individual-oriented cultures to stigmatize nonnormative groups. They also showed that the cultural value of uniqueness predicts differences in stigmatization better than behavioral conformity. In another article by Overstreet and Quinn (2013/this issue), cultural beliefs legitimizing intimate partner violence and promoting the stigmatization of victims of abuse are discussed in the context of a proposed intimate partner violence stigmatization model. Last, Madera and Hebl (2013/this issue) discuss structural stigma at an organizational level. In their article, they investigate how staffing policies and interview structure can exacerbate the stigmatization of Black interviewees and conclude that identity-blind policies and unstructured interviews allow for greater stigmatization.

A special issue on the current state of the art in stigma research would seem incomplete without some discussion of work on stigma reduction. In this special issue, two articles focus explicitly on stigma reduction. The first is by Corrigan and Kosyluk (2013/this issue). They review the stigma reduction literature and argue for approaches involving targeted, local, credible, and continuous contact with stigmatized persons as a means of reducing public stigma. The second by Schmader, Croft, Whitehead, and Stone (2013/this issue) focuses on specific interaction

strategies that can be used by stigmatized persons to deflect biases. They examine how gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people can avoid stigmatizing treatment in a professional setting by evoking common identities with their coworkers.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN STIGMA RESEARCH

In the 50 years since Goffman’s treatise, research has greatly expanded our understanding of stigma, yet much remains to be learned, and there will be new developments and challenges in the coming decades. We believe that the field would benefit greatly from additional research on the following issues: structural factors that promote and maintain stigma, the social neuroscience of stigma, how social interactions between perceivers and stigmatized individuals impact stigma, the interrelatedness of different forms of stigma, the measurement of stigma, and stigma reduction interventions.

Structural Factors

There is a growing trend toward acknowledging structural factors in the development and persistence of stigmatization (Link & Phelan, 2001). Social structures empower and privilege some people, often at the expense of others. Power differences are essential for the production of stigma (Parker & Aggleton, 2003). For example, experiences of stigmatization are more likely among people who live in poverty (Jones, Weil, Coreil, & Shoush, 2004) or who lack social capital (Sivaram et al., 2009). Other cultural-determined factors such as the degree to which people are held responsible for life outcomes are also important (Crandall & Martinez, 1996). Future research should therefore strive to develop better measures of important variations in social structures and investigate how structural stigma can best be changed. We recommend a multidisciplinary approach that incorporates insights from a variety of disciplines, including law, economics, and policy research.

The Social Neuroscience of Stigma

In the past few decades, our understanding of the relationship between the brain and (social) behavior has increased phenomenally. The field of neuroscience has much to offer stigma researchers (Amodio, 2010; Dovidio, Pearson, & Orr, 2008). It not only offers another dimension of analysis (Derks, Inzlicht, & Kang, 2008) but also allows us to examine the processes underlying stigmatization in the brain. It further enables the measurement of

various forms of stigma at the more implicit level. Although the social neuroscience of stigma is still in its infancy, it has already demonstrated its usefulness by showing how certain areas in the brain are involved in the process of stigmatization in those who stigmatize (Amodio, 2008; Harris & Fiske, 2006; Quadflieg et al., 2009) and in those who are stigmatized (Derks et al., 2008; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003). We feel that additional theory-driven research on the social neuroscience of stigma will serve to further advance our psychological understanding of stigmatization (Amodio, 2010).

Social Interactions

According to Goffman (1963), stigma is inherently rooted in social interactions. Through the language of relationships, what is “abnormal” or deviant is determined in the context of what is “normal” or expected, and vice versa. However, research on interactions between perceivers and stigmatized individuals in real-life rather than laboratory settings is uncommon (Hebl & Dovidio, 2005). In the past, this type of research was incredibly complex and controlling all variables was practically impossible. However, today, with the technology offered by virtual reality, we can observe, test, and compare social interactions in an innovative and controlled environment (Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008; McCall & Blascovich, 2009). Virtual reality research also offers the opportunity to examine how explicit attitudes, implicit attitudes, and physiological measures are related to stigmatizing behavior in social interactions.

The Interrelatedness of Different Forms of Stigma

We have theorized that public stigma is at the root of self-stigma (Corrigan, Watson, & Barr, 2006), stigma by association (Corrigan et al., 2006), and structural stigma (Corrigan & Lam, 2007). More empirical research on the interrelatedness of the different stigma manifestations is necessary. For example, we need to know if efforts to decrease structural stigma (e.g., changing discriminatory laws) can yield lower public stigma. In addition, it would be beneficial to further examine the relationship between self-stigma and public stigma. We know that public stigma causes self-stigma, but can self-stigma cause public stigma? And could reductions in self-stigma from, for example, the acquisition of effective coping mechanisms impact public stigma? Clearly, there is a need for research that examines the potential reciprocal relationships between the different manifestations of stigma.

Measurement of Stigma

Over the past five decades, stigma researchers’ methodological toolbox has evolved from qualitative research

to self-reported and behavioral measures of explicit stigmatization to, more recently, measures of implicit associations (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), psychophysiological measures (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001), social distance measures in virtual reality (Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008), and measures aligned with social neuroscience, such as EEG and fMRI (Amodio, 2010; Derks et al., 2008). We now understand that stigmatization involves both automatic, implicit responses as well as controlled, deliberate responses (Pryor et al., 2004). Future research should incorporate multiple measures of this sort, allowing for comparison of their validity and reliability.

Goffman was a sociologist and sociology has always been comfortable with the use of qualitative research methods. In psychology, however, qualitative research has historically been undervalued. Fifty years after Goffman, we hope to see a renewed interest in qualitative research methods. Qualitative studies can help us to better understand the cultural nuances and subjective impact of stigmatization. This has been particularly the case in the study of stigma in cultures with strong oral traditions (see Stutterheim, Bos, Shiripinda, et al., 2012; Stutterheim, Bos, Van Kesteren, et al., 2012). Qualitative research methods have also demonstrated their utility in understanding structural stigma (Parker & Aggleton, 2003). We therefore encourage the use of qualitative methods in addition to and alongside quantitative methods.

Stigma Reduction

Although social psychological research on stigma reduction is growing (Bos, Schaalma, & Pryor, 2008; Paluck & Greene, 2009; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), many stigma interventions lack sound theory and methodology. Interventions that are carefully planned, specific, and based on current theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence are more likely to be effective (Bartholomew, Parcel, Kok, Gottlieb, & Fernandez, 2011; Bos et al., 2008). We recommend that interventions identify specific manifestations for potential change (public stigma, self-stigma, stigma by association, and/or structural stigma) and include appropriate measures to evaluate these components. We need to establish what works best at all levels of intervention (intrapersonal, interpersonal, community, and institutional levels). Comprehensive and detailed evaluations of stigma reduction interventions and, in particular, of their respective components are therefore warranted (Abraham & Michie, 2008; Bos et al., 2008; Schaalma & Kok, 2009). Such evaluation studies should be initiated from the very inception of an intervention and in collaboration with target populations and relevant stakeholders (Bartholomew et al., 2011; Bos et al., 2008).

CONCLUSION

Fifty years after Goffman's classical book *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, we conclude that stigma remains an important research priority. Perhaps Goffman's main contribution was that he recognized commonality across a wide variety of social stigmas and illustrated how each is dynamically interwoven into the fabric of social interaction. He also acknowledged that stigma represents a dilemma for the nonstigmatized who interact with and are sometimes related to people with a stigmatized condition. Although Goffman was essentially "an armchair theorist" who sought support for his theories in anecdotes, newspaper stories, and biographical accounts, his theoretical observations nonetheless remain contemporary and can now be examined with exciting new research methods (e.g., virtual reality research, social neuroscience).

In the coming decades, we believe that the scientific study of stigma will be characterized by interdisciplinary approaches. We foresee collaboration between social psychologists and researchers in the fields of sociology, law, and political science so as to gain a better understanding of structural stigma and develop societal level stigma reduction interventions. In addition, we feel that social psychologists should work together with experts in the field of neuroscience in order to examine research questions pertaining to the brain and stigmatizing responses (Amodio, 2010). Research on the interrelatedness of different manifestations of stigma would also likely benefit from collaboration between different disciplines within psychology. For example, in exploring the association between self-stigma and psychopathology, insights and measures from clinical psychology may have much to offer. Because of their dual focus upon basic and applied research, stigma researchers in the next 50 years are likely to make advances in the understanding of the processes underlying stigmatization that will hopefully result in theory- and evidence-based interventions that can successfully reduce stigma in all its manifestations—public stigma, self-stigma, stigma by association, and structural stigma.

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Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations

Nilanjana Dasgupta¹

Three broad themes that emerge from the social psychological research on unconscious or implicit prejudice and stereotypes are highlighted in this article. First, individuals who belong to socially advantaged groups typically exhibit more implicit preference for their ingroups and bias against outgroups than do members of socially disadvantaged groups. This research suggests that intergroup preferences and prejudices are influenced by two different psychological forces—people’s tendency to prefer groups associated with themselves as a confirmation of their high self-esteem versus their tendency to prefer groups valued by the mainstream culture as a confirmation of the sociopolitical order in society. Second, these implicit prejudices and stereotypes often influence people’s judgements, decisions, and behaviors in subtle but pernicious ways. However, the path from implicit bias to discriminatory action is not inevitable. People’s awareness of potential bias, their motivation and opportunity to control it, and sometimes their consciously held beliefs can determine whether biases in the mind will manifest in action. Finally, a new line of research suggests that implicit biases exhibited by individuals who belong to socially disadvantaged groups towards their own group may have unintended behavioral consequences that are harmful to their ingroup and themselves.

KEY WORDS: implicit; unconscious; prejudice; stereotypes; discrimination.

In the last 50 years grassroots social justice movements dedicated to the civil rights of historically disadvantaged groups have produced far-reaching changes in the laws and policies that govern civil society and have also elicited concurrent changes in social norms that guide individuals’ attitudes and beliefs (Albert and Albert, 1984; Chong, 1991; Cruikshank, 1992; D’Emilio, 1983; Gitlin, 1987; Levy, 1992; Vaid, 1990; Williams, 1987). The notion that prejudice and discrimination

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against disadvantaged groups, most notably African Americans, other racial/ethnic minorities, and women, is illegitimate and unethical has become an increasingly mainstream philosophy. These changes in American public opinion are clearly reflected in national surveys that reveal prejudice and stereotypes have declined steadily over the past few decades, especially toward African Americans (Brigham, 1972; Karlins *et al.*, 1969; Maykovich, 1971, 1972; Schuman *et al.*, 1997), women (Huddy *et al.*, 2000; Kluegel and Smith, 1986), and to a lesser extent, gays and lesbians (Herek, 1991, 2002; Yang, 1997).

Despite these optimistic findings, other evidence continues to show group-based inequality in several domains of everyday life—healthcare, housing, education, employment, and the justice system (Badgett, 1996; Daniels, 2001; Ellis and Riggle, 1996; Leonhardt, 2002; Portwood, 1995; Raudenbush and Kasim, 1998; Ridgeway, 1997; Rubenstein, 1996; Stohlberg, 2002). The discrepancy between increasingly tolerant self-reported attitudes in the face of enduring and glaring disparities in people's lived experience prompted some social psychologists to urge the development of alternative, less obtrusive, measures of attitudes and behavior that do not rely so heavily on people's willingness and ability to accurately self-report their thoughts and actions, especially with regard to socially sensitive issues like prejudice and stereotypes (Crosby *et al.*, 1980; Gaertner and Dovidio, 1977; Jones and Sigall, 1972; also see Nisbett and Wilson, 1977).

Serendipitously, at about the time that social psychology was searching for new ways to capture intergroup attitudes and behavior, cognitive psychology was witnessing the evolution of new theories of nonconscious or implicit memory and new tools with which to measure memory without relying on individuals' conscious recollections of past events (Jacoby, 1991; Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork, 1988; Roediger, 1990; Roediger and McDermott, 1993; Schacter, 1987). This body of research together with theories and measures of semantic memory (Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 1971, 1976; Neely, 1977; Posner and Snyder, 1975) gave rise to a new knowledge base and tools with which to study cognition that operates without conscious awareness and volitional control. These theories and tools were eagerly adapted by social psychologists for the study of nonconscious or implicit *social* cognition—that is, how people think and feel about social issues.² The focus on implicit social cognition is particularly important in the study of prejudice and stereotyping for two reasons. First, the controversial nature of these issues raise the possibility that people's voluntary reports of their attitudes and behavior may be overly determined by their desire to put their best foot forward (i.e., concerns about impression management and self-presentation bias). Second, while self-reporting

²Over the years, nonconscious or implicit social cognition has been defined as thoughts, feelings, and behavior toward social objects that are influenced by “traces of past experience” without people's awareness, intention, and/or control (see Bargh, 1989, 1994; Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Kihlstrom, 1990). However, it is rare for any psychological judgment or behavior to meet all of these criteria at the same time. Typically, psychological responses measured in research studies have been called “implicit,” “automatic,” or “nonconscious” to the extent that at least one of the primary criteria—lack of awareness, intention, or control—has been operational.

their attitudes and behavior people often make a strong distinction between their own personal attitudes and those circulating in the larger culture (“society at large may be prejudiced against Group X, but I am not”); yet there is often a great deal of overlap between individuals’ own mental representations of social groups and the mainstream culture’s construal of the same groups (Banaji and Greenwald, 1994; Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). Early converts among social psychologists to this new way of thinking were Fazio, Dovidio, Gaertner and their colleagues (Dovidio *et al.*, 1986; Fazio *et al.*, 1986; Gaertner and McLaughlin, 1983) who adapted cognitive psychology’s new tools, particularly reaction time tasks, to assess attitudes and beliefs spontaneously associated with social groups for the study of prejudice and stereotypes respectively (for more detail on the history of implicit social cognition, see Banaji, 2001; Banaji and Bazerman, 2004).³

In the first series of such studies, Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983) investigated the nature of contemporary racial stereotypes starting with the assumption that a stereotype, like any other cognitive representation, can be conceptualized as a mental association between a social group (e.g., African Americans) and a particular characteristic (e.g., athletic). One way to assess the strength of such a mental association without relying on self-reports is to measure how quickly and easily certain traits and attributes “pop into mind” when people see the name or picture of a particular group. In their research Gaertner and McLaughlin used a computerized task called semantic priming to assess how quickly people associated Black compared to White Americans with racial stereotypes that were positive or negative. In this task, a racial label (the word “Black” or “White”) was presented briefly on a computer screen and was rapidly replaced by a (positive or negative) word or a nonword. All negative words selected for this study were stereotypes associated with African Americans (e.g., lazy, welfare) whereas all positive words were stereotypes associated with White Americans (e.g., ambitious, smart). Participants’ task was simply to indicate, as quickly as possible, whether the second stimulus presented on screen was a word or nonword. Their speed of response was taken to be an indirect indicator of the degree to which they associated those stimulus characteristics with African Americans relative to White Americans. In other words, if participants thought White Americans, as a group, were smarter than African Americans, then exposure to the label “White” (compared to “Black”) ought to activate White stereotypes in their mind, which in turn ought to speed up their response to the word “smart” when it appeared on screen. If, however, participants did not think White Americans were any different from

³In this paper, I make a distinction between *prejudice* and *stereotypes*, in keeping with other researchers’ work (Ashmore and Del Boca, 1981; Fiske and Pavelchak, 1986; Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Hamilton and Troler, 1986). Prejudice is defined as a negative evaluation of a group and refers to one’s unfavorable feelings toward the group and its members (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Thurstone, 1931; Zajonc, 1980). A stereotype is defined as a belief and refers to characteristics thought to be possessed by most or all members of a particular group. Whereas a prejudicial attitude implies a negative evaluation of a group, a stereotype may involve both positive and negative beliefs.

African Americans in terms of intelligence, then exposure to the label “White” compared to “Black” ought not to facilitate responses to the word “smart.” Results revealed that the speed with which participants classified positive words (“smart,” “ambitious”) after seeing the label “White” was substantially faster than the speed with which they classified the same words after seeing “Black.”

Follow-up studies extended this research by demonstrating that participants were also faster at classifying negative words after “Black” compared to “White” primes (Dovidio *et al.*, 1986). Moreover, the degree to which they exhibited automatic racial stereotyping was unrelated to their self-reported racial attitudes measured by traditional paper-and-pencil questionnaires. This marked the beginning of a long and productive line of research leading to greater methodological and theoretical sophistication in the study of implicit attitudes and beliefs about a host of groups.

THE FIRST WAVE: IMPLICIT INGROUP FAVORITISM

Initial investigations on the nature of implicit prejudice and stereotypes focused entirely on attitudes and beliefs held by members of advantaged groups toward members of disadvantaged groups. This lopsided research attention was partly pragmatic given the unequal distribution of power and resources in the hands of individuals who belonged to advantaged groups compared to disadvantaged groups. That is, negative attitudes and beliefs held by members of advantaged groups were far more likely to have a pernicious impact on the lives of disadvantaged group members, whereas mirror image perceptions on the part of disadvantaged group members were less likely to have the same impact. The primary prediction of the early research on implicit intergroup relations was that people would favor their own group at the expense of other groups in terms of their evaluations, judgments, and behavior in intergroup situations. This prediction is consistent with social identity theory which argues that when people strongly identify with their ingroup and when their self-esteem is linked to the perceived worthiness of their ingroup, they will tend to favor their ingroup and sometimes derogate other outgroups (Abrams and Hogg, 1988, 1990; Bourhis, 1994; Bourhis *et al.*, 1997; Oakes and Turner, 1980; Rubin and Hewstone, 1998; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Turner *et al.*, 1987).

By now almost a hundred studies have documented people’s tendency to automatically associate positive characteristics with their ingroups more easily than outgroups (i.e., ingroup favoritism) as well as their tendency to associate negative characteristics with outgroups more easily than ingroups (i.e., outgroup derogation). While many of these studies have focused on automatic *attitudes* toward outgroups (particularly automatic prejudice), a significant number have also focused on automatic *beliefs* about outgroups (particularly stereotypes about those groups).

In the case of intergroup attitudes, a host of studies have found that people's implicit intergroup preferences captured by indirect attitude measures reliably predict their membership in various social groups, typically those of high status. For example, in the domain of race, White Americans, on average, show strong implicit preference for their own group and relative bias against African Americans (Dasgupta *et al.*, 2000; Dasgupta and Greenwald, 2001; Devine, 1989; Dovidio *et al.*, 1986, 1997, 2002; Fazio *et al.*, 1995; Greenwald *et al.*, 1998; Kawakami *et al.*, 1998; Lowery *et al.*, 2001; McConnell and Leibold, 2001; Nosek *et al.*, 2002a; Pratto and Shih, 2000; Richeson and Ambady, 2003; Rudman *et al.*, 2001; von Hippel *et al.*, 1997; Wittenbrink *et al.*, 1997, 2001b). Similar results have been obtained in terms of White Americans' implicit attitudes toward other ethnic minority groups such as Latinos (Ottaway *et al.*, 2001; Uhlmann *et al.*, 2002), Jews (Rudman *et al.*, 1999), Asians (Son Hing *et al.*, 2002), and non-Americans (Ashburn-Nardo *et al.*, 2001; Devos and Banaji, 2004; Rudman *et al.*, 1999). In other national contexts outside the United States, parallel findings have been obtained in terms of majority group members' attitudes toward racial/ethnic minority groups (e.g., aborigines in Australia, Locke *et al.*, 1994; Turkish immigrants in Germany, Gawronski *et al.*, 2003).

In the domain of age-related attitudes, young people, typically college students, show very strong preference for their ingroup and relative prejudice against the elderly (Dasgupta and Greenwald, 2001; Jelenec and Steffens, 2002; Mellott and Greenwald, 1999; Nosek *et al.*, 2002a; Perdue and Gurtman, 1990). In the case of attitudes toward sexual minorities, heterosexuals' implicit attitudes toward lesbians and gay men also show strong evidence of ingroup favoritism and outgroup bias (Banse *et al.*, 2001; Dasgupta, 2002; Dasgupta and Rivera, 2004; Lemm, 2001).

When it comes to gender-related attitudes, the data are a little bit different in that both men and women express implicit positive attitudes toward women in general relative to men in general; however, women's attitudes tend to reveal more pro-female sentiments than men's attitudes (Carpenter, 2001; Richeson and Ambady, 2001; Skowronski and Lawrence, 2001). Finally, illustrating the extreme case, even when arbitrary in- and outgroups are created in the laboratory, people quickly develop attachments to their own group, and exhibit automatic preference for the ingroup and relative bias against the outgroup within a very short period of time (Ashburn-Nardo *et al.*, 2001; DeSteno *et al.*, 2004; Perdue *et al.*, 1990; cf. Brewer, 1979; Brewer and Brown, 1998).

Although the preponderance of evidence in the domain of implicit ingroup favoritism and outgroup bias has focused on pure evaluations, there is also plenty of evidence for the pervasiveness of stereotypic beliefs about outgroups especially when those outgroups are racial minorities (Correll *et al.*, 2002; Devine, 1989; Devos and Banaji, 2004; Kawakami and Dovidio, 2001; Payne, 2001; Sekaquaptewa *et al.*, 2003; Wittenbrink *et al.*, 1997, 2001b), the elderly (Bargh

et al., 1996; Chasteen *et al.*, 2002; Dijksterhuis *et al.*, 2000; Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2000; Kawakami *et al.*, 2002), and women (Banaji *et al.*, 1993; Banaji and Greenwald, 1995; Banaji and Hardin, 1996; Blair *et al.*, 2001; Blair and Banaji, 1996; Dasgupta and Asgari, in press; Kawakami and Dovidio, 2001; Moskowitz *et al.*, 1999; Nosek *et al.*, 2002a,b; Rudman *et al.*, 2001; Rudman and Glick, 2001).

Although the single-minded focus on implicit prejudice and stereotypes harbored by members of advantaged groups has been enormously productive in revealing the existence of subtle and nonconscious bias despite the scarcity of willingly expressed bias, the story is clearly not complete without considering how members of disadvantaged groups perceive their own group relative to the advantaged majority. A close inspection of the research reviewed above already contains hints that individuals belonging to disadvantaged groups do not always implicitly favor their ingroup in a mirror image fashion.

THE FIRST WAVE (REVISED): IMPLICIT OUTGROUP FAVORITISM

Social identity theory and most other theories on intergroup relations in social psychology (e.g., self-categorization theory, Turner *et al.*, 1987; social dominance theory, Sidanius and Pratto, 1999; realistic conflict theory, Sherif, 1967, etc.) posit that people have a strong tendency to favor their ingroup in terms of their attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. While this is often true, people also have other reactions to in- and outgroups particularly in the context of power and status differences between groups. For example, system justification theory argues that people's intergroup attitudes and behavior may sometimes reflect the tendency to legitimize existing social hierarchies even at the expense of personal and group interest (Jost *et al.*, in press; Jost and Banaji, 1994). In other words, in the case of individuals who belong to advantaged or dominant groups, their tendency to implicitly favor their ingroup relative to competing outgroups may be as much a function of the desire to preserve current social hierarchies (system justifying motive) as it is the desire to protect their self-esteem (ego-justifying motive). In the case of individuals who belong to disadvantaged or subordinate groups, the two motivations work in opposition—the desire to protect self-esteem should lead to ingroup favoritism and outgroup bias, but the desire to maintain current social arrangements leads to predictions of outgroup favoritism. Put differently, there may be two independent sources of implicit attitudes. The first source, consistent with social identity theory, relies on group membership. To the extent that people's group membership is a meaningful source of self-beliefs and self-esteem, it should promote implicit preference for the ingroup relative to outgroups. The second source, consistent with system justification theory, is the mainstream culture's imposition of high or low value on particular groups. Thus, for members of disadvantaged social groups, implicit liking for the ingroup may sometimes be attenuated by the cultural construal of their group, whereas for members of advantaged groups, implicit liking

for the ingroup may sometimes be exacerbated by the cultural construal of their group.

Consistent with system justification theory, a number of studies reveal outgroup favoritism (or sometimes, less ingroup favoritism) in the case of disadvantaged groups, especially when people's attitudes and beliefs are assessed using indirect measures rather than self-report measures. In the case of gender, for example, although women show strong preference for women in general compared to men in general, their attitudes are quite different when attention is drawn to people in leadership roles—women are as likely as men to implicitly favor male leaders over female leaders (Rudman and Kilianski, 2000; but see Carpenter, 2001). Likewise, women are as likely as men to express automatic gender stereotypes (i.e., both sexes spontaneously associate women with communal traits like “sensitive” and men with agentic traits like “ambitious”; Banaji *et al.*, 1993; Blair *et al.*, 2001; Blair and Banaji, 1996).

Implicit outgroup favoritism is also evident in the domain of racial attitudes and beliefs. Livingston (2002) assessed the extent to which African Americans believe that the mainstream American culture regards their ingroup negatively and examined the extent to which such beliefs correlated with Black participants' implicit and explicit racial attitudes. He found that the more negativity African Americans perceived in the mainstream culture's construal of their ingroup, the *less* ingroup favoritism they exhibited at an implicit level, but the *more* ingroup favoritism they reported at an explicit level. Taking a different approach, Nosek *et al.* (2002a) measured a large sample of White and Black participants' implicit and explicit racial attitudes via the Internet (N s > 17,000). They found that whereas White Americans exhibited strong implicit ingroup favoritism, African Americans exhibited no ingroup favoritism on average, but rather showed much more variability in their implicit interracial attitudes compared to White Americans. However, in terms of explicit attitudes, African Americans as a group expressed stronger ingroup favoritism than did White Americans (see also Jost *et al.*, in press, for more relevant data from this source). Similar findings were obtained by Spicer (2000) and Ashburn-Nardo *et al.* (2003); in fact in some of their studies African Americans favored White Americans over their ingroup implicitly but not explicitly. Finally, with regard to implicit racial stereotypes, Correll *et al.* (2002) demonstrated that African American and White American participants were equally likely to harbor implicit stereotypes associating Black with criminality which were revealed in their tendency to respond faster when “shooting at” Black compared to White armed fictitious characters in a video game simulating a police chase.

Even when group distinctions are based on ethnicity or, even more simply, skin color, people implicitly prefer lighter-complexioned outgroups over darker-complexioned ingroups. Moreover, they also prefer lighter-complexioned ingroup members over darker-complexioned ingroup members. Specifically, Uhlmann *et al.* (2002) assessed Hispanic American and Chilean participants' implicit

attitudes towards Latinos (their ethnic ingroup) versus Anglos (their outgroup) and found that at an implicit level, Chileans strongly preferred Anglos over Latinos whereas Hispanic Americans did not favor either group on average. More interestingly, participants' implicit attitudes revealed further fractures along color lines. Both Hispanic Americans and Chileans expressed strong preference for lighter-complexioned Hispanics (called "Blanco" in Spanish) over darker-complexioned Hispanics (called "Moreno" in Spanish). Implicit preference for Blancos was evident both among self-identified Moreno as well as Blanco participants in both countries, suggesting that preference for light skin apparently supersedes national boundaries and reverses the ubiquitous ingroup favoritism effect usually obtained in intergroup research.

Implicit attitudes about age constitute yet another domain in which a disadvantaged social group is known to show outgroup favoritism: older adults implicitly favor young people and show relative bias against the elderly to the same extent as young adults (Levy and Banaji, 2002; Mellott and Greenwald, 1999; Nosek *et al.*, 2002a). Whereas explicit attitudes vary as a function of participants' own age, implicit attitudes do not. Moreover, older people are as likely as young people to express implicit stereotypes about the elderly (Chasteen *et al.*, 2002).

Similar findings have also been obtained for other types of groups that are based on transient group memberships (e.g. college affiliation), rather than stable ones (e.g., race, gender, etc.). For example, Jost *et al.* (2002) found that students at San Jose State University were more likely to implicitly favor a higher status university (e.g., Stanford) than their own, and more likely to implicitly stereotype their ingroup as insufficiently intellectual compared to the outgroup. To the extent that similar hierarchies often exist within the same university among residential colleges on campus (i.e., dormitories), a similar pattern of in- and outgroup favoritism may also be evident there. As predicted, Yale undergraduates who belonged to lower status residential colleges within Yale College implicitly (but not explicitly) favored higher status residential colleges to their own (Lane *et al.*, 2003).

The degree of outgroup favoritism manifested by individuals who belong to disadvantaged groups appears to be moderated by a few interrelated variables: (a) the degree of status difference between perceivers' ingroup and the comparison outgroup (Rudman *et al.*, 2002), (b) group members' perception of the mainstream culture's opinion of their group (Livingston, 2002), and (c) the degree to which group members endorse politically conservative beliefs which is arguably a form of system justification (Jost *et al.*, in press). Larger differences in intergroup status (e.g., rich vs. poor as opposed to Christians vs. Jews), more conservative political beliefs, and more negativity perceived to be directed at one's ingroup, all produce stronger nonconscious preference for outgroups on the part of individuals belonging to lower status groups.

To the extent that implicit attitudes and beliefs function like any other (explicit) attitudes and beliefs, they are unlikely to remain confined to the mind, but rather should diffuse into people's judgments, decisions, and behavior in ways that

maintain social inequities and hierarchies and sometimes even exacerbate them. The idea that implicit prejudice and stereotypes have the potential to shape behavior has propelled research in a new direction that focuses on testing the link between such attitudes and various types of behavior, judgments, and decisions.

THE SECOND WAVE: FROM IMPLICIT ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS ABOUT OUTGROUPS TO BEHAVIOR

A new wave of research was marked by the 1995 publication of an article by Fazio and colleagues in which they reported a study demonstrating research participants' implicit racial attitudes, as measured by an evaluative priming task, predicted their friendliness toward a Black experimenter as judged by the experimenter herself. Specifically, the more implicit race bias participants exhibited during a reaction time task, the less friendly was their nonverbal and verbal behavior in the eyes of a Black experimenter who was unaware of their attitudes. Implicitly prejudiced participants smiled less, made less eye contact, and were less friendly toward the experimenter. Implicit prejudice also correlated with participants' opinions about a particular racially divisive incident in recent American history—i.e., the degree to which they attributed responsibility for the 1990 Los Angeles riots after the Rodney King trial to the local African American community. However, participants' conscious or explicit racial attitudes did not correlate with their nonverbal behavior or attributions of responsibility—a finding consistent with Fazio *et al.*'s theoretical framework which argues that people's motivation and opportunity to respond carefully determine whether their attitudes and behaviors will be driven by automatic or controlled mental processes (Fazio, 1990).

A number of related publications followed on the heels of the first report. These studies, 36 in all, are listed in Table I.⁴ Some of them directly replicated and extended Fazio and colleagues' initial finding in several ways (Dovidio *et al.*, 1997, Experiment 3; Dovidio *et al.*, 2002; Fazio and Hilden, 2001; McConnell and Leibold, 2001; Rudman and Lee, 2003, Experiment 2; Sekaquaptewa *et al.*, 2003, Experiments 1 and 2). First, they illustrated the generalizability of the phenomenon by confirming that implicit prejudice and stereotypes assessed by a variety of measures influence different types of behaviors, judgments, and decisions.⁵ For example, the more implicit prejudice participants harbored against

⁴For the sake of clarity, in the text and table I only discuss studies in which the measurement or manipulation of implicit attitudes ensured that participants were either (a) *unaware* of the construct being measured or manipulated, or (b) *unable to control their responses* even if they became aware. Thus, studies that manipulated stereotype activation using tasks such as sentence unscrambling or prolonged exposure to a person from a particular target group are not included here given the possibility that participants may have become aware of the stereotype being activated in the study.

⁵These studies used subliminal lexical decision tasks (LDT), Implicit Association Tests (IAT), evaluative priming, and tasks measuring Stereotypic Explanatory Bias (SEB) to measure implicit racial attitudes.

Table I. A List of Studies on the Relation between Implicit Intergroup Attitudes/Beliefs and Behavior

Study	Attitude/belief measure	Behavior/outcome measure	Moderators of attitude behavior relation
<i>Link between implicit attitudes/beliefs about outgroups and behavior</i>			
Devine (1989, Exp 2)	Subliminal priming (race stereotypes)	(1) Judgments of a race-unspecified person whose behavior is ambiguous	None
Fazio <i>et al.</i> (1995, Exp 1)	Supraliminal evaluative priming (race attitudes)	(1) Nonverbal behavior toward a Black confederate as rated by the confederate (smiling eye contact, spatial distance) (2) Attributions of responsibility for L.A. riots after Rodney King trial	None
Bargh <i>et al.</i> (1996, Exp 3)	Subliminal LDT (Black or White faces)	(1) Hostile behavior rated by experimenter, observer	None
Chen and Bargh (1997)	Subliminal LDT (Black or White faces)	(1) Hostile behavior toward interaction partners (2) Partners' hostile response	None
Dovidio <i>et al.</i> (1997, Exp 3)	Subliminal LDT (race attitudes)	(1) Visual gaze and eye blinking during interaction with Black compared to White confederates	None
Bessenoff and Sherman (2000)	Subliminal LDT (antifat attitudes)	(1) Seating distance away from an overweight interaction partner	None
McConnell and Leibold (2001)	IAT (race attitudes)	(1) Nonverbal behavior toward Black compared to White confederates as rated by confederates and third party observers (smiling, speaking time, speech errors, hesitations, social comments, molar/gestalt impression)	None
Fazio and Hilden (2001)	Supraliminal evaluative priming (race attitudes)	(1) Guilt and agitation after forming an invalid stereotypic impression of a Black male target in an advertisement	MCPR (implicit attitude to behavior was not moderated by MCPR)
Rudman and Glick (2001)	IAT (gender stereotypes)	(1) Evaluations of agentic female and male job candidates	None
Dovidio <i>et al.</i> (2002)	Subliminal LDT (race attitudes)	(1) Nonverbal friendliness toward Black vs. White confederates; rated by confederates and observers	None
Gawronski <i>et al.</i> (2003, Exp 1)	IAT (gender stereotypes)	(1) Use of individuating information in forming impressions of female and male target persons	None
Gawronski <i>et al.</i> (2003, Exp 2)	IAT (gender stereotypes)	(1) Recall of stereotypic vs. counterstereotypic individuating information about female vs. male target	None

Table I. Continued

Study	Attitude/belief measure	Behavior/outcome measure	Moderators of attitude behavior relation
Sekaquaptewa <i>et al.</i> (2003, Exp 1)	SEB (race attitudes)	(1) Number of stereotypical interview questions asked of Black vs. White job candidates	None
Sekaquaptewa <i>et al.</i> (2003, Exp 2)	SEB (race attitudes)	(1) Nonverbal behavior toward Black confederate (friendliness, eye contact, initiation of conversation, body posture)	None
Rudman and Lee (2003, Exp 2)	IAT (race stereotypes)	(1) Impression of Black or White target in terms of hostility and sexism	Exposure to violent and nonviolent pop music (implicit attitude to judgment relation was not moderated by music exposure)
Gawronski <i>et al.</i> (in press)	IAT (ethnic attitudes)	(1) Negative evaluation of Turkish compared to German target person's present behavior (2) Dispositional attributions about Turkish vs. German target	MCPR (implicit attitude to judgment relation was not moderated by MCPR)
Jackson (1997)	Supraliminal evaluative priming	(1) Evaluation of a Black student's essay quality	None
Lemm (2001, Exp 1)	IAT (attitudes toward gay men)	(1) Nonverbal behavior toward gay compared to heterosexual male confederate (comfort, eye gaze)	Internal and external motivation to control prejudice (attitude to behavior relation was not moderated by EMS, IMS)
Dasgupta (2002)	IAT (attitudes toward lesbians)	(1) nonverbal behavior toward lesbian compared to heterosexual confederate (smiling, eye gaze, openness friendly, comfort, interest)	None
<i>Link between implicit attitudes/beliefs about outgroups and behavior is moderated by other variables</i>			
Dunton and Fazio (1997)	Supraliminal evaluative priming (race attitudes)	(1) Impression of a typical Black male undergraduate student	(1) MCPR (implicit attitude to behavior relation was significantly moderated by restraint but not concern subscale)
Lepore and Brown (1997, Exp 2)	Subliminal priming (race categories)	(1) Judgments of a race-unspecified person whose behavior is ambiguous	(1) Level of explicit racial prejudice
Dijksterhuis <i>et al.</i> (2000, Exp 1)	Subliminal LDT (elderly or neutral primes)	(1) Word recall	Amount of prior contact with the elderly (significant moderation)
Dijksterhuis <i>et al.</i> (2000, Exp 2)	Subliminal LDT (elderly or neutral primes)	(1) Word recall	Amount of prior contact with the elderly (significant moderation)

Table I. Continued

Study	Attitude/belief measure	Behavior/outcome measure	Moderators of attitude behavior relation
Towles-Schwen and Fazio (2003)	Supraliminal evaluative priming (race attitudes)	(1) Anticipated comfort and willingness to enter into hypothetical interracial interactions	(1) MCPR both subscales (significant moderation) (2) Type of situation: varying in intimacy, scriptedness (significant moderation)
Olson and Fazio (in press)	Supraliminal evaluative priming (race attitudes)	(1) Impressions of Black and White target people in different professions	MCPR (implicit attitude to behavior relation was significantly moderated by restraint but not concern subscale)
Carpenter (2001, Exp 1)	IAT (attitude toward female vs. male political leaders)	(1) Voting preference for the female or male politician	Participant sex (significant moderation)
Dasgupta and Rivera (2004, Exp 1)	IAT (attitudes toward gay men)	(1) Nonverbal behavior toward gay vs. heterosexual man (smiling, gaze, openness, friendliness, comfort, interest)	Participant sex (significant moderation)
Dasgupta and Rivera (2004, Exp 2)	IAT (attitudes toward gay men)	(1) Nonverbal behavior toward gay vs. heterosexual target (smiling, eye gaze, openness, friendliness, comfort, interest, speech errors, length of conversation)	Participant sex, MCPR, traditional beliefs about gender and own sexuality (significant)
<i>Link between implicit attitudes/beliefs about ingroups and behavior</i>			
Levy (1996, Exp 1)	Subliminal priming (negative or positive age stereotypes)	(1) Five recall measures	None
Hausdorff <i>et al.</i> (1999)	Subliminal priming (negative or positive age stereotypes)	(1) Walking speed (2) Swing time during walking	None
Levy (2000)	Subliminal priming (negative or positive age stereotypes)	(1) Quality of handwriting (2) Judgments of personality based on handwriting (3) Judgments of age based on handwriting	None
Levy <i>et al.</i> (2001)	Subliminal priming (negative or positive age stereotypes)	(1) Blood pressure (2) Heart rate (3) Skin conductance (4) Performance on math test (5) Math self-efficacy	None
Levy <i>et al.</i> (2001)	Subliminal priming (negative or positive age stereotypes)	(1) Decisions about own medical treatment given various illness scenarios	None
Ashburn-Nardo <i>et al.</i> (2003)	IAT (race attitudes)	(1) Black partners' likelihood of selecting White partner over Black partner for intellectually challenging joint task	Motivation to win (no moderation)

Table I. Continued

Study	Attitude/belief measure	Behavior/outcome measure	Moderators of attitude behavior relation
Rudman and Heppen (2003)	IAT-assessed romantic fantasies about men	Women's interest in: (1) Higher education (2) Occupations that confer status or wealth (3) Volunteering for a leadership role	Being in a relationship (no moderation)
Spicer (2000)	IAT	(1) Stereotype activation during difficult test (2) Anxiety (3) Self-handicapping (4) Test performance	Attitudes measured before or after the test

Note. All studies are listed in chronological order according to their date of publication. Unpublished studies, marked with asterisks, are listed at the end of each relevant section.

African Americans, the more uncomfortable and anxious they appeared in terms of their nonverbal behavior during interracial interactions (e.g., more speech errors, shorter conversations, etc.) as rated both by Black interaction partners and by third party observers. Implicit race bias also predicted participants' behavior in employment situations, specifically the frequency with which they chose to ask racially stereotypic interview questions to Black compared to White job candidates during simulated job interviews (Sekaquaptewa *et al.*, 2003, Experiment 1; cf. Rudman and Borgida, 1995). Moreover, implicit bias influenced the degree to which participants formed stereotypic impressions of a Black or White male target person whose behavior was ambiguous (Rudman and Lee, 2003, Experiment 2). Similarly, such race bias predicted the degree to which participants felt guilty after realizing that their first impression of a Black man featured in a particular advertisement was wrong (i.e., most participants misperceived him to be a criminal rather than a police officer). The more implicit race bias participants harbored, the less guilty they felt after discovering the falsity of their inference (Fazio and Hilden, 2001).

Second, extending Fazio *et al.*'s (1995) research, in all the above-mentioned studies that measured nonverbal behavior, participants interacted with both Black and White confederates, which allowed researchers to determine whether participants' interaction styles differed as a function of the confederates' race. Third, one of these studies (Dovidio *et al.*, 2002) vividly illustrated why interracial interactions sometimes go awry with individuals coming away with very different impressions about the quality of their interactions with each other. Dovidio and colleagues found that when Black and White individuals interacted with each other, their opinions about interaction quality were based on very different types of information—Black individuals were more influenced by the subtle cues being communicated by White partners (i.e., White partners' implicit racial attitudes and nonverbal

behavior) whereas White individuals were more influenced by the overt cues they were communicating (i.e., their explicit racial attitudes and their verbal behavior).

Three other studies extended this line of research beyond a Black–White comparison, to other stigmatized social groups, namely lesbians and gay men (Dasgupta, 2002; Lemm, 2001), overweight people (Bessenoff and Sherman, 2000), and Turkish immigrants in Germany (Gawronski *et al.*, 2003). Dasgupta (2002), found that stronger implicit negativity against lesbians relative to heterosexuals predicted a host of social distancing behaviors when participants interacted alone with a woman who was allegedly gay compared to one who was allegedly heterosexual. These nonverbals included less smiling, less eye contact, more tense body posture, less overall friendliness, and less interest in a conversation with a lesbian interaction partner compared to a heterosexual one. Lemm (2001) obtained a similar finding with regard to people's implicit attitudes and behavior toward gay men. Along similar lines, Bessenoff and Sherman (2000) found that the more implicit antifat bias people evinced, the further away they chose to sit from an interaction partner they were yet to meet, but who they thought was overweight. Using a different type of dependent measure, Gawronski and colleagues tested whether White Germans' implicit attitudes toward Turks influenced their evaluations of a Turkish individual compared to a German individual behaving in an identical fashion. They found that implicit prejudice toward Turks not only made people render negative evaluations of a Turkish person's current behavior, but it also led them to make more definitive dispositional attributions about that person's future actions than they did when the person was German (Gawronski *et al.*, 2003).

Just as implicit attitudes about social groups predict certain types of behaviors and judgments directed at members of those groups, so too implicit *stereotypic beliefs* also influence important judgments such as people's impressions of others (Devine, 1989, Experiment 2), decisions about who should be hired for a job (Rudman and Glick, 2001), as well as other ingredients of decision-making such as the ability to remember counterstereotypic information about individuals who belong to outgroups, and the likelihood of using such information to form impressions about them (Gawronski *et al.*, 2003). For example, Rudman and Glick (2001) found that people who held strong implicit gender stereotypes associating women with communal traits (e.g., helpful) and men with agentic traits (e.g., ambitious) were more likely to evaluate negatively an agentic (thus counterstereotypic) female job candidate for her "poor" social skills. Moreover, such stereotypic beliefs produced more positive evaluations of an equally agentic male job candidate in terms of his suitability for the job. In other studies, participants who expressed the same implicit gender stereotypes showed poor memory for counterstereotypic individuating information about women and men, and not surprisingly, were less likely to use that information in forming impressions of those individuals (Gawronski *et al.*, 2003).

Other research has taken a different approach to the relation between implicit stereotypes and behavior by arguing that the automatic activation of group

stereotypes ought to increase the likelihood that perceivers themselves will act in a stereotype consistent manner even if they do not belong to the particular target group whose stereotype had been activated (Bargh *et al.*, 1996; Chen and Bargh, 1997; cf. Bargh, 1997). On the basis of theory of ideomotor action, Bargh and colleagues have argued if perception and behavior are closely linked mental representations, the activation of a particular representation (e.g., a stereotype) should lead people to act in a way that is congruent with that representation, automatically, without the mediation of conscious thought or interpretation. Consistent with their prediction, Bargh *et al.* (1996, Experiment 3) found that White participants who were subliminally exposed to Black male faces (compared to White male faces) for a fraction of a second, responded with greater hostility and anger toward an experimenter after being told that they would have to repeat a boring task because of a computer malfunction. Here, presumably, exposure to Black faces not only activated the category “African American” but also activated the associated stereotype “hostile” and the behaviors that go along with it, leading participants to enact those behaviors within the experimental situation. Taking this argument a step further, Chen and Bargh (1997) demonstrated that the subliminal activation of stereotypes could lead to behavioral confirmation. They found that once racial stereotypes had been activated and manifested in perceivers’ hostile behavior toward a naïve interaction partner, that behavior in turn elicited a similar response from the partner, which led each person to believe that the other had provoked the hostile interaction.

In summary, the first generation of studies demonstrating a link between implicit attitudes/beliefs and behavior tells a fairly simple story that has been replicated with variations a reassuring number of times. However, further probing reveals that the story gets more complicated—new research suggests that implicit attitudes and beliefs influence behavior under some conditions but not under other conditions.

THE SECOND WAVE (REVISED): MODERATORS OF THE IMPLICIT ATTITUDE/BELIEF—BEHAVIOR LINK

Some research suggests that implicit prejudice and stereotypes do not result in discriminatory behavior in an obligatory fashion. For people who consciously endorse egalitarian attitudes, exposure to members of stigmatized groups may not automatically activate related stereotypes in their mind and produce biases in subsequent judgments (Lepore and Brown, 1997). Moreover, even when stereotypes and prejudices are automatically activated, whether or not they will bias behavior depends on how *aware* people are of the possibility of bias, how *motivated* they are to correct potential bias, and how much *control* they have over the specific behavior. Just as implicit attitudes have, in recent years, been shown to be remarkably malleable (e.g., Blair *et al.*, 2001; Dasgupta and Greenwald, 2001; Wittenbrink

et al., 2001a; for a review see Blair, 2003), so too behaviors are also quite malleable depending on the extent to which awareness, control, and motivation are at play. For example, consider studies that assess people's nonverbal behavior toward outgroup members in terms of smiling, eye contact, spatial distance, overall friendliness, and so on. Typically, people are relatively unaware of such nonverbal actions and thus do not try to control or correct them. However, this modal response masks a great deal of individual variability in people's vigilance over their own nonverbal "body language" as well as that of others. For those who are aware of such behaviors, they can control and correct them to the extent that they are motivated to do so. In the case of prejudice-related behavior, people who are motivated to behave in an unbiased fashion because of their conscious egalitarian values or contemporary social norms may be particularly vigilant in intergroup settings and particularly motivated to correct any appearance of bias (Dunton and Fazio, 1997; Plant and Devine, 1998). Similarly, in the case of other types of outcomes (e.g., first impressions), people may be able to prevent implicit prejudice or stereotypes from influencing their judgments to the extent that they are aware of the possibility of bias and possess the requisite motivation and opportunity to correct their responses.

A few studies by Fazio and his colleagues recently sought to test whether people's motivation to control prejudicial responses influences the degree to which implicit race prejudice affects judgments and emotions (Dunton and Fazio, 1997; Olson and Fazio, in press; Towles-Schwen and Fazio, 2003). Fazio and colleagues were particularly interested in two aspects of prejudice-related motivation—people's concern about acting in a prejudiced fashion, and their motivation to avoid interracial disputes, which were measured by a scale entitled Motivation to Control Prejudiced Responses (MCPR; Dunton and Fazio, 1997). All three studies showed that people's motivation to control prejudice significantly moderated the relation between their implicit racial attitudes and their judgments or anticipated emotions; however, this moderation effect was sometimes produced by people's concern about appearing prejudiced and at other times by their motivation to avoid disputes. For example, Dunton and Fazio (1997) found that among participants who were not motivated to avoid interracial disputes, greater implicit prejudice predicted less positive judgments about a typical Black male undergraduate student. However, among those who were highly motivated to avoid interracial disputes, the relation between implicit attitudes and judgment was reversed—greater implicit prejudice predicted more positive judgments of the Black male target. The authors argued that motivated participants were correcting their judgments to prevent bias, but were falling prey to overcorrection or were "bending over backwards" to compensate for potential bias (cf. Wegner and Petty, 1997). The same pattern of findings was replicated by Olson and Fazio (in press) using a different judgment measure—specifically, people's trait ratings of Black compared to White individuals in different professional positions. In both these studies, concern

about appearing prejudiced did not moderate the relation between implicit racial attitudes and judgments.

The way in which motivation to control prejudice moderates the relation between implicit racial attitudes and behavior also depends on the nature of the dependent variable. For example, Towles-Schwen and Fazio (2003) explored how comfortable participants were about anticipating interracial encounters that varied in intimacy (e.g., having a Black roommate) and scriptedness (the presence of clear behavioral norms). They found that anticipated comfort in interracial interactions decreased as the intimacy of the situation increased, especially for participants who were implicitly prejudiced compared to others who were less prejudiced. Moreover, when interracial situations were relatively unscripted (i.e., when rules of engagement were unclear leaving more room for unintended bias), implicitly prejudiced participants who wanted to avoid interracial conflict admitted feeling uncomfortable about entering such interactions if they were also not concerned about appearing biased. However, participants who were concerned about appearing biased reported feeling comfortable about entering such interactions suggesting that they were “correcting” or modifying their reports of anticipated comfort. Finally, among participants who were not motivated to avoid interracial conflict, implicit attitudes and concern about appearing biased did not predict anticipated comfort.

New research in the domain of antigay attitudes and behavior suggests that whether implicit prejudice will translate into action also depends on other related variables; specifically, the degree to which people are aware of, and vigilant about, their nonverbal behavior and the degree to which they endorse traditional beliefs about gender and sexuality (Dasgupta and Rivera, 2004). These traditional beliefs involve (a) people’s endorsement of customary gender demarcations in society in terms of the traits, roles, and behaviors deemed appropriate for men versus women, and (b) people’s investment in making their own normative heterosexuality known to others and the self. Dasgupta and Rivera (2004) found that among men who endorsed traditional beliefs about gender and sexuality and who were not vigilant about their behavior, the more implicitly antigay their attitudes were the more subtly discriminatory was their nonverbal behavior toward a gay male with whom they were interacting. However, among traditional men who *were* motivated to control bias, greater implicit prejudice resulted in more friendly behavior toward the gay man interaction partner suggesting that participants were overcorrecting their behavior or “bending over backwards.” Among nontraditional men, implicit prejudice did not translate into discriminatory action regardless of their level of behavior vigilance. Finally, in the case of women, the data suggest that their beliefs about gender and sexuality were substantially more nontraditional than those of their male counterparts, which may explain why women’s implicit prejudices did not translate into action. Together, these data suggest that during interactions with sexual minorities, people’s behavior may be guided by a blend of psychological

factors—their implicit attitudes toward gays and lesbians, their personal values about gender and sexuality, and their ability to monitor their own actions in the immediate situation.

Finally, a different type of moderation effect has been observed in some research that examined the effect of stereotype activation on self-relevant behavior even among participants who were not members of the target group. Dijksterhuis *et al.* (2000) argue that when a group stereotype has a “kernel of truth” (e.g., memory decline in older adults), people who have a great deal of contact with members of that particular outgroup (in this case, old people) and thus who have more knowledge about memory loss in old people should be more susceptible to stereotype activation than others who have little contact with the same outgroup. Moreover, strong stereotype activation should lead social perceivers to enact the stereotype nonconsciously (in keeping with the principle of ideomotor action), but weak stereotype activation should not lead to such stereotypic behavior. In two experiments, Dijksterhuis *et al.* (2000) demonstrated that among college students who had had a great deal of contact with the elderly, subliminal exposure to old primes (e.g., the words “old,” “gray,” “bingo”) resulted in worse performance on a subsequent memory test than subliminal exposure to neutral primes. No such behavioral effect was seen among participants who had had little contact with the elderly. This predicted effect is clearly dependent on assumptions about the accuracy of the elderly-forgetful stereotype. In other words, if extended contact with older adults demonstrates that the “forgetful” stereotype does not apply to all older adults, intergroup contact ought to undermine stereotype activation and its manifestation in behavior. This hypothesis is yet to be investigated.

THE THIRD WAVE? FROM IMPLICIT OUTGROUP FAVORITISM TO BEHAVIOR

Existing data suggest that members of disadvantaged groups sometimes show more individual variability in their implicit attitudes toward their ingroup than do members of advantaged groups (e.g., Nosek *et al.*, 2002a). Specifically, members of disadvantaged groups sometimes exhibit weak implicit preference for their ingroup, and at other times show preference for advantaged outgroups. These data beg the question: Do disadvantaged group members’ implicit attitudes predict their behavior in ways that impact on their ingroup and themselves? Very few studies have examined this question, but those that have, point to a new direction of research that have both intriguing and disturbing implications.

Consider the following study by Ashburn-Nardo *et al.* (2003). African American participants were led to believe that they would take part in a challenging intellectual task for which they had to choose another student as a partner (the latter was either Black or White). Task motivation was manipulated by informing some participants that the winning team would win \$100. Then, under the guise of a second unrelated study, participants’ implicit and explicit racial attitudes were

measured using an IAT and self-report questionnaires. Results revealed that Black participants showed a great deal of individual variability in their implicit racial attitudes, but on average, exhibited significant preference for Whites. More importantly, the more White preference participants exhibited, the more favorably they evaluated the White partner compared to the Black partner for the intellectually challenging task. The relation between implicit outgroup favoritism and preference for the White task partner was significant regardless of participants' task motivation and their explicit racial attitudes.

While the above-mentioned study illustrates how the implicit attitudes held by members of disadvantaged groups affect their behavior toward other ingroup members, several other recent studies extend this line of work by showing that people's implicit attitudes and beliefs about their ingroup can have direct consequences for the self. One such study by Spicer (2000) examined whether Black students' thoughts, feelings, and performance during an academic testing situation would be associated with their implicit racial attitudes. He found that Black participants who exhibited more pro-White sentiments implicitly showed more stereotype activation, anxiety, and self-handicapping immediately after the test. Surprisingly, however, more pro-White attitudes were also associated with better performance on particularly difficult parts of the test. A closer examination of this finding suggests that participants' test performance may have influenced their implicit racial attitudes rather than vice versa. Specifically, among participants whose attitudes were measured before the test, there was no relation between implicit attitudes and performance. However, among those whose attitudes were measured after the test, the better their test performance, the more implicit outgroup favoritism they evinced. Mediation analyses suggested that participants who had experienced more automatic stereotype activation during the test may have exerted more effort to disprove the stereotype resulting in better performance. However, the unintended consequence of stereotype activation may have been greater outgroup favoritism on the posttest attitude measure.

In the case of gender stereotypes, a series of studies have found a strong link between women's implicit stereotypes about idealized heterosexual relationships and their interest in personal power (Rudman and Heppen, 2003). Women who implicitly associated male romantic partners with chivalry and heroism were less likely to express interest in personal power, high-status jobs, high educational goals, leadership roles, and future income. Interestingly, women's self-reported beliefs about romance were not linked to any of these indicators of professional power. These findings suggest that when members of disadvantaged groups non-consciously absorb system justifying gender stereotypes circulating in the mainstream culture, their goals about their own professional future become limited by the status quo.

Implicit ageist stereotypes have also been found to elicit disturbing self-stereotypic behaviors in older adults. In the first study of its kind, Levy (1996) demonstrated that older adults who were subliminally exposed to negative

age-related stereotypes (e.g., words such as “alzheimer’s” and “dementia”), showed a substantial decline in memory performance on a subsequent task, whereas older adults who were subliminally exposed to positive age stereotypes (e.g., “wise” and “learned”) showed a substantial increase in memory performance on a subsequent task. More recently, Levy and colleagues have extended this line of research in several ways. First, they found that implicit stereotype activation has serious consequences for older adults’ physical health. Specifically, subliminal activation of negative aging stereotypes increased older adults’ cardiovascular stress (measured by heart rate and blood pressure) when they were faced with mathematical and verbal challenges, whereas subliminal activation of positive stereotypes decreased such cardiovascular stress (Levy *et al.*, 2000b). Moreover, participants in the same study who were primed with negative stereotypes performed significantly worse on a subsequent mathematics test and expressed less efficacious beliefs about math than their peers primed with positive stereotypes. Second, other studies have found that subliminal activation of age-related stereotypes affects how older adults function in everyday life: exposure to negative (compared to positive) age stereotypes hampered older adults’ handwriting, which became shaky and characteristic of physically debilitated people (Levy, 2000b), and hampered the speed and energy with which they walked (Hausdorff *et al.*, 1999). Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, exposure to negative age-related stereotypes influenced the medical decisions older adults made regarding their lives when given hypothetical medical scenarios. Participants primed with negative stereotypes were more likely to refuse life-prolonging medical interventions offered in the scenarios whereas their peers primed with positive age stereotypes were more likely to accept such interventions (Levy *et al.*, 2000b).

Taken together, these studies suggest that implicit biases in one’s attitudes and beliefs toward the ingroup can result in behaviors and judgments that are harmful to both the self and one’s ingroup. Yet, given the small number of studies in this area, more replications and extensions are needed to determine the stability of these findings and to test the boundary conditions of the link between implicit outgroup preference and behavior.

CONCLUSION

In the 20 years since the first studies on implicit prejudice and stereotypes were first reported, we now know a few facts with reassuring clarity. First, implicit prejudice and stereotypes are real, not methodological artifacts. Although they sometimes overlap with people’s explicitly reported attitudes and beliefs, the overlap is considerably variable (for a detailed discussion of the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes, see Rudman, 2004).

Second, members of high status or advantaged groups typically exhibit more implicit favoritism toward their ingroup and bias against salient outgroups than

do members of lower status or disadvantaged groups. The data suggest that people's implicit attitudes about ingroups relative to outgroups are influenced by two different forces—the tendency to prefer groups associated with the self as a confirmation of their positive self-esteem, and the tendency to prefer groups valued by the mainstream culture as a confirmation of the sociopolitical order in society. As a result of these opposing tendencies, members of disadvantaged social groups show more variable implicit attitudes toward their ingroup and, on average, show less ingroup favoritism, and sometimes even outgroup favoritism.

Third, it is also clear that people's implicit attitudes and beliefs toward in- and outgroups affect specific types of behaviors, some of which may operate without social actors' awareness or control; but it is also evident that implicit biases do not always result in discriminatory action in an obligatory fashion. People's awareness of potential bias, their motivation and opportunity to control it, are a few of the factors that influence whether attitudes translate into action. Other moderating variables have also been identified, and together, these constitute an emerging topic of research of both theoretical and practical importance that can elucidate the conditions under which biases in implicit social cognition will result in actions that help perpetuate social inequities.

Finally, a new line of research from the perspective of historically disadvantaged groups suggests that implicit biases exhibited by individuals toward their own groups can also have unintended behavioral consequences that are harmful to the ingroup and self. This is another emerging topic that is likely to attract a lot of research attention given its disturbing illustration that implicit bias acts like an "equal opportunity virus" that infects both advantaged and disadvantaged groups, calling into question assumptions of group-based immunity. On a more optimistic note however, given the evidence that implicit prejudice and stereotypes are malleable and that they do not always produce discriminatory action, a potentially productive program of future research might be the investigation of environmental and individual difference variables that may either prevent the cognitive activation of biased attitudes and beliefs or disable their translation into action.

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